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Introduction and Summary
This dissertation consists of four research papers, covering topics from
decision and game theory. Chapters 1 and 2 concern continuous-time games
and extensive forms. Chapter 3 presents results on the number of Nash
equilibria in a particular class of games called circulant games, while Chapter
4 covers the preference reversal phenomenon. In the following, I present a
brief overview of the four chapters summarizing the main ﬁndings.
Chapter 1, entitled “Repeated Games in Continuous Time as Extensive
Form Games”, is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University
of Cologne). Continuous-time games suﬀer from a severe conceptual issue,
namely that some strategy proﬁles induce multiple outcomes while other
proﬁles induce no outcome at all. Since preferences are deﬁned on the set
of ultimate outcomes, neither proﬁles leading to a multiplicity of outcomes
nor proﬁles that “evaporate” can be evaluated, hence making it impossible
to analyze such games for example in terms of equilibria. The literature
has proposed several ways to deal with this issue. The most common one
requires players to stick to a chosen action for some strictly positive amount
of time. Indeed, it can be shown that any proﬁle of such strategies induces
a unique outcome. This approach is, however, problematic from a game-
theoretic point of view. Fixing the extensive form of the game (i.e. decision
nodes and choices) determines the players’ strategies as these are mappings
from the set of decision nodes to the set of choices. Placing exogenous re-
strictions on the set of strategies hence implicitly changes (and in the worst
case destroys) the extensive form. Our paper presents a game-theoretically
well-founded framework for modeling repeated games in continuous time. It
further provides a clariﬁcation as to which restrictions on strategies can be
allowed in the sense that the resulting strategies can be derived from a well-
deﬁned extensive form. Work on this paper was shared among authors as
follows: Johannes Kern 50%, Carlos Alós-Ferrer 50%.
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Chapter 2 is based on the paper “Comment on ‘Trees and Extensive
Forms’ ”, which is joined work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University of Cologne)
and Klaus Ritzberger (IHS Vienna) and has been published in the Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, Vol. 146, No. 5, September 2011, pp. 2165–2168.
The paper comments on the deﬁnition of Extensive Form in Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2008) and shows that one of the properties there needs to be ad-
justed. It provides counterexamples showing that with the original version
of this property some results do not hold as stated and presents a corrected
formulation of the property as well as the corrected statement of the results.
It further provides proofs for these results under the new formulation. Work
on this paper was shared among authors as follows: Johannes Kern 331
3
%,
Carlos Alós-Ferrer 331
3
%, Klaus Ritzberger 331
3
%.
Chapter 3 entitled “Circulant Games” is joint work with Ðura-Georg
Granić (University of Cologne). Games with a cyclical structure are ubiq-
uitous in game theory and are routinely used to generate popular examples,
starting with Matching Pennies and Rock-Paper-Scissors. For these as well
as larger games, the cyclical structure can be captured by circulant payoﬀ
matrices in which each row vector is rotated by one element relative to the
preceding row vector. In our paper we study a class of two-player games in
which both players payoﬀs are given by such circulant matrices. Given that
these payoﬀs are ordered, we are able to determine the exact number of (pure
and mixed) Nash equilibria. This number only depends on the number of
strategies, the position of one of the player’s largest payoﬀ in the ﬁrst row
of his payoﬀ matrix, and whether the players’ payoﬀ matrices “cycle” in the
same or in diﬀerent directions. Our results further allow us to describe the
support of each Nash equilibrium strategy. Work on this paper was shared
among authors as follows: Johannes Kern 50%, Ðura Georg Granić 50%.
Chapter 4, “Preference Reversals: Time and Again”, is the result of joint
work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ðura-Georg Granić, and Alexander K. Wagner
(all at the University of Cologne). Experiments documenting the preference
reversal phenomenon highlight that, contrary to the invariance assumption
underlying most economic theories of choice, preferences may actually be in-
ﬂuenced by the elicitation method employed. In the most basic setup of such
2
experiments, subjects are asked to choose from pairs of lotteries containing
one lottery with a high chance of paying a moderate amount of money (P -bet)
and one lottery with a moderate chance of paying a high amount of money
($-bet). They are then asked to state prices for each of the lotteries. A prefer-
ence reversal occurs if either the $-bet receives a higher price in a pair where
the P -bet is chosen (predicted reversal) or the P -bet receives a higher price
in a pair where the $-bet is chosen (unpredicted reversal). The preference re-
versal phenomenon is characterized by a signiﬁcantly higher rate of predicted
reversals. We present a new, simple process-based model that explains the
preference reversal phenomenon and makes novel predictions about the asso-
ciated decision times in the choice phase. The phenomenon is jointly caused
by noisy lottery evaluations and an overpricing phenomenon associated with
the compatibility hypothesis. A laboratory experiment conﬁrmed the model’s
predictions for both choice data and decision times. Choices associated with
reversals take signiﬁcantly longer than non-reversals, and non-reversal choices
take longer whenever long-shot lotteries are selected. A second experiment
showed that the overpricing phenomenon can be shut down, greatly reducing
reversals, by using ranking-based, ordinally-framed evaluation tasks. This
experiment also disentangled the two determinants of the preference rever-
sal phenomenon since noisy evaluations still deliver testable predictions on
decision times even in the absence of the overpricing phenomenon. Work on
this paper was shared among authors as follows: Johannes Kern 25%, Carlos
Alós-Ferrer 25%, Ðura Georg Granić 25%, Alexander K. Wagner 25%.
References
Alós-Ferrer, C., and K. Ritzberger (2008): “Trees and Extensive
Forms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 43(1), 216–250.
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Chapter 1
Repeated Games in Continuous Time as
Extensive Form Games
1.1 Introduction
Suppose two players play a continuous-time version of the inﬁnitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, starting at time t = 0. A player is then free to choose a
strategy conditioning on arbitrary events in the past. For instance, a player
could specify the following grim-trigger strategy: cooperate as long as both
players have always cooperated in the past, otherwise defect forever. Now
suppose both players use this strategy. One is tempted to conclude that the
outcome of the strategy proﬁle is eternal cooperation. Indeed, this outcome
is compatible with the strategy proﬁle in the sense that, at every point in
time, instantaneous cooperation is prescribed by the strategy proﬁle given
the past history contained in the outcome. However, if time is continuous,
there are inﬁnitely many other outcomes which are equally compatible with
these grim-trigger strategies. Fix any arbitrary time T , and consider the
outcome where both players cooperate up to and including time T , and
defect at any later point in time. Since there is no ﬁrst point in time where
players defect, this outcome never contradicts the prescriptions of the grim-
trigger strategy proﬁle and hence is also compatible with it. We conclude
that the strategy proﬁle induces a continuum of diﬀerent outcomes. As a
consequence, even if every outcome has a well-deﬁned payoﬀ, the payoﬀ of
the considered strategy proﬁle is not well-deﬁned, and a game-theoretical
analysis becomes impossible.
Outcome multiplicity is not the only problem in continuous-time repeated
games. Consider a diﬀerent strategy proﬁle where each player starts coop-
erating and further decides to cooperate unless only cooperation has been
5
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observed in the past. What is the outcome? Obviously, eternal cooperation
cannot be the outcome. But, if a defection occurred at any strictly posi-
tive point in time, this must mean that no defection occurred before, and
hence the strategies prescribe a defection at every previous, strictly positive
point in time, a contradiction. Hence, this simple strategy proﬁle induces no
outcome at all.
These problems have been previously pointed out by Anderson (1984),
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), Stinchcombe (1992), and Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2008), among others. As shown in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger
(2008, 2013a), they are not exclusive of continuous-time settings: intuitively,
it suﬃces for the time axis to have an accumulation point towards the past to
generate such problems, as e.g. in the case of the time set {1/n}n=1,2,...
⋃
{0}.
We now have a good understanding of the underlying reasons for these prob-
lems. Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008) (see also Alós-Ferrer, Kern, and
Ritzberger, 2011) formulated out a characterization of the set of extensive
forms where every proﬁle of pure strategies generates a unique outcome (and
hence a normal-form game can be deﬁned). This characterization can be ar-
gued to describe the domain of game theory, for games outside the character-
ized set cannot be “solved” in any sense of the word. Unsurprisingly, perfect-
information continuous-time games are outside this domain; technically, they
fail a condition called “up-discreteness” in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008),
which precludes accumulation points toward the past.
This state of aﬀairs has not prevented economic theory from venturing
into the realm of continuous-time games (the literature is of course too ex-
tensive to review it here). And neither should it. On the one hand, contin-
uous time is often analytically convenient due to the possibility of employ-
ing techniques from diﬀerential calculus along the time dimension. On the
other hand, discrete time sometimes creates artiﬁcial phenomena which van-
ish away in continuous time; and it is their vanishing in the latter framework
which proves their artiﬁciality in the former. However, the problems pointed
out above create serious diﬃculties with the interpretation of continuous-
time applications. For instance, if certain strategy combinations fall out of
the framework by virtue of creating outcome existence or uniqueness prob-
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lems, the meaning of any equilibrium concept becomes questionable, since
some deviations might be excluded for merely technical reasons, and not the
self-interest of the deviator. Further, if a proper extensive form game can-
not be speciﬁed for a continuous-time model, notions of “time consistency”
cannot rely on subgame perfection or other equilibrium reﬁnements based on
backward induction, since in the absence of a properly formulated extensive
form, it is not possible to determine the full collection of subgames capturing
the strategic, intertemporal structure of the problem.
One typical approach for developing a coherent framework in continuous
time is to admit an exogenous restriction on the set of pure strategies and de-
clare some of those inadmissible. In the case of diﬀerential games (Friedman,
1994), this approach often leads to the speciﬁcation of a normal-form game,
where strategies are required to be e.g. diﬀerentiable or integrable functions
of some state variable. In other domains, the analysis has been restricted
to strategies incorporating some Markov structure, as e.g. in the case of the
literature on (individual) strategic experimentation (e.g. Keller and Rady,
1999; Keller, Rady, and Cripps, 2005). The approach was most eﬀectively
described by Stinchcombe (1992), who set out to identify a maximal set of
strategies for a continuous-time game such that every strategy proﬁle induces
a unique outcome. The result incorporates elements of a framework intro-
duced by Anderson (1984) and also studied by Bergin and MacLeod (1993)
and Bergin (1992, 2006), and rests on the condition that a strategy must
always identify the player’s next move.
Stinchcombe (1992) identiﬁes the best that can be done through strategy
constraints once one accepts the inconvenient fact that unconstrained con-
tinuous time games cannot be solved. From a game-theoretic point of view,
however, restricting the strategy set is an unsatisfactory approach. On the
one hand, since certain strategies are excluded on purely technical grounds,
we face the problems with the interpretation of equilibria and time consis-
tency pointed out above. On the other hand, there is a more fundamental,
conceptual problem. An extensive form game incorporates a complete de-
scription of the possible choices of every player at every decision node. A
behavioral strategy is merely a collection of possible “local” decisions at the
7
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nodes, and any possible combination thereof is a feasible behavioral strategy.
Once the game is speciﬁed, there can be no further freedom in the speciﬁca-
tion of the possible local decisions, since those have already been ﬁxed in the
extensive form. The set of possible behavioral strategies is thus automatically
speciﬁed once the extensive form is given.
A restriction prohibiting a given combination of local decisions in order
to preserve some property of the outcome, no matter how desirable, lacks
any decision-theoretic justiﬁcation. Worse, it is then unclear whether the
extensive form structure survives the restriction, raising doubts as to whether
the resulting formal object is simply a (constrained) normal-form game.
Here we propose a diﬀerent approach to the study of continuous-time
games. The basic idea is as follows. Continuous time is a convenient device;
its modelization within an extensive form game, however, needs only go so
far as it is useful for game-theoretic purposes. The formalizations analyzed
until now might have “gone too far”, in the sense that the associated extensive
forms become too large and restoring tractability requires restricting their
strategy spaces. The literature has concentrated on providing ideas and
rationales for restricting the strategy space in an ex-post way. In this paper,
we prove that continuous-time decisions can be captured by applying those
ideas to the very deﬁnition of the game. The resulting formal object can
then still be considered a well-deﬁned “continuous-time game”; it is, however,
a fully solvable extensive form game, i.e. every strategy proﬁle induces a
unique proﬁle, without any restriction on the set of behavioral strategies.
The advantage is that the framework is an extensive form game without
any caveat, and standard game-theoretic concepts and methods can then
be applied. In other words, our message is a positive one: we show that
continuous-time modeling is possible without giving up the beneﬁts and the
conceptual discipline resulting from well-deﬁned extensive form games.
In this paper, we focus on the repeated-game framework with observable
actions.1 Speciﬁcally, we show how repeated games in continuous time can
1This is the framework where the problems we mentioned above are the most severe.
Continuous-time models are also customarily used in diﬀerent frameworks, e.g. games with
imperfect monitoring (Sannikov, 2007). Intuitively, the fact that players cannot condition
on as many events as in the case of perfectly observable actions shrinks the strategy space
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be formalized incorporating natural conditions from the onset. The construc-
tion is not trivial, and in order to describe it we must carefully detail the
appropriate game tree and choice structure. Once this is in place, we show
that, by virtue of fulﬁlling the appropriate conditions, the resulting game is
well-behaved without any restrictions on the strategy sets. In order to link
our construction to the literature, we then show that it is possible to retrace
our steps and prove an equivalence result between the unrestricted behav-
ioral strategies in our repeated game and a restricted class of strategies in a
more naïvely speciﬁed (and hence, in our view, problematic) continuous-time
repeated game.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 lies out the general frame-
work for repeated games in continuous time, the Action-Reaction Framework.
Section 1.3 presents our main result, showing that in our framework all strat-
egy proﬁles induce unique outcomes. Section 1.4 presents the alternative ap-
proach through restricted strategies (Conditional Response Mappings) and
Section 1.5 proves an equivalence result, which allows us to link our exten-
sive form to the previous literature in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
The construction and the main arguments are detailed in the main text but
speciﬁc proofs are relegated to the appendix.
1.2 Repeated Games in Continuous Time
1.2.1 Extensive Form Games Without Discreteness As-
sumptions
Working deﬁnitions of extensive form games frequently incorporate strong re-
strictions in the form of explicit ﬁniteness or discreteness assumptions. Since
we aim to view continuous-time repeated games as extensive form games, we
need a more general approach. We will rely on a deﬁnition of extensive form
games allowing for inﬁnite time horizon, continuous time axis, and arbitrary
action sets. This concept is the basis for a general framework developed in
and makes it easier to obtain a well-deﬁned extensive form game. See Alós-Ferrer and
Kern (2013) for a comment.
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Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2005, 2008, 2013a,b).
The deﬁnition comes in two parts. The ﬁrst is a general concept of game
tree, capturing the order and nature of decisions. The second is a deﬁnition
of extensive decision problem (given the game tree) which incorporates all
appropriate consistency conditions on the choices that players can make.
Let us start with game trees. Following Kuhn (1953), a game tree is just
an ordered set of “decision points” or nodes which can be represented as an
abstract graph. Alternatively, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) focus
on ultimate outcomes as the primitive objects and consider nodes as sets of
such outcomes, which become ﬁner as decisions are taken. A result arising in
the work quoted above is that there exists exactly one way of deﬁning game
trees such that both approaches are equivalent. As a consequence, there is
no loss of generality in assuming a game tree where nodes are taken to be
sets of ultimate outcomes, as in the following deﬁnition.
Definition 1. A (rooted) game tree T = (N,⊇) is a collection of nonempty
subsets x ∈ N (called nodes) of a given set W partially ordered by set
inclusion such that W ∈ N (W is called the root) and
(TI) “Trivial Intersection:” if x, y ∈ N with x ∩ y 6= ∅, then x ( y or y ⊆ x.
(IR) “Irreducibility:” if w,w′ ∈ W with w 6= w′, then there exist x, x′ ∈ N
such that w ∈ x \ x′ and w′ ∈ x′ \ x.
(BD) “Boundedness:” for every nonempty chain h ⊆ N there exists w ∈ W
such that w ∈ x for all x ∈ h.2
A play is a chain of nodes h ⊆ N that is maximal in N , i.e. there is no
x ∈ N \ h such that h ∪ {x} is a chain. Plays are the natural objects on
which preferences can be deﬁned in a setting where the time horizon is not
assumed to be ﬁnite. The advantage of game trees is that the underlying set
W can also be identiﬁed with the set of plays. Speciﬁcally, Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2005, Theorem 3(c)) show that an element w ∈ W can be seen
either as a possible outcome (element of some node) or as a play (maximal
2A chain is a subset of N that is completely ordered by set inclusion.
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chain of nodes), and a node x ∈ N can be identiﬁed with the set of plays
passing through it.
For a game tree (N,⊇) with set of plays/outcomes W and an arbitrary
subset a ⊆ W (not necessarily a node), deﬁne the up-set ↑a and the down-set
↓a by
↑a = {y ∈ N |y ⊇ a} and ↓a = {y ∈ N |a ⊇ y} .
The key implication of (TI) is that ↑ x is a chain for all x ∈ N , which is
contained in (can be “prolonged to”) the play ↑{w} for any w ∈ x. Further,
if h is a play, by (BD) there exists a unique outcome w ∈ W such that
∩x∈hx = {w}, or, equivalently, h =↑ {w}. This fact is the basis for the
equivalence between outcomes and plays, which essentially reduces to the
fact that, for w ∈ W and x ∈ N , w ∈ x if and only if x ∈↑ {w}. When a
distinction is called for, we write w for the outcome and ↑ {w} for the play
(chain of nodes).
We now turn to the second part of the deﬁnition. In an extensive form
game, players make decisions at nodes that are properly followed by other
nodes, called moves. Let X = {x ∈ N | ↓x \ {x} 6= ∅} be the set of all
moves.3 In ﬁnite, perfect information examples, the possible actions or op-
tions available to a player at a given move can be identiﬁed with the nodes
following that move (its immediate successors). In more general settings, we
need a more general object. The possible alternatives faced by players are
modeled through choices, which are subsets c ⊆ W satisfying a number of
consistency conditions.
Before we present those conditions, we need a notion of when a choice c
is available at a move x. For an arbitrary set of outcomes/plays a ⊆W , the
set of immediate predecessors of a is deﬁned by
P (a) = {x ∈ N |∃y ∈↓a : ↑x =↑y\ ↓a} .
Since nodes in a game tree are sets of plays, they too may, but need not,
have immediate predecessors. Since choices are also sets of plays, the set of
3All other nodes are called terminal. It follows from (IR) that a node x ∈ N is terminal
if and only if there is w ∈W such that x = {w}.
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immediate predecessors of a choice is well deﬁned, and we will say that a
choice c is available at a move x ∈ X if x ∈ P (c). This is the key element in
the following deﬁnition.
Definition 2. An extensive decision problem (EDP) with player set I is
a pair (T, C), where T = (N,⊇) is a game tree with set of plays W and
C = (Ci)i∈I is a system consisting of collections Ci (the sets of players’
choices) of nonempty unions of nodes (hence, sets of plays) for all i ∈ I such
that
(EDP.i) if P (c)∩P (c′) 6= ∅ and c 6= c′, then P (c) = P (c′) and c∩ c′ = ∅,
for all c, c′ ∈ Ci for all i ∈ I;
(EDP.ii) x ∩
[
∩i∈I(x)ci
]
6= ∅ for all (ci)i∈I(x) ∈ A (x) and for all x ∈ X;
(EDP.iii) if y, y′ ∈ N with y ∩ y′ = ∅ then there are c, c′ ∈ Ci for some
player i ∈ I such that y ⊆ c, y′ ⊆ c′, and c ∩ c′ = ∅;
(EDP.iv) if x ) y ∈ N , then there is c ∈ Ai (x) such that y ⊆ c for all
i ∈ I (x), for all x ∈ X;
where A (x) = ×i∈I(x)Ai (x), Ai (x) = {c ∈ Ci |x ∈ P (c)} are the choices
available to i ∈ I at x ∈ X, and I (x) = {i ∈ I |Ai (x) 6= ∅} is the set of
decision makers at x, which is required to be nonempty, for all x ∈ X.
An extensive form game is an extensive decision problem together with a
speciﬁcation of players’ preferences on the set of plays.
The interpretation of the conditions above is as follows (see Alós-Ferrer
and Ritzberger, 2005, Section 5 or Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2008, Section 3
for additional details). (EDP.i) stands in for information sets: if two distinct
choices c, c′ ∈ Ci are ever simultaneously available, then they are disjoint
and available at the same moves—at those in the information set P (c) =
P (c′). (EDP.ii) requires that simultaneous decisions by diﬀerent players
at a common move do select some outcome. (EDP.iii) states that for any
two disjoint nodes, there is a player who can eventually make a decision that
selects among them. Finally, (EDP.iv) states that, if a player takes a decision
at a given node, he must be able not to discard any given successor of the
node. This excludes absent-mindedness (Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997), as
in the original formulation of Kuhn (1953).
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An important point about EDPs is that they allow several players to de-
cide at the same move. This sometimes simpliﬁes both the representation of
a game and the equilibrium analysis (see Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2013a,
for examples). This will also be important for our present purposes, for in
repeated games players act simultaneously at every time point. If we adopted
the convention that each move is assigned to one player only, we would be
forced to incorporate artiﬁcial “cascading information sets” to accommodate
this characteristic.
1.2.2 Existing Approaches to Extensive Form Games in
Continuous Time
We now turn to the speciﬁc problem of modeling a repeated game in contin-
uous time explicitly as an extensive form game. A ﬁrst, direct approach to
this task is to deﬁne strategies as mappings from the set of history-time pairs
to the set of possible actions with the minimal requirement that at time t the
same action is prescribed for two histories that agree on [0, t[. Indeed, this
approach can be readily formalized as an EDP (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger,
2005, 2008).
Let W be the set of functions f : R+ → A, where A =
∏
i∈I Ai and
each Ai is some ﬁxed set of actions containing at least two elements. W
is the set of all possible outcomes in the continuous-time repeated game.
Let the set of nodes be N = {xt(f) | t ∈ R+, f ∈ W }, where xt(f) =
{g ∈ W | g(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t[} for f ∈ W and t ∈ R+. A node xt(f)
contains all functions that agree with f on [0, t[ while all possibilities of val-
ues at t and afterwards are still open. (N,⊇) can be shown to be a game
tree (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2005).
A strategy in this framework is a mapping assigning a choice of the form
cit(f, ai) = {g ∈ xt(f) | gi(t) = ai} (for some ai ∈ Ai) to every move of the
form xt(f). However, it is then possible to deﬁne strategies like the ones
described in the introduction that induce no outcome or that induce a con-
tinuum of outcomes (cf. Examples 10 and 12 of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger,
2008). Hence, this approach, while intuitive, is not suited to model repeated
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games in continuous time. In order to be able to “solve” these games, addi-
tional assumptions are needed.
A second approach is to view a continuous-time game as the limit of some
sequence of discrete-time games and then deﬁne continuous-time strategies
as limits of sequences of strategies in discrete time. This approach, however,
presents diﬃculties of its own. A particular problem, pointed out by David-
son and Harris (1981) and Fudenberg and Levine (1986), is that sequences of
discrete time strategies may not possess a limit (the “chattering problem”).
Imagine, for instance, a sequence of discretizations with period length 1/n
and discrete-time strategies prescribing to cooperate in periods k/n with k
odd and defect in other periods.
A third approach is to restrict the sets of strategies in a game, that is,
to impose the exogenous constraint that certain strategies cannot be used
for e.g. equilibrium analysis. This allows to identify strategy sets which keep
the framework tractable (e.g. guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of out-
comes), and hence avoids the problems mentioned above. This approach has
been pursued in Anderson (1984), Bergin (1992, 2006), Bergin and MacLeod
(1993), Perry and Reny (1993), and Perry and Reny (1994), among others
(see also Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for a combination of this approach
and discrete-time approximations). Stinchcombe (1992) investigates maxi-
mal strategy sets such that a unique outcome can be assigned to every admis-
sible strategy proﬁle, thereby obtaining a setting which is as good as it can
be given a potentially problematic extensive form. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, this approach presents conceptual problems because (behavioral)
strategies are collections of local decisions, and which decisions are feasible
should be solely and completely determined by the extensive form. However,
it remains an open question whether the maximal strategy set approach can
be reconciled with a pure extensive form approach. This would entail ﬁnding
a new extensive form such that the unconstrained sets of behavioral strategies
are equivalent, in a well-deﬁned sense, to the set of constrained strategies.
We will return to this question in Section 1.5.
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1.2.3 The Action-Reaction Framework
Our approach to the problem of deﬁning extensive form games in continuous
time is diﬀerent to the ones just mentioned. We will exhibit a speciﬁc exten-
sive decision problem capturing repeated decisions in continuous time, such
that, for every strategy proﬁle, one and only one associated outcome exists.
The basic construction relies on ideas present in the frameworks of Anderson
(1984), Stinchcombe (1992), and Bergin (2006). However, the approach is
diﬀerent at a basic level because strategy sets are kept unconstrained; the
diﬀerences with respect to the “direct approach”-EDP mentioned above are
built directly into the construction of the extensive decision problem.
The basic idea of the construction is as follows. At time 0 all players
choose a ﬁrst action that they will have to stick to for some positive amount
of time. This amount of time is determined by the choice of “inertia times”
during which a player is committed to her current action. After this, when-
ever a player’s inertia time has run out she can revise her previous action.
If she switches to a diﬀerent one, i.e. “makes a jump”, the players who did
not jump can react instantly and choose new actions as well. All players will
again have to stick to their new actions for some positive amount of time,
i.e. decide on new inertia times. This construction prevents players from
jumping again right after an action change and from reacting even though
no other player has jumped. The latter is crucial: a direct consequence is
that the set of decision points becomes well-ordered, hence eliminating the
problems of the direct approach.
We proceed in two steps. First we will describe the set of outcomes/plays
of the game. The construction of this set already incorporates the essence of
the Action-Reaction Framework. The second step is to appropriately deﬁne
nodes and choices and show that the resulting structure is indeed an extensive
decision problem.
The Outcome Space
Fix a ﬁnite set of players I and an arbitrary action space Ai for each player
i ∈ I. Assume that Ai is a metric space.
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We start by deﬁning the set of plays, i.e. the possible maximal chains of
decisions that might actually occur during the game. Ultimately, the history
of all decisions taken by a player i builds a function fi : R+ 7→ Ai as in
the direct approach. We will introduce additional constraints to reﬂect the
Action-Reaction Framework.
We require some preliminary notation. First, given a metric space B,
call a function g : R+ 7→ B (right-)piecewise constant if for every t ∈ R+
there exists ε > 0 such that g
∣∣
]t,t+ε[ is constant. If g is piecewise constant,
g+(t) := limτ→t+ g(τ) exists for all t ∈ R+. In this case, deﬁne
RK(g) = {t ∈ R+ | g+(t) = g(t)}
to be the set of points where g is right-constant. Second, given any function
g : R+ 7→ B, let
LC(g) =
{
t ∈]0,+∞[
∣∣∣∣ ∃ g−(t) := limτ→t− g(τ) ∧ g−(t) = g(t)
}
denote the set of points where g is left-continuous.4
The following deﬁnition spells out the ﬁrst ingredient of our framework.
Definition 3. A decision path is a tuple f = (fi)i∈I such that
(DP.i) for each i ∈ I, fi : R+ 7→ Ai is piecewise constant,
(DP.ii) for each i ∈ I, LC(fi)
⋃
RK(fi) = R+,
(DP.iii) for each t ∈ R+, if ∃ i ∈ I with t ∈ R(fi), then ∃ j ∈ I with t ∈ J(fj),
where J(fi) := RK(fi) \ LC(fi) and R(fi) := LC(fi) \ RK(fi) are the set
of jump points and reaction points of player i, respectively. The set of all
decision paths is denoted by F .
Property (DP.i) states that a player’s action revision cannot occur arbi-
trarily close to a previous action revision. A direct consequence (see Lemma
4For piecewise constant functions as deﬁned here, a function is right-continuous at t if
and only if it is right-constant at t.
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A.2 in Section 1.7) is that the set of jump points of any player is well-ordered
by the usual order on the real numbers. Property (DP.ii) requires that a
player’s action revision cannot take the form of an instantaneous change
which is then abandoned (i.e. simultaneous failure of left- and right-continui-
ty).5 Taken together, (DP.i) and (DP.ii) mean that when a player changes
action, be it due to a jump or to a reaction to somebody else’s revision, the
player is not able to change action again immediately after the change.
Property (DP.iii) is the only condition requiring consistency across play-
ers’ paths of decisions. Intuitively, jump points are those where a players’
decision path has changed discontinuously (a sudden action revision), while
t is a reaction point if the player’s strategy shifts immediately after t but
not at t, in reaction to an observed shift of another player at t: an “instant
reaction”. (DP.iii) states that a player can change action by instant reaction
only if some other player jumped at t.
The second key ingredient of the Action-Reaction Framework are inertia
times. By (DP.i), after every jump or reaction at t, there exists ε > 0 such
that the player is “committed” not to revise action again until at least t + ε
(although a better interpretation is a physical impossibility to revise too
often). We will introduce an explicit record of inertia times as part of every
play. Formally, let E be the set of all possible functions ǫ = (ǫi)i∈I with
ǫi : R+ → R+ such that ǫi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ I. The quantity ǫi(t) will play
the role of a marker, with the interpretation that ǫi(t) > 0 if and only if
player i is able to revise her action at t. In that case, ǫi(t) represents the
length of time after t for which player i cannot change action again, unless
it is as reaction to some other action change.
Deﬁne the set of decision points of player i as
DP (ǫi) := {t ∈ R+ | ǫi(t) > 0} ,
i.e. the set of times at which player i is able to take a decision. In order to
link inertia times with decision paths, we will have to spell out consistency
5In particular, (DP.ii) implies that 0 ∈ RK(fi) for all i ∈ I, i.e. f+(0) = f(0). That is
the players’ initial decisions cannot be adjusted arbitrarily close to t = 0. Note that this
implies 0 ∈ RK(fi) \ LC(fi) = J(fi) for all i ∈ I.
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conditions. A minimal such condition is that J(fi) ∪ R(fi) ⊆ DP (ǫi), i.e.
whenever a player makes a decision or reacts to another decision at time t,
an inertia time ǫi(t) > 0 is speciﬁed. However, the inclusion will typically
be strict, since a player can always decide to keep the previous action, which
still requires specifying a (new) inertia time. That is, t ∈ DP (ǫi) indicates
a decision which might not be observable as such (because no action change
ensues), while t ∈ J(fi) ∪ R(fi) implies an observable action change.
Before introducing the announced consistency conditions, again we re-
quire additional notation. Since ǫi(0) > 0, for all i ∈ I, ǫ ∈ E, and t ∈]0,+∞[
the intersection DP (ǫi)∩ [0, t[ is not empty and hence by the Supremum Ax-
iom we can deﬁne
Prev(ǫi, t) := sup(DP (ǫi) ∩ [0, t[),
which gives the last time before t that player i has taken a decision. Deﬁne
Prev(ǫi, 0) = 0 for all i ∈ I and ǫ ∈ E. For i ∈ I, ǫ ∈ E, and t ∈ DP (ǫi)
deﬁne
Next(ǫi, t) := t+ ǫi(t),
which gives the next time after t that player i can initiate an action change
if no other player jumps before. Further let
PJ(ǫi) := {t ∈ R+ | Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) = t} ∪ {t ∈ R+ | t = Prev(ǫi, t)}
be the set of potential jumps for player i, i.e. the set of times where a player
is allowed to initiate an action change according to the inertia times. Those
are of two kinds. The “natural ones” are those where the inertia time since
the last time an action change was implemented has “run out”. The second is
slightly counterintuitive, and corresponds to points which are the supremum
of the set of prior time points where action changes have been initiated, i.e.
accumulation points of prior action changes.
Last, for w = (f, ǫ) ∈ F × E and t ∈ R+ deﬁne (for notational conve-
nience) IDP (ǫ, t) := {i ∈ I | t ∈ DP (ǫi)}, IJ(f, t) := {i ∈ I | t ∈ J(fi)},
and IPJ(ǫ, t) := {i ∈ I | t ∈ PJ(ǫi)}, i.e. the sets of players having decision
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points, jumps, and potential jumps at t, respectively.
We are now ready to deﬁne the set of plays, which incorporate the con-
nection between decision paths and inertia times.
Definition 4. A play is a pair w = (f, ǫ) ∈ F ×E such that
(P.i) for each i ∈ I, J(fi) ⊆ PJ(ǫi);
(P.ii) for each i ∈ I, J(fi) ⊆
⋂
j∈I DP (ǫj);
(P.iii) for each i ∈ I, PJ(ǫi) ⊆ DP (ǫi);
(P.iv) for each i ∈ I and each t ∈ DP (ǫi) if τ ∈ DP (ǫi)∩]t,Next(ǫi, t)[ then⋃
j 6=i J(fj)∩]t, τ ] 6= ∅.
The set of all plays is denoted by W .
(P.i) states that a player can jump at t only if t was indeed a potential
jump. (P.ii) means that, whenever a player jumps, every player who does
not also jump is allowed to react, and all players have to specify inertia
times. Note that (P.ii) together with (DP.iii) implies that J(fi) ∪ R(fi) ⊆
DP (ǫi). (P.iii) requires that every potential jump be a decision point. The
interpretation of (P.iv) is as follows. If at time t a player makes a decision
with inertia time ε, then the only way he can make a decision before t+ ε is
if some other player jumped before t + ε.
The Extensive Decision Problem
We ﬁrst deﬁne the decision nodes, and hence the tree.
For every w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W and t ∈ R+, deﬁne the following sets
xt(w) = {w
′ = (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ W | w′(τ) = w(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t[} ,
xRt (w) = {w
′ = (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ xt(w) | f
′(t) = f(t)} ,
xPt (w) =
{
w′ = (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ xRt (w)
∣∣ f ′+(t) = f+(t)} .
Nodes of the form xt(w) are “potential jump nodes” at which a player
might make the decision to initiate a change of action. Hence, they will
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be part of the tree whenever t ∈
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫi) or, equivalently, whenever
IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅.
Nodes of the form xRt (w) are “reaction nodes” which model the possibility
of players to react to a change of action initiated by another player. Hence
they are part of the tree whenever t ∈
⋃
i∈I J(fi) but t /∈ J(fj) for some
j ∈ I; equivalently, whenever ∅ ( IJ(f, t) ( I.
Nodes of the form xPt (w) are “peek nodes” where both the actions at t
(individual action change initiations) and the immediate reactions to them
(the right limits of f), have already been decided, but the times ǫi(t) still
have not. Again, they are part of the tree whenever IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅.
Note that nodes are independent of the “representant play”. If w′ ∈ xt(w),
then xt(w) = xt(w
′), and analogously for reaction and peek nodes.
Potential jump, reaction, and peek nodes account for all possible decision
situations. Note that the root, i.e. the node W containing all plays, is con-
tained in N because x0(w) = W for all w ∈ W . The root is followed by peek
nodes of the form xP0 (w). The set of nodes is given by
N = {xt(w) | t ≥ 0, IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅}⋃{
xRt (w) | t > 0, ∅ ( IJ(f, t) ( I
}
(1.1)⋃{
xPt (w) | t ≥ 0, IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅
}
.
We now specify the choices, and hence the extensive decision problem
by reviewing the decisions that have to be taken at each type of node. At
potential jump nodes xt(w), players who are allowed to jump may decide
how to continue, i.e. which action to adopt. That is, for every t ≥ 0, w =
(f, ǫ) ∈ W , i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t), and ai ∈ Ai, we include the choice
ci(xt(w), ai) = {w
′ = (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ W | t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i), f
′(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t[,
f ′i(t) = ai } .
At reaction nodes xRt (w), the players who did not jump decide on their instant
reaction. That is, for every t > 0, w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W with IJ(f, t) 6= ∅,
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i ∈ I \ IJ(f, t), and ai ∈ Ai, we include the choice
ci(x
R
t (w), ai) =
{
w′ = (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ W
∣∣ f ′(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t], f ′i+(t) = ai} .
At peek nodes xPt (w), all players who either had a potential jump at t
or reacted at t decide how long they are going to stick to their action. That
is, for every t ≥ 0, w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W , i ∈ I such that i ∈ IDP (ǫ, t),6 and
εi ∈ R++, we include the choice
ci(x
P
t (w), εi) = {w
′ = (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ W | f ′(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t],
f ′+(t) = f+(t), ǫ
′
i(t) = εi} .
Hence, the set of choices of player i is given by
Ci = {ci(xt((f, ǫ)), ai) | t ≥ 0, i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t), ai ∈ Ai}⋃{
ci(x
R
t ((f, ǫ)), ai) | t > 0, i ∈ I \ IJ(f, t), IJ(f, t) 6= ∅, ai ∈ Ai
}
⋃{
ci(x
P
t ((f, ǫ)), εi) | t ≥ 0, i ∈ IDP (ǫ, t), εi ∈ R++
}
.
Let us now look at information sets. By deﬁnition an information set in
an EDP is the set of immediate predecessors of a given choice. For a choice
c = ci(xt(w), ai) ∈ Ci with w = (f, ǫ) we obtain
P (c) = {xt((f
′, ǫ′)) ∈ N | f(τ) = f ′(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t[, t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i) } .
This means that at a potential jump node xt(w) a player knows all past
actions (i.e. the decision path up to time t) but not the record of inertia times
which has led to the particular decision path (with the obvious exception that
she knows that the play is such that she is allowed to jump).
For a choice c = ci(x
R
t (w), ai) ∈ Ci with w = (f, ǫ) (which implies i /∈
IJ(f, t)) we have
P (c) =
{
xRt ((f
′, ǫ′)) ∈ N | f ′(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t] } ,
6This is equivalent to i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t) or IJ(f, t) 6= ∅ (see Lemma A.5 in the appendix).
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i.e. at a reaction node xRt (w) the player knows the decision path up to and
including time t.
Finally, for a choice c = ci(x
P
t (w), εi) ∈ Ci with w = (f, ǫ) we obtain
P (c) =
{
xPt ((f
′, ǫ′)) ∈ N | f ′(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t], f ′+(t) = f+(t),
t ∈ DP (ǫ′i) }
which means that at a peek node xPt (w) the player knows the decision path
up to and including time t, as well as what all players are “going to do next”,
i.e. the right limits at t, and that she took a decision at t (which cannot
necessarily be inferred from the decision path).
This completes the speciﬁcation of the framework. Denote T := (N,⊇)
and C := (Ci)i∈I . We call the pair (T, C) the Action-Reaction Framework.
Proposition 1. The Action-Reaction Framework (T, C) is an extensive de-
cision problem.
To deﬁne an extensive form game on the EDP capturing the Action-
Reaction Framework, all what is left is a speciﬁcation of individual prefer-
ences on plays. Plays, however, contain a full speciﬁcation of inertia times,
which are essential to capture the idea that an action initiation cannot oc-
cur arbitrarily close to a previous one (as also assumed in Bergin, 1992;
Stinchcombe, 1992; Perry and Reny, 1993) but should ultimately be payoﬀ-
irrelevant. Hence, one can deﬁne a repeated game in continuous time as
an EDP as above together with a speciﬁcation of preferences on plays which
does not depend on inertia times, e.g. if utilities on w = (f, ǫ) only depend on
the ﬁrst argument. As we will clarify below, the information sets described
above guarantee that players’ choices only depend on decision paths and not
on inertia times.
1.3 A Possibility Result
In this section we aim to show that the framework we have introduced is
well-suited to the analysis of repeated games in continuous time. For that,
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we need to establish that it is better behaved than general EDPs, since
being an EDP does not guarantee that well-speciﬁed strategy proﬁles lead to
well-speciﬁed outcomes. Fortunately, the conditions guaranteeing outcome
existence and uniqueness are already known. We now review them for the
general case and then return to our framework.
1.3.1 Strategies and Outcomes in General Extensive Form
Games
Given an extensive decision problem, let Xi := {x ∈ X|∃c ∈ Ci : x ∈ P (c)}
be the set of moves for player i, for every i ∈ I.
A pure strategy for player i ∈ I is a function si : Xi → Ci, such that
s−1i (c) = P (c) for all c ∈ si (Xi)
where si (Xi) ≡ {si (x) |x ∈ Xi}.
That is, the function si assigns to every move x ∈ Xi a choice c ∈ Ci
such that (a) choice c is available at x, i.e. si (x) = c ⇒ x ∈ P (c) or
s−1i (c) ⊆ P (c), and (b) to every move x in an information set P (c) the
same choice gets assigned, i.e. x ∈ P (c) ⇒ si (x) = c or P (c) ⊆ s
−1
i (c), for
all c ∈ Ci that are chosen somewhere, viz. c ∈ si (Xi). Let Si denote the
set of all pure strategies for player i ∈ I. A pure strategy combination is an
element s = (si)i∈I ∈ S ≡ ×i∈ISi.
We want to obtain a framework where every strategy combination induces
an outcome/play. Hence, we need to clarify the formal meaning of when a
pure strategy combination “induces” a play. Deﬁne, for every s ∈ S, the
correspondence Rs : W →W by
Rs (w) =
⋂
{si (x) |w ∈ x ∈ X, i ∈ I (x)} .
Say that strategy combination s induces the play w if w ∈ Rs(w), i.e. if it is
a ﬁxed point of Rs.
In an arbitrary EDP the correspondence Rs for a given strategy combi-
nation s ∈ S may not have a ﬁxed point at all, or have a whole continuum
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thereof. The two basic desiderata on an EDP, expressed in terms of Rs, are
as follows.
(A1) For every s ∈ S there is some w ∈ W such that w ∈ Rs (w).
(A2) If for s ∈ S there is w ∈ W such that w ∈ Rs (w), then Rs has no other
ﬁxed point and Rs (w) = {w}.
(A1) says that for every strategy combination s ∈ S there is an out-
come/play w ∈ W that is induced by s. (A2) requires that the induced
outcome is unique. (A1) and (A2) deﬁne a function φ : S → W that asso-
ciates a unique play to each pure strategy combination. (Furthermore, this
function is onto by Theorem 4 of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2008). These
two properties are, therefore, necessary and suﬃcient to deﬁne a normal form
(without payoﬀs).
The main result of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008) states that (A1)
and (A2) are essentially equivalent to two properties of the tree: “regularity”
and “up-discreteness.” Thus, these two properties represent the appropriate
restrictions on game trees for a well-founded sequential decision theory.
Definition 5. A game tree (N,⊇) is regular if ↑x \ {x} has an inﬁmum for
every x ∈ N , x 6= W . It is up-discrete if every (nonempty) chain in N has a
maximum.
In the terminology of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008), regularity means
that there are no strange nodes, or, equivalently, that every node other than
the root is either finite (meaning that it has an immediate predecessor) or
infinite, meaning that it coincides with the inﬁmum of its strict predeces-
sors. Up-discreteness is equivalent to the chains ↑x for x ∈ N being dually
well-ordered (that is, all their subsets have a maximum). This condition is
common in order theory and theoretical computer science (see Koppelberg,
1989, chp. 6). It implies that the set of immediate successors of a move is
nonempty and forms a partition of the move by ﬁnite nodes.
Intuitively, up-discreteness should exclude continuous-time examples, since
immediate successors can be seen as “the next” decision points. It turns out,
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however, that the Action-Reaction Framework fulﬁlls up-discreteness in spite
of being a model for decisions in continuous time.
1.3.2 Strategies and Outcomes in the Action-Reaction
Framework
In (T, C) the sets of moves and the sets of choices are ﬁxed. As described
above this speciﬁes the set of strategies for each player since strategies in
an EDP are mappings from the set of moves to the set of choices. Hence in
the Action-Reaction Framework there is no freedom in the speciﬁcation of
strategies and in particular players cannot be prevented from using certain
strategies. All restrictions on the players’ ways to act are already incorpo-
rated in the tree and the choice system respectively. Note that due to the
structure of the information sets the choices prescribed by strategies only
depend on decision paths and not on inertia times.
We denote the set of strategies of player i in the Action-Reaction Frame-
work by Si. Let further S := ×i∈ISi denote the set of strategy proﬁles in
(T, C).
Lemma 1. The tree of the Action-Reaction Framework is an up-discrete and
regular tree.
By Proposition 1 above and Theorem 4 in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger
(2008) any decision path in W can be reached by some proﬁle of strategies.
Using Proposition 1 above, Lemma 1, and Propositions 6(b) and 9 in Alós-
Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008) we obtain that (T, C) is an Extensive Form
(Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2008; Alós-Ferrer, Kern, and Ritzberger, 2011).
Corollary 5(b) from Alós-Ferrer, Kern, and Ritzberger (2011) then yields the
following result.
Theorem 1. Every strategy profile in the Action-Reaction Framework in-
duces one and only one outcome.
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1.4 An Alternative Approach: Strategy Con-
straints
In the previous sections, we have established that it is possible to deﬁne
extensive form games modeling continuous-time problems without the re-
course to an artiﬁcially constrained strategy set. It is, however, natural to
ask whether there is a relation between the Action-Reaction Framework and
previous approaches which employed strategy constraints. Indeed, it is pos-
sible to embody ideas similar to the ones in the Action-Reaction Framework
through strategy constraints. In this section we detail this alternative route
and show how these constraints must be imposed to preserve equivalence (in
a well-deﬁned sense to be detailed below) with the extensive form approach.
Informally, a Conditional Response Mapping is a mapping which speciﬁes,
at each time t, an action (depending only on the previous history of play)
and a response which depends on the actions being simultaneously decided by
other players. A number of additional conditions must be imposed in order
to capture the constraints which are also inherent in the Action-Reaction
Framework. Naturally, these additional conditions resemble the restrictions
imposed on strategies by e.g. Stinchcombe (1992) and Bergin (2006), among
others (see Section 1.6). The reason we refrain from using the term strategy is
that a priori it is not clear whether the set of Conditional Response Mappings
indeed corresponds to the set of strategies in a well-deﬁned extensive form.
We shall, however, see that this is the case.
Analogously to the conditions discussed for extensive forms, a coherent
framework will be obtained if every proﬁle of mappings induces an outcome
contained in the appropriate outcome set and any outcome can be reached
by some proﬁle. In order to guarantee these properties, however, it is not
suﬃcient to place restrictions on Conditional Response Mappings only. It is
necessary to also constrain the set of possible outcomes, and hence (through
the dependence on histories) the domain of these mappings. The appropriate
constraints for the set of outcomes are exactly as in the Action-Reaction
Framework: outcomes must deﬁne decision paths.
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Let F denote the set of decision paths as introduced in Deﬁnition 3. The
formal deﬁnition of Conditional Response Mappings is as follows.
Definition 6. A Conditional Response Mapping (CRM) for player i ∈ I is
a mapping σi : F × R+ → A2i , (f, t) 7→ (σ
1
i (f, t), σ
2
i (f, t)) such that for every
f ∈ F and all t ∈ R+
(CRM.i) if f(τ) = f ′(τ) for f ′ ∈ F and all τ ∈ [0, t[, then σ1i (f, t) = σ
1
i (f
′, t);7
if f(τ) = f ′(τ) for f ′ ∈ F and all τ ∈ [0, t], then σ2i (f, t) = σ
2
i (f
′, t).
(CRM.ii) if t ∈
(⋂
j∈I LC(fj)
)
∪J(fi) then σ
2
i (f, t) = fi(t) and there is εi(f, t) >
0 such that σ1i (f, τ) = fi(t) for all τ ∈]t, t + εi(f, t)[.
(CRM.iii) if t ∈ LC(fi) ∩
(⋃
k∈I J(fk)
)
then there is εi(f, t) > 0 such that
σ1i (f, τ) = fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t+ εi(f, t)[.
Denote the set of CRMs for player i by Σi and let Σ := ×i∈IΣi.
For each decision path f and time t, a CRM hence speciﬁes an action,
denoted σ1i (f, t), and an instant response σ
2
i (f, t). The ﬁrst part of condition
(CRM.i) speciﬁes that actions depend only on the past history of play, i.e.
on the values of f up to (but excluding) t. The second part of this condition
stipulates that responses depend only on the values of f up to and including
t. Equivalently, at time t each player speciﬁes an action and, for any possible
proﬁle of actions at t which is part of a decision path, also a conditional
response.
Condition (CRM.ii) captures the intuition that, as long as no player has
changed action at t (and hence the decision path is left-continuous in all
coordinates), then no player can change the current action through a condi-
tional response. That is, “no reaction without a triggering action”. Further,
players will be constrained to the current action for some small time interval.
Likewise, the same restrictions apply if a given player has changed action at t
(“jumped”), which embodies the intuition that two action changes of a given
player cannot be arbitrarily close. In particular, all players have to stick to
the action picked at time 0 for some positive amount of time.
7In particular σ1
i
(f ′, 0) = σ1
i
(f, 0) for all f ′ ∈ F .
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Condition (CRM.iii) captures a similar intuition for responses. If a player
did not initiate an action change at t, but some other player did, then the
original player was allowed to react through the stipulated conditional re-
sponse (hence no constraint is placed on the second component of the action
tuple). The condition requires that the player needs to stick to the action
speciﬁed as a response for some small time interval, as long as no other player
initiates an action change.8
The following examples illustrate that the restriction to decision paths
is necessary. In other words, CRMs are well-deﬁned mappings only on F ×
R+. The ﬁrst example shows that a CRM cannot be built by simply gluing
together arbitrary chains of decisions.
Example 1. Let I = {1} and A1 = {0, 1} and consider the function h : R+ →
A1 deﬁned by
h(τ) =

0, if τ ∈ Q,1, if τ ∈ R \Q.
By (CRM.ii), for any t ∈ Q, there should exist an ε > 0 such that σ1(h, τ) = 0
for all τ ∈]t, t+ε[. Also by (CRM.ii) for any t′ ∈ R\Q∩]t, t+ε[ there should
exist an ε′ > 0 such that σ1(h, τ) = 1 for all τ ∈]t′, t′ + ε′[, which leads to a
contradiction.
In this example, the decision maker changes action “too often”, with action
changes being arbitrarily close to each other. The next example shows that
this problem also arises with more intuitive, “continuous” mappings.
Example 2. Let I = {1} and A1 = R+. Consider the function h : R+ → A1
deﬁned by h(τ) = τ for all τ ∈ R+. By (CRM.ii) for any t ∈ R+, there should
exist an ε > 0 such that σ1(h, τ) = t for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. Also by (CRM.ii)
for any t′ ∈]t, t + ε[ there should exist an ε′ > 0 such that σ1(h, τ) = t′ > t
for all τ ∈]t′, t′ + ε′[, which leads to a contradiction.
The last two conditions in the deﬁnition of CRM implicitly incorporate
a notion of “inertia” analogous to the inertia times needed for the Action-
Reaction Framework. A ﬁrst step in order to show that the new framework
8By (DP.iii), t fulﬁlls either the hypothesis of (CRM.ii) or the hypothesis of (CRM.iii).
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is coherent is to make the relationship to inertia times explicit. This corre-
sponds to the following thought experiment. Given a decision path f and
a time instant t, imagine the path after t was changed in such a way that
nobody changed action after the reactions speciﬁed at time t, i.e. the path
was ﬁxed at f+(t). What is the ﬁrst point in time after t such that a given
CRM σi would specify a deviation from the new path? If such a ﬁrst point
in time is well deﬁned and equal to t+ ε, the quantity ε will fulﬁll the same
role as an inertia time in the Action-Reaction Framework.
Let us formally construct these inertia times for a given CRM σi ∈ Σi.
For each f ∈ F and t ∈ R+ let f t+ be given by f t+(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ≤ t and
f t+(τ) = f+(t) for all τ > t. We call ε > 0 a deviation point prescribed by σi
after (f, t) if σ1i (f
t+, t+ε) 6= fi+(t). That is, for a deviation point ε, the action
prescribed by σi at time t + ε is diﬀerent from the action/reaction chosen
by player i at time t, given that all players stick to their actions/reactions
chosen at time t. The following lemma shows that whenever such a deviation
point exists, there is a first deviation point, which then plays the role of an
inertia time.
Lemma 2. Let f ∈ F , t ∈ R+, i ∈ I, σi ∈ Σi, and let Eσi(f, t) be the set of
all deviation points prescribed by σi after (f, t). If E
σi(f, t) 6= ∅ then there
exists a first deviation point εσi(f, t) = minEσi(f, t).
This property is a consequence of condition (CRM.ii). It should be
remarked that the existence of a ﬁrst deviation point corresponds to the
“Identiﬁability” assumption for admissible strategies imposed by Stinchcombe
(1992). The diﬀerence is that in Stinchcombe (1992), this property is imposed
as one of the conditions restricting the strategy set, while in our framework,
it is a property derived from the deﬁnition of CRM.
The existence of ﬁrst deviation points as identiﬁed in Lemma 2 is crucial
for the framework at hand. It has two important consequences. First, it plays
a major role in the proof of outcome existence and uniqueness below. Second,
and as already announced, the εσi(f, t) essentially reconstruct inertia times
and will allow us to establish the equivalence between the Action-Reaction
Framework and the framework based on CRMs.
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The next result shows that this framework is coherent, that is, every
proﬁle of CRMs induces a unique outcome (after every history) and any
outcome in F can be reached by some proﬁle of CRMs.
Definition 7. Let σ ∈ Σ.
(i) f ∈ F is induced by σ if σ1i (f, t) = fi(t) and σ
2
i (f, t) = fi+(t) for all
i ∈ I and all t ∈ R+.
(ii) Given f ∈ F and t ∈ R++, f ∈ F is induced by σ after (f, t) if
f(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[, σ1i (f, τ) = f(τ) and σ
2
i (f, τ) = fi+(τ) for
all τ ∈ [t,+∞[ and i ∈ I.
Proposition 2. (i) Every σ ∈ Σ induces a unique f ∈ F .
(ii) For all f ∈ F and t ∈ R++ every σ ∈ Σ induces a unique f ∈ F after
(f, t).
(iii) Every f ∈ F is induced by some σ ∈ Σ.
Properties (i) and (ii) in the last Proposition are comparable to Theorem
IV.1 in Stinchcombe (1992), Theorem 3 in Bergin (1992), Lemma A.1 in Perry
and Reny (1993), Theorem 2 in Bergin and MacLeod (1993), and Theorem
1 in Bergin (2006). All these results state that, under the constraints of the
respective framework, every proﬁle of strategies induces a unique outcome
after any history. Property (iii) additionally states that any outcome can
be reached by some proﬁle of strategies, a result similar to Theorem IV.2 in
Stinchcombe (1992).
The intuition behind the proof of the last result is as follows. Given
a proﬁle of CRMs, initial actions are clear. The inertia times identiﬁed
in Lemma 2 then allow us to identify the (constant) path up to the next
deviation point. At that point, the CRMs can be used to establish the
new actions/reactions. Applying Lemma 2, the construction can be iterated.
Since time is continuous, the exact iterative argument relies on transﬁnite
recursion, which is made possible by the structure of decision paths.
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1.5 An Equivalence Result
Proposition 2 shows that the framework based on CRMs is coherent, in the
sense that every proﬁle of CRMs induces one and only one outcome. Coher-
ence of the framework, however, is just a necessary prerequisite for exten-
sive form analysis. In this section, we show that CRMs indeed allow for a
full-ﬂedged extensive form formulation. In particular, they are shown to be
equivalent to the Action-Reaction Framework. Hence, CRMs represent the
“translation” into constrained strategy sets of a proper extensive form game
modeling continuous-time decisions.
1.5.1 Outcome-Equivalence and Equivalence Classes
We need some additional notation. For f ∈ F and t ∈ R++ let t(f, t) :=
sup
⋃
i∈I
J(fi)∩[0, t[ and further let t(f, 0) = 0. Note that
⋃
i∈I J(fi)∩[0, t[ 6= ∅
for t ∈ R++ as 0 ∈ J(fi) for all i ∈ I. The time point t(f, t) is essentially the
last time strictly before t that some player jumped. In particular (by Lemma
C.1 in the appendix), if t(f, t) < t then f is constant on ]t(f, t), t[. Note,
however, that t′ = t(f, t) might be an accumulation point of jumps. In this
case, necessarily t(f, t′) = t′. Let J (f) :=
⋃
i∈I J(fi) ∪ {t ∈ R+|t = t(f, t)}.
Note that t(f, t) ∈ J (f) for all t ∈ R+.
In order to show the equivalence between the Action-Reaction Framework
and the approach based on CRMs, we need to associate a CRM to each
strategy si ∈ Si in the Action-Reaction Framework. The idea is as follows.
The construction of a CRM requires to prescribe an action and a reaction
for every history-time pair. The structure of the EDP allows for a natural
way to deﬁne actions ai(f, t, si) and reactions a
R
i (f, t, si) that only depend
on the history-time pair (f, t) and the strategy si. The only diﬃculty is to
determine the set M(f, si) ⊆ R+ of time points t such that the strategy si
and the past decisions along f imply that i actually has to make a decision
at t. Once this is in place, a CRM can be deﬁned by prescribing the action
ai(f, t, si) whenever player i has to make a decision, and the left limit of past
actions if not (reactions are determined in a similar manner).
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First, we identify the natural actions. Given si ∈ Si and (f, t) ∈ F×R+ let
ai(f, t, si) be the action such that si(xt((f
′, ǫ′))) = ci(xt((f
′, ǫ′)), ai(f, t, si))
for any (f ′, ǫ′) ∈ W such that f ′(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ and t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i)
(provided, of course, some such potential jump node exists). Note that by
construction of the EDP, for any (f ′′, ǫ′′) ∈ W such that f ′′(τ) = f(τ) for
all τ ∈ [0, t[ and t ∈ PJ(ǫ′′i ), xt(f
′′, ǫ′′) belongs to the same information set
as xt((f
′, ǫ′)) and hence si(xt((f
′, ǫ′))) = si(xt((f
′′, ǫ′′))). Thus ai(f, t, si) is
uniquely determined by the strategy si, the time point t, and the decision
path f up to t.
Now, analogously to the last paragraph, we determine the natural reac-
tions. Given si ∈ Si and (f, t) ∈ F × R+ let aRi (f, t, si) be the action such
that si(x
R
t ((f
′, ǫ′))) = ci(x
R
t ((f
′, ǫ′)), aRi (f, t, si)) for any (f
′, ǫ′) ∈ W such
that f ′(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t] and i /∈ IJ(f ′, t) 6= ∅ (provided, of course,
such a reaction node exists). Note that by construction of the EDP, for any
(f ′′, ǫ′′) ∈ W such that f ′′(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t] and i /∈ IJ(f ′′, t) 6= ∅,
xRt (f
′′, ǫ′′) belongs to the same information set as xRt ((f
′, ǫ′)) and hence
si(x
R
t ((f
′, ǫ′))) = si(x
R
t ((f
′′, ǫ′′))). Thus aRi (f, t, si) is uniquely determined
by the strategy si, the time point t, and the decision path f up to and
including t.
Now, we proceed to identify the set M(f, si) of time points where player
i needs to move given f and si. The construction of M(f, si) requires a
deﬁnition and a lemma.
Definition 8. Let i ∈ I, si ∈ Si, and (f, ǫ) ∈ W . For t1, t2 ∈ R+ ∪ {∞},
t1 < t2, (f, ǫ) agrees with si on [t1, t2[ if for all τ ∈ [t1, t2[,
ǫi(τ) > 0⇒ si
(
xPτ ((f, ǫ))
)
= ci
(
xPτ ((f, ǫ)), ǫi(τ)
)
. (1.2)
Lemma 3. Let i ∈ I, si ∈ Si, f ∈ F . Then
(i) for any t ∈ J (f) there is ǫ ∈ E such that (f t+, ǫ) ∈ W and it agrees
with si on [t,∞[ (in particular, ǫi(t) > 0);
(ii) for any t ∈ J (f), if (f t+, ǫ), (f t+, ǫ′) ∈ W agree with si on [t,∞[ then
ǫi(τ) = ǫ
′
i(τ) for all τ ∈ [t,∞[;
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(iii) for any t ∈ R+, if (f t(f,t)+, ǫ), (f t(f,t)+, ǫ′) ∈ W agree with si on [t(f, t),∞[
then PJ(ǫi) ∩ [t,∞[= PJ(ǫ
′
i) ∩ [t,∞[.
Given any si ∈ Si and (f, t) ∈ F ×R+, we deﬁne ǫi(f, t, si) : [t(f, t),∞[→
R+ as the unique function given by Lemma 3. That is, if (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W
agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[ then ǫi(τ) = ǫi(f, t, si)(τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t),∞[
and ǫi(f, t, si)(t(f, t)) > 0. Further, for any si ∈ Si and (f, t) ∈ F × R+ we
deﬁne (abusing notation) PJ(f, t, si) = PJ(ǫ
′
i) ∩ [t,∞[ for any ǫ
′ ∈ E such
that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ′) ∈ W and agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[. This is well-deﬁned
by Lemma 3(iii). Finally, let M(f, si) = {t ∈ R+|t ∈ PJ(f, t, si)}. The
intuition for M(f, si) is as follows. Since no player jumps between t(f, t) and
t, one can uniquely reconstruct the inertia times chosen by player i between
t(f, t) and t according to si (Lemma 3(i) and (ii)). This yields a sequence
of time points between t(f, t) and t at which player i has to move. If this
sequence either includes t or “converges” to it then t ∈M(f, si).
The considerations above allow us to construct a well-deﬁned CRM given
a strategy in (T, C) as follows. Given i ∈ I and a strategy si ∈ Si deﬁne
σsi : F × R+ → A2i by
σsi,1(f, t) :=

ai(f, t, si) if t ∈M (f, si) ,fi−(t) if t /∈M (f, si)
and
σsi,2(f, t) :=


aRi (f, t, si), if t ∈
⋃
j∈I
J(fj) ∩ LC(fi),
fi(t), if t ∈
⋂
j∈I
LC(fj) ∪ J(fi).
The intuition behind this construction is as follows. Given a history-time
pair (f, t) one ﬁrst checks whether past decisions prescribe that i should
make a decision at t, i.e. whether t ∈ M (f, si). If this is the case, the
action chosen at (f, t) is the unique action prescribed by si at the corre-
sponding potential jump node. If not, the left-continuous action is chosen.9
Reactions are chosen according to the uniquely prescribed reactions at the
9If t /∈M(f, si), then t(f, t) < t by (P.ii) and the deﬁnition of a potential jump. Since
f is constant on ]t(f, t), t[ by Lemma C.1 in the appendix, fi−(t) exists.
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corresponding reaction nodes. Note that t ∈ M(f, si) implies that there is
ǫ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W and t ∈ PJ(ǫi) and consequently that
xt((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ)) ∈ Xi. Hence, in particular ai(f, t, si) is well-deﬁned. Anal-
ogously, if t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ LC(fi) then i /∈ IJ(f, t) 6= ∅. Hence by con-
struction of the game tree (and Lemma C.2 in the appendix), there is ǫ ∈ E
such that (f, ǫ) ∈ W and xRt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi which guarantees that a
R
i (f, t, si)
is well-deﬁned. As the next proposition shows, the mappings above indeed
deﬁne CRMs.
Proposition 3. Let i ∈ I, and si ∈ Si. Then σ
si is a CRM.
Given a proﬁle s ∈ S of strategies in (T, C), denote by ws = (f s, εs) the
play induced by s (recall Section 1.3.1) and say that f s is the decision path
induced by s.
The structure of (T, C) allows for a natural way to deﬁne an equivalence
relation on the set of a player’s strategies, which will be used in the sequel.
Definition 9. Let i ∈ I. Two strategies s1i , s
2
i ∈ Si are outcome-equivalent,
s1i ∼ s
2
i , if they induce the same decision path for any given proﬁle of the
other players’ strategies, that is f (s
1
i ,s−i) = f (s
2
i ,s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i.
For si ∈ Si denote the equivalence class of si with respect to ∼ by [si]
and let Si/∼ be the set of equivalence classes.
As the next lemma shows, if two strategies induce the same CRM they
are outcome-equivalent.
Lemma 4. Let i ∈ I and s1i , s
2
i ∈ Si. If σ
s1i = σs
2
i then s1i ∼ s
2
i .
1.5.2 Equivalence of CRM and Action-Reaction Frame-
work
We now proceed to show that the Action-Reaction Framework and the ap-
proach using CRMs are equivalent. Proposition 3 establishes the existence
of a well-deﬁned mapping from the set of strategies in (T, C) to the set of
CRMs. Next, we construct a mapping from the set of CRMs to the set of
(equivalence classes of) strategies in (T, C) and subsequently show that any
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proﬁle of strategies in (T, C) induces that same decision path as the associ-
ated proﬁle of CRMs and conversely that any proﬁle of CRMs induces the
same decision path as the associated strategy proﬁles in (T, C).
We ﬁrst note that every CRM deﬁnes a set of associated strategies in
(T, C) in a natural way.
Definition 10. Let σi ∈ Σi. A strategy si : Xi → Ci is induced by σi if
(IS.i) si(xt(w)) = ci(xt(w), σ
1
i (f, t)) for all potential jump nodes xt(w) ∈ Xi
where w = (f, ǫ),
(IS.ii) si(x
R
t (w)) = ci(x
R
t (w), σ
2
i (f, t)) for all reaction nodes x
R
t (w) ∈ Xi where
w = (f, ǫ),
(IS.iii) si(x
P
t (w)) = ci(x
P
t (w), ε
σi(f, t)) for all peek nodes xPt (w) ∈ Xi such
that Eσi(f, t) 6= ∅, where w = (f, ǫ).
Let S(σi) be the set of all strategies si : Xi → Ci that are induced by σi.
This deﬁnition is, for all practical purposes, constructive. At each poten-
tial jump node (reaction node) the action prescribed is the action (reaction)
chosen by the CRM after the corresponding history-time pair. At peek nodes,
the inertia time chosen is the length of the period until the next jump pre-
scribed by the CRM. The only part of the deﬁnition which allows for some
freedom in the speciﬁcation of choices corresponds to history-time pairs after
which the CRM does not prescribe a jump if no other player jumps. Formally,
one then has si
(
xPt ((f, ǫ))
)
= ci
(
xPt ((f, ǫ)) , ε
)
for some arbitrary ε > 0 for
all peek nodes xPt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi where E
σi(f, t) = ∅. The next proposition
shows that this construction indeed delivers a set of strategies in (T, C) for
any given CRM.
Proposition 4. Let i ∈ I, and σi ∈ Σi.
(i) S(σi) 6= ∅.
(ii) If si, s
′
i ∈ S(σi) then si ∼ s
′
i.
For a proﬁle σ ∈ Σ of CRMs let fσ denote the outcome induced by σ
(recall Deﬁnition 7 and Proposition 2).
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Theorem 2. Let σ = (σi)i∈I ∈ Σ be a CRM profile and s = (si)i∈I ∈ S be a
strategy profile in (T, C).
(i) σs
′
i = σi for all i ∈ I and s
′
i ∈ S(σi).
(ii) [si] = [s
′
i] for all s
′
i ∈ S(σ
si).
(iii) f (s
′
i)i∈I = fσ for all (s′i)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IS(σi).
(iv) f (σ
si )i∈I = f s.
What the theorem states is the following. By (i) when going from a CRM
to a corresponding strategy in the EDP and then from that strategy to the
corresponding CRM one obtains the original CRM. Part (ii) says that one
obtains an outcome-equivalent strategy when going from a strategy in the
EDP to the corresponding CRM and then to a strategy corresponding to
that CRM. In (iii) we show that the outcome induced by a proﬁle of CRMs
coincides with the decision path of the play induced by any corresponding
strategy proﬁle in (T, C). Part (iv) is the analogous statement for a proﬁle
of strategies in (T, C). These properties show that the approach using the
Action-Reaction Framework and the approach using CRMs are equivalent.
1.6 Relation to the Literature
In this section we discuss several frameworks for games in continuous time
that have been suggested in the literature, and comment on the relation of
those to our approach.
1.6.1 Maximal Strategy Sets
In a remarkable paper, Stinchcombe (1992) proposed a two-step approach
in order to obtain a coherent framework for the analysis of continuous-time
decision problems. His ﬁrst step is to reduce the set of possible outcomes,
and hence the underlying extensive form. The second step is to restrict the
class of “admissible” strategies on that extensive form. This approach is thus
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located “in between” the Action-Reaction Framework and the approach using
strategy constraints. On the one hand the set of possible outcomes of the
game is restricted and a decision tree is used. On the other hand the players’
strategy sets are exogenously restricted.
The construction in Stinchcombe (1992) is as follows. First, the con-
straints on the set H of possible outcomes guarantee that jumps can only
occur on a well-ordered set of time points. An outcome is a list of jump
times and actions chosen at these jump times for all players such that the
set of jump times is well-ordered by ≤. From this set, the decision nodes
and the game tree are deﬁned. Strategies are then mappings from the set of
decision nodes to the set of actions. However, players are only allowed to use
a strict subset of strategies satisfying two additional assumptions. The ﬁrst,
“identiﬁability”, requires that the inﬁmum of a set of jump times also has to
be a jump time, i.e. at any point in time the next time a strategy prescribes
a jump can be identiﬁed. The second, “ﬁnitely many moves at any point in
time”, states that a player is allowed to initiate at most ﬁnitely many jumps
at any point in time. The main purpose of this condition is to guarantee that
proﬁles of admissible strategies induce outcomes in H .
The results of Stinchcombe (1992) show that every proﬁle of admissi-
ble strategies induces a unique outcome after every possible history. Further,
every outcome in H can be reached through some proﬁle of admissible strate-
gies. Importantly, the set of admissible strategies is shown to be maximal in
the sense that weakening the identiﬁability condition for any player or the
second condition for all players simultaneously would lead to the existence
of strategy proﬁles that induce either no outcome or multiple outcomes.
The identiﬁability condition is comparable to our conditions (CRM.ii) and
(CRM.iii). Both identiﬁability and our conditions essentially ensure that at
any point in time when a player changed his action he has to stick to the
new action for some positive amount of time. The eﬀect of either approach
is to guarantee that the next point in time when a decision is to be taken is
well-deﬁned.
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1.6.2 Staying Quiet
Perry and Reny (1993) develop a bargaining model in continuous time. At
any point in time players can submit an oﬀer or “stay quiet”, i.e. not make
an oﬀer. The strategy sets are then restricted through three conditions.
Condition S1 requires that once an oﬀer is made by a player, he must stay
quiet for an exogenously given strictly positive amount of time. Condition S2
speciﬁes that the other player cannot react to the oﬀer for some exogenously
given nonnegative amount of time (although he can make an oﬀer himself
during that period). The game ends whenever either both players make
the same oﬀer at some point in time or at some point a player stays quiet
but the other player matches his most recent oﬀer. Perry and Reny (1993)
provide an example showing that S1 and S2 alone do not guarantee outcome
existence. This (and outcome uniqueness) is accomplished by condition S3,
which requires that at any point in time, after making a decision, whether
this was making an oﬀer or staying quiet, the player must stay quiet for some
strictly positive amount of time. Interestingly, given S1, S3 is both necessary
and suﬃcient for the existence of an outcome.
Condition S3 incorporates an idea akin to inertia times and is related to
our condition (CRM.ii), but it is a more stringent constraint in the sense that
it does not allow for instant responses. While a player may immediately learn
about the other player’s oﬀer, by S3 he has to stay quiet for some strictly
positive amount of time. Hence while the lower bound of possible reaction
times is 0, there is a strictly positive delay. A similar but slightly stronger
restriction is used in Perry and Reny (1994) where it is required that for every
history all points in time where the strategy prescribes something else than
staying quiet are isolated points, i.e. for every history and all times t there is
an ε > 0 such that the strategy prescribes to stay quiet on ]t− ε, t+ ε[ \ {t}.
1.6.3 Conditioning on Counterfactuals
Bergin (1992, 2006) and Bergin and MacLeod (1993) propose an interesting
framework for repeated games in continuous time that also relies on reducing
the set of allowable strategies. The restrictions imposed in those works result
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in a framework guaranteeing outcome existence and uniqueness. In partic-
ular, Bergin (2006) presents a general formalization of restricted strategies,
and we have drawn from it for the formulation of our Conditional Response
Mappings. However, the restrictions imposed in those papers cause prob-
lems in a diﬀerent front, because the framework cannot be captured through
an extensive form game. We think it is important to address those here to
highlight the kind of problems that can inadvertently be created if a model
of continuous time does not rely on an explicit extensive form game.
To illustrate the problems, we focus on Bergin (2006). We ﬁrst present
a brief introduction to the framework in that paper, adapting the original
notation to ours. Let I and Ai be as in the Action-Reaction Framework
and let H :=
{
h = (h1, . . . , h|I|) | hi : R+ → Ai ∀ i ∈ I
}
. A “strategy” for
a player i in Bergin’s framework is a mapping bi : H × R+ → Ai such that
for all h ∈ H the following conditions hold.
(B.i) If h(τ) = h′(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ for some h′ ∈ H and some t ∈ R+, then
bi(h, t) = bi(h
′, t).
(B.ii) There exists ε > 0 such that bi(h, τ) = bi(h, 0) for all τ ∈ [0, ε[.
(B.iii) If t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(hj) then there exists ε > 0 such that bi(h, τ) = bi(h, t)
for all τ ∈ [t, t+ ε[.
(B.iv) If t /∈ LC(hi) then then there exists ε > 0 such that bi(h, τ) = bi(h, t)
for all τ ∈ [t, t+ ε[.
(B.v) If t ∈ LC(hi) \
⋂
j 6=i
LC(hj) then there is εi(h, t) > 0, ai ∈ Ai such that
bi(h, τ) = ai for all τ ∈]t, t + εi(h, t)[.
Conditions (B.ii)-(B.v) are similar in spirit to our conditions (CRM.ii) and
(CRM.iii). Whenever a player jumps, the other players can react instantly.
After that, however, all players have to stick to their new action for some
positive amount of time. Bergin (2006) proves that any proﬁle of “strate-
gies” in his framework induces a unique outcome after every history. This
approach, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, it can be shown
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that the set of outcomes induced by proﬁles of such “strategies” is equal to
our set F of decision paths deﬁned above (see Proposition 5 in Appendix
1.D), i.e. not all elements of H can be reached by such a proﬁle. This is
in contrast to the Action-Reaction Framework or the framework of Stinch-
combe (1992). Second, the restrictions imposed on the strategies make it
impossible to formalize this approach as an extensive form game. Speciﬁ-
cally, conditions (B.ii)-(B.v) require the set of choices that are available to a
player after a history to not only depend on the history, as it should be in an
extensive form, but also on the chosen strategy. In a sense, they “depend on
a counterfactual future”, because by (B.ii) and (B.iii) after a time t a player
is forced to choose what the strategy chose along the (future) outcome path,
irrespective of the history after t. Intuitively, the problem is that a “strategy”
insists on what “should have been done ” rather than considering the actual
path of play.
The following example shows that Bergin’s approach cannot be formalized
in the Action-Reaction Framework. This also provides an indication as to
why it cannot be formalized as an extensive form game.
Example 3. Let I = {1}, and A1 = {0, 1}. Let h0 be deﬁned by h0(t) = 0 for
all t ∈ R+ and
h1(t) =

0, if t < 42,1, if t ≥ 42.
Let w0 := (h0, ǫ0) ∈ W and w1 := (h1, ǫ1) ∈ W . Given x ∈↑ {wk} let ck(x)
be the (unique) choice available at x that leads to {wk}, k = 0, 1. Deﬁne a
strategy s in (T, C) as follows:
s(x) =


c1(x), if x ∈↑ {w1},
c0(x), if x ∈↑ {w0}\ ↑ {w1},
c(x), otherwise,
where c(x) ∈ A(x) is some arbitrary element of A(x). The corresponding
CRM σ satisﬁes σ1(h1, t) = h1(t) for all t ∈ R+ and σ1(h0, t) = 0 for all
t > 42. For any strategy b in Bergin’s framework that induces the same
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outcome as σ, i.e. for which b(h1, t) = h1(t) for all t ∈ R+, (B.i) implies
b(h0, 42) = 1. Further, (B.iii) implies that there is an ε > 0 such that
b(h0, t) = 1 for all t ∈]42, 42+ε[. Even though b(h0, 42) = 1 means departing
from h0, (B.iii) implies a condition for actions chosen along h0 after t = 42.
Hence the outcome induced by σ and the outcome induced by b after the
history-time pair (h0, 42 + ε/2) can never be the same. Thus there is no
strategy in Bergin’s framework that induces the same outcome as σ after
every history and could therefore be considered equivalent to σ. In particular
there is no strategy in Bergin’s framework that could be considered equivalent
to the strategy s in the Action-Reaction Framework.
The above example illustrates the problem caused by conditions (B.i)-
(B.v). On the one hand a player is required to stick to an action chosen for
some positive amount of time. On the other hand this “rule” does not apply
to counterfactual histories where the player is forced to immediately switch
to the action that was chosen along the actual outcome path. Thus Bergin’s
framework is an example of a framework where the extensive form does not
survive the restrictions imposed on the strategy set.
1.7 Conclusion
Repeated games in continuous time are plagued with problems of outcome
nonexistence and nonuniqueness, which amount to various forms of impos-
sibility results and convey the overall message that continuous-time models
are not well-founded. In contrast, we provide a possibility result. Our ap-
proach shows that it is possible to capture continuous-time modeling within
the framework of well-deﬁned extensive form games, without any artiﬁcial
restriction of the associated strategy sets. All the necessary conditions en-
suring that every strategy proﬁle induces a unique outcome are incorporated
in the game form, which allows for a better understanding of the tradeoﬀs
involved in continuous-time modeling.
Previous work had concentrated on a “second best”, placing exogenous
restrictions on the players’ strategy sets. From a game-theoretic point of
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view, however, this is a problematic approach, since it is unclear in which
sense a solution concept based on a strategy set restricted for purely technical
reasons is related to the original extensive form. What our construction
accomplishes is showing that the restrictions for strategy sets considered
in the literature (e.g. Stinchcombe, 1992) can be adapted to appropriate
conditions formulated from the onset, i.e. incorporated into the game tree
and the choice system. The relation to the literature is made clear by showing
that the (unrestricted) behavioral strategies from the resulting extensive form
are equivalent to those in a restricted class of strategies in a more naïvely
speciﬁed continuous-time repeated game. In turn, those restricted strategies
are closely related to the approaches presented in the literature (Stinchcombe,
1992; Bergin, 2006).
Of course, our results do not mean that naïvely speciﬁed continuous time
models can be treated as extensive form games, as our initial examples show.
Familiarity should not be confused with simplicity, and the continuum is not
a simple construction. The accomplishment of this paper is to show that
continuous-time modeling is possible within the realms of standard game
theory. Modeling decisions in continuous time, however, requires a relatively
involved framework. The beneﬁts are of two kinds. The ﬁrst is of practical
nature. Once the framework is in place, there is no further question of
interpretation of game-theoretic concepts. The game is an extensive form
game to which standard ideas apply. The second is more fundamental. In
a sense, our construction resolves the tension between technical assumptions
imposed for the sake of tractability and conceptual requirements resulting
from a well-established theory of strategic interactions. If continuous time is
deemed a worthy setting for tractability reasons, it is not necessary to give
up the standard decision- and game-theoretic framework in order to use it.
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Appendix 1.A: Proofs from Sections 1.2 and 1.3
This appendix contains the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, which in
turn implies Theorem 1. We start with a few preliminary lemmata which are
also used elsewhere. N0 will denote the set of natural numbers including 0,
i.e. N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Lemma A.1. Let w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W , i ∈I, and t ∈ R+.
(i) Prev(ǫi, t) ∈ DP (ǫi).
(ii) Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) ≥ t.
Proof. (i) By deﬁnition Prev(ǫi, t) = sup(DP (ǫi) ∩ [0, t[). By contradiction,
assume that t := Prev(ǫi, t) /∈ DP (ǫi). Then for all ε > 0 there is τ ∈
]t − ε, t[∩DP (ǫi). Hence sup(DP (ǫi) ∩ [0, t[) = t and thus t ∈ PJ(ǫi) by
deﬁnition of PJ(ǫi). (P.iii) then implies t ∈ DP (ǫi), a contradiction.
(ii) By deﬁnition, Prev(ǫi, t) ≤ t. If Prev(ǫi, t) = t then ǫi(t) > 0 as t ∈
PJ(ǫi) ⊆ DP (ǫi) by (P.iii) and hence Next(ǫi, t) > t. If Prev(ǫi, t) < t assume
by contradiction that t := Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) < t. As ǫi(Prev(ǫi, t)) >
0 by (i), Prev(ǫi, t) < t < t. By deﬁnition of Prev(ǫi, t), ǫi(τ) = 0 for
all τ ∈]Prev(ǫi, t), t[, hence for all τ ∈]Prev(ǫi, t), t], implying Prev(ǫi, t) =
sup(DP (ǫi)∩ [0, t[) = Prev(ǫi, t). Thus t = Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) which implies
t ∈ PJ(ǫi) ⊆ DP (ǫi) by (P.iii), a contradiction with ǫi(t) = 0.
Lemma A.2. For every f ∈ F and all i ∈ I the set J(fi) is well-ordered by
≤. In particular the set
⋃
i∈I J(fi) is well-ordered by ≤.
Proof. Let ∅ 6= U ⊆ J(fi). Since U ⊆ R+ we have that t := inf U exists. By
(DP.i) there is ε > 0 such that fi is constant on ]t, t + ε[. By contradiction,
suppose t /∈ U , then for every ε > 0 there is τ ∈]t, t + ε[ such that τ ∈ U ⊆
J(fi), contradicting that fi is constant on ]t, t + ǫ[.
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Lemma A.3. Let w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W .
(i) For i ∈ I the sets DP (ǫi), and PJ(ǫi) are well-ordered by ≤.
(ii) The sets
⋃
i∈I DP (ǫi), and
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫi) are well-ordered by ≤, and hence
countable.
Proof. (i) Fix a player i ∈ I. We will ﬁrst show that DP (ǫi) is well-ordered.
Let ∅ 6= U ⊆ DP (ǫi). As U ⊆ R+, t := inf U exists. If t ∈ U , we are done.
By contradiction, if t /∈ U then for all ε > 0 there is t ∈]t, t + ε[ such that
t ∈ U ⊆ DP (ǫi). Let
t′ := min{ min
j∈IDP (ǫ,t)
Next(ǫj , t); min
j∈I\IDP (ǫ,t)
Next(ǫj ,Prev(ǫj , t))}.
By Lemma A.1(ii) Next(ǫj ,Prev(ǫj , t)) ≥ t for all j ∈ I. Hence, by (P.iii)
Next(ǫj ,Prev(ǫj , t)) > t for all j ∈ I \ IDP (ǫ, t). As Next(ǫj , t) > t for all
j ∈ IDP (ǫ, t), we obtain t′ > t.
As f ∈ F by (DP.i) there is ε > 0 such that f is constant on ]t, t+ ε[. We
claim that ǫi(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t,min{t
′, t + ε}[. Assume by contradiction
that ǫi(τ) > 0 for some τ ∈]t,min{t
′, t+ ε}[. If i ∈ IDP (ǫi, t) then by (P.iv),⋃
j 6=i J(fj)∩]t, τ ] 6= ∅, which contradicts the fact that f is constant on ]t, t+ǫ[.
If i /∈ IDP (ǫ, t) then as Prev(ǫi, t) ≤ t < τ < t
′ ≤ Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)), (P.iv)
implies
⋃
j 6=i J(fj)∩]Prev(ǫi, t), τ ] 6= ∅ which again contradicts the fact that
f is constant on ]t, t+ ǫ[.
Hence there is ε′ > 0 such that ǫi(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t, t + ε
′[. As t /∈ U ,
this is a contradiction to the deﬁnition of inﬁmum.
(ii) follows from (i) as all sets are ﬁnite unions of well-ordered sets. All
sets of real numbers which are well-ordered by ≤ are countable.10
10This is a well-known observation. Let s(x) be the successor of a real number x accord-
ing to the standard order ≤. The open intervals (x, s(x)) for the diﬀerent elements of the
well-ordered set are nonempty and disjoint. Since each such interval contains a diﬀerent
rational number, the well-ordered set must be countable.
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Lemma A.4. Let w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W , t ∈ R+, and εi ∈ R++ for all i ∈ I.
Further let a, b ∈ ×i∈IAi and let f
t be given by f t(τ) = f(τ) for all τ < t,
f t(t) = a, and f t(τ) = b for all τ > t. Suppose f t ∈ F and that for all i ∈ I,
t ∈ J(f ti ) only if i ∈ IPJ(ǫi, t).
(i) There is ǫ′ ∈ E such that ǫ′(t) = ǫ(t) for all t ∈ [0, t[, ǫ′i(t) = εi for all
i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t), and w′ = (f t, ǫ′) ∈ W .
(ii) If t ∈ J (f t) then there is ǫ′ ∈ E such that ǫ′(t) = ǫ(t) for all t ∈ [0, t[,
ǫ′i(t) = εi for all i ∈ I, and w
′ = (f t, ǫ′) ∈ W .
Proof. (i) Let I(t) = {i ∈ I|t ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∪
⋃
j∈I J(f
t−
j )}. For each i ∈ I deﬁne
ǫ′i(t) =


ǫi(t), if t < t,
εi, if i ∈ I(t) and t = t+ ǫin for some n ∈ N0,
73, if i /∈ I(t) and t = Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) + 73n for some n ∈ N0,
0, otherwise
(Note that the third condition becomes void if t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(f
t
j )).
We will show that w′ = (f t, ǫ′) ∈ W . To see (P.i) and (P.ii), let i ∈ I and
t ∈ J(f ti ). Then t ≤ t by deﬁnition of f
t, and hence t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i)∩
⋂
j∈I DPj(ǫ
′
j)
by (P.i) and (P.ii) for w and the construction of ǫ. To prove (P.iii), let i ∈ I
and t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i). If t ≤ t then t ∈ DP (ǫ
′
i) by (P.iii) for w. If t > t then by
construction t ∈ PJ(ǫi) if and only if t ∈ DP (ǫi).
Finally, we will turn to (P.iv). Let i ∈ I, t ∈ DP (ǫ′i), and τ ∈ DP (ǫ
′
i) ∩
[t,Next(ǫ′i, t)[. If Next(ǫ
′
i,Prev(ǫ
′
i, t)) ≤ t, then
⋃
j 6=i J(f
t−
j )∩]t, τ ] 6= ∅ by
(P.iv) for w. Hence suppose that Next(ǫ′i,Prev(ǫ
′
i, t)) > t. If t ≥ t then by
construction of f t, t ∈ DP (ǫ′i) implies DP (ǫ
′
i)∩]t,Next(ǫ
′
i, t)[= ∅, a contra-
diction to our choice of τ . If t > t and t > τ , applying (P.iv) to w yields⋃
j 6=i J(f
t−
j )∩]t, τ ] 6= ∅.
If τ ≥ t consider three cases. If t ∈
⋃
j 6=i J(f
t
j ), we are done. Therefore
suppose t /∈
⋃
j 6=i J(f
t
j ). Then if t ∈ PJ(ǫi) we get that t ∈ DP (ǫi) and
t < t < Next(ǫi, t). Applying (P.iv) for w then yields
⋃
j 6=i J(f
t−
j )∩]t, t] 6= ∅
and hence
⋃
j 6=i J(f
t−
j )∩]t, τ ] 6= ∅. Finally, if t /∈ PJ(ǫi) then by hypothesis
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t /∈ J(f ti ). Note that if t < Prev(ǫi, t) < t, applying (P.iv) for w we obtain
∅ 6=
⋃
j 6=i J(f
t−
j )∩]t,Prev(ǫi, t)] ⊆]t, τ ], as Prev(ǫi, t) ∈ DP (ǫi) by Lemma
A.1(i). Hence w.l.o.g. assume t = Prev(ǫi, t) < t. By construction of ǫ
′
i
we get τ = Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) + 73n for some n ∈ N0, which yields τ ≥
Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) ≥ Next(ǫ
′
i, t), a contradiction to our choice of τ . Hence
(P.iv) holds.
(ii) Note that in (i) we actually proved that ǫi(t) = ǫi for all i ∈ I(t). If
t ∈ J (f) then I(t) = I and hence the statement follows.
Lemma A.5. Let w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W , t ∈ R+. Then i ∈ IDP (ǫ, t) if and
only if i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t) or IJ(f, t) 6= ∅. In particular, IDP (ǫ, t) 6= ∅ implies
IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅.
Proof. “If”: If i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t) then i ∈ IDP (ǫ, t) by (P.iii). If IJ(f, t) 6= ∅ then
i ∈ IDP (ǫ, t) by (P.ii).
“Only if”: Let i ∈ IDP (ǫ, t) and suppose that i /∈ IPJ(ǫ, t). Let t =
Prev(ǫi, t). Then t < t < Next(ǫi, t), where the second inequality follows
from Lemma A.1(ii). By Lemma A.1(i) t ∈ DP (ǫi). As t ∈ DP (ǫi), (P.iv)
implies that there is t˜ ∈
⋃
j 6=i J(fj)∩]t, t]. If t˜ ∈]t, t[ then by (P.ii) t˜ ∈ DP (ǫi).
As t = Prev(ǫi, t) < t˜ < t this would contradict the deﬁnition of Prev(ǫi, t).
Hence t ∈
⋃
j 6=i J(fj) and thus IJ(f, t) 6= ∅.
We are now ready to turn to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. For x ∈ N , let tx ∈ R+ and wx = (fx, ǫx) ∈ W be
such that x = xtx(w
x), x = xRtx(w
x), or x = xPtx(w
x).
We will ﬁrst show that T = (N,⊇) is a game tree (Deﬁnition 1).
(TI): Let x, y ∈ N be such that x∩y 6= ∅ and let w = (f, ǫ) ∈ x∩y. Then
xPtx(w) ⊆ x ⊆ xtx(w) and x
P
ty (w) ⊆ x ⊆ xty (w). Without loss of generality,
assume tx ≤ ty. Then for any wy = (f y, ǫy) ∈ y we obtain wy(τ) = w(τ) for
all τ ∈ [0, ty[. If tx < ty then f y(tx) = f(tx) and f y+(t
x) = f+(t
x). Hence
wy ∈ xPtx(w) ⊆ x, i.e. y ⊆ x. If t
x = ty then x, y ∈ {xtx(w), x
R
tx(w), x
P
tx(w)}
and hence are ordered.
(IR) Let w,w′ ∈ W with w = (f, ǫ), w′ = (f ′, ǫ′) be such that w 6= w′.
Then there is t ∈ R+ such that w(t) 6= w′(t). Let t1 = mini∈I Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t))
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and t2 = mini∈I Next(ǫ
′
i,Prev(ǫ
′
i, t)). By (P.iv),
⋃
i∈I DP (ǫi)∩]Prev(ǫi, t), t
1[=
∅ and
⋃
i∈I DP (ǫ
′
i)∩]Prev(ǫ
′
i, t), t
2[= ∅. Hence Prev(ǫi, t
1) = Prev(ǫi, t) and
Prev(ǫ′i, t
2) = Prev(ǫ′i, t) for all i ∈ I and there are i, j ∈ I such that
t1 = Next(Prev(ǫi, t
1), t1) and t2 = Next(Prev(ǫ′j , t
2), t2). Thus t1 ∈ PJ(ǫi),
t2 ∈ PJ(ǫ′j) and by the construction of the tree, xt1(w), xt2(w
′) ∈ N . By
Lemma A.1(ii), t1, t2 ≥ t and hence by construction of the nodes w ∈ xt1(w)
and w /∈ xt2(w
′) and w′ ∈ xt2(w
′) and w′ /∈ xt1(w).
(BD) Let h ∈ 2N be a nonempty chain. Let
D :=
{
t ∈ R+
∣∣ ∃w ∈ W : xt(w) or xRt (w) or xPt (w) ∈ h} .
Note that as in the proof of (TI) above (case tx = ty) for each t ∈ A there are
at most three nodes x ∈ h such that tx = t (a peek node, a reaction node,
and a potential jump node).
Suppose ﬁrst that ∃t = supD and t ∈ D. Let y ∈ h be the smallest of
the nodes in the chain h with ty = t. Let w ∈ y. As in the proof of (TI)
above (case tx < ty), it follows that w ∈ x for all x ∈ h.
Suppose now that either ∃t = supD and t /∈ D or ∄ supD. In the latter
case write t = +∞ for convenience. For any 0 < K < t there is tK ∈]K, t[∩D
and wK = (fK , ǫK) ∈ W such that xtK (w
K) or xRtK (w
ε) or xPtK (w
K) ∈ h.
For each i ∈ I and some ai ∈ Ai deﬁne wi = (f i, ǫi) ∈ F × E by
wi(τ) :=

w
τ
i (τ), if τ < t,
(ai, 0), if τ ≥ t.
Note that (since h is a chain) if τ < t then wτi (τ) = w
K
i (τ) for any K ∈]0, t[
with τ ∈ [0, tK [.
If t < +∞ we claim that t ∈
⋃
j∈I PJ(ǫj). Assume by contradiction
that t /∈
⋃
j∈I PJ(ǫj). Then Prev(ǫj , t) < t and hence ǫj(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈
]Prev(ǫj , t)[ and all j ∈ I. Let K ∈] maxj∈I Prev(ǫj , t), t[. Then there is t
K ∈
]K, t[ and wK = (fK , ǫK) ∈ W such that xtK (w
K) or xRtK (w
ε) or xPtK (w
K) ∈ h
and hence IDP (ǫK , tK) ⊇ IPJ(ǫK , tK) 6= ∅, where the inclusion follows from
(P.iii). By construction wi(t
K) = wt
K
i (t
K) and as IDP (ǫK , tK) 6= ∅ this
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implies IDP (ǫK , tK) 6= ∅, which contradicts the fact that IDP (ǫ, τ) = ∅ for
all τ ∈] maxj∈I Prev(ǫj , t), t[.
For each i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t) choose a′i such that a
′
i 6= limt→t f i−(t) if limt→t f i−(t)
exists and arbitrarily otherwise. For each i ∈ I\IPJ(ǫ, t) let a′i = limt→t f i−(t).
Note that the limit exists as otherwise t would be an accumulation point of
jump points of fi (and hence decision points of ǫi by (P.i) and (P.iii)) and
hence i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t).
Now deﬁne
fi(τ) :=

f i(τ), if τ < ta′i, if τ ≥ t
and
ǫi(τ) :=


ǫi(τ), if τ < t,
73, if τ ≥ t and τ = t + 73n for some n ∈ N0,
0, otherwise.
and set w := (f, ǫ) ∈ F × E. Note that the construction guarantees the
t ∈ J(fi) if and only if t ∈ PJ(ǫi). We will now verify that w ∈ W . To
see (P.i), let τ ∈ J(fi). As f is constant on ]t,+∞[, τ ≤ t. If τ < t
then τ ∈ [0, tK [ for some K > 0. Then, by (P.i) for wK , τ ∈ PJ(ǫKi )
and hence τ ∈ PJ(ǫi). If τ = t, by construction of f , t ∈ J(fi) if and
only if t ∈ PJ(ǫi) and hence t ∈ PJ(ǫi). This proves (P.i). (P.ii) follows
immediately from the construction of ǫ. To see (P.iii) let τ ∈ PJ(ǫi). If τ ≤ t
then τ ∈ DP (ǫi) by construction. If τ > t then Prev(ǫi, τ) = t + 73n for
some n ∈ N0 implying that τ = t+73(n+1) and thus ǫi(τ) > 0. Thus (P.iii)
is satisﬁed. To prove (P.iv) let t ∈ DP (ǫi) and τ ∈]t,Next(ǫi, t)[∩DP (ǫi)
be such that
⋃
j∈I J(fj)∩]t, τ ] = ∅. If τ ≤ t we reach a contradiction with
(P.iv) for wK with K > τ . If t < t and t < τ then in particular t /∈⋃
j∈I J(fj), in contradiction with the construction of f . Now suppose t ≥ t.
The construction of ǫ implies that if τ ∈]t,Next(ǫi, t)[ then ǫi(τ) = 0, a
contradiction with τ ∈ DP (ǫi). Hence (P.iv) holds and we obtain w ∈ W .
Next we will show that (T, C) is an EDP (Deﬁnition 2).
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(EDP.i) Let i ∈ I and c, c′ ∈ Ci be such that P (c)∩P (c
′) 6= ∅ and c 6= c′.
First, let c = ci(xt(w), ai) for some w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W and some ai ∈ Ai. Then
P (c) = {xt((f
′, ǫ′)) ∈ N | f(τ) = f ′(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t[, t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i) } .
P (c) ∩ P (c′) 6= ∅ yields c′ = ci(xt(w), a
′
i) for some a
′
i ∈ Ai and hence P (c) =
P (c′). As c 6= c′, we have ai 6= a
′
i which implies c∩ c
′ = ∅. The proofs for the
cases c = ci(x
R
t (w), ai) and c = ci(x
P
t (w), ai) are analogous.
(EDP.ii) Let x ∈ X and (ci)i∈I(x) ∈ ×i∈I(x)Ai(x). If x = xtx(w
x) let
f(τ) = fx(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tx[ and fi(τ) = ai for all τ ∈ [t
x,∞[ and all i ∈ I
where the ai are such that ci = ci(x, ai) if i ∈ I(x) and ai = limτ→tx f
x
i (τ) if
i /∈ I(x). Applying Lemma A.4(i) there exists ǫ ∈ E such that ǫ(τ) = ǫx(τ)
for all τ ∈ [0, tx[ and w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W . By construction w ∈ x ∩
⋂
i∈I(x) ci.
If x = xRtx(w
x) let f(τ) = fx(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tx], and fi(τ) = ai for all
τ ∈]t,∞[ and all i ∈ I where the ai are such that ci = ci(x, ai) if i ∈ I(x) and
ai = f
x
i (t
x) if i /∈ I(x). By Lemma A.4(i) there is ǫ ∈ E such that ǫ(τ) = ǫx(τ)
for all τ ∈ [0, tx[ and w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W . By construction w ∈ x ∩
⋂
i∈I(x) ci.
If x = xPtx(w
x) let f(τ) = fx(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tx], and fi(τ) = fi+(t
x)
for all τ ∈]t,∞[ and all i ∈ I. By Lemma A.4(i) there is ǫ ∈ E such that
ǫ(τ) = ǫx(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tx[, ǫi(t
x) = εi for all i ∈ I(x) where εi is such
that ci = ci(x, εi) if i ∈ I(x) and εi = 0 if i /∈ I(x) and w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W . By
construction w ∈ x ∩
⋂
i∈I(x) ci.
(EDP.iii) Let y, y′ ∈ N be such that y ∩ y′ = ∅. Let t := inf{t ∈
R+|wy(t) 6= wy
′
(t)}. Then wy(τ) = wy
′
(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[. Note that
t ∈ PJ(ǫyi ) if and only if t ∈ PJ(ǫ
y′
i ) for all i ∈ I as w
y(τ) = wy
′
(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, t[.
We claim that t ∈
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫ
y
i ). By contradiction, suppose that t /∈⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫ
y
i ). If w
y(t) 6= wy
′
(t) then t ∈ DP (ǫyj ) ∪ DP (ǫ
y′
j ) for some j ∈ I
as either f y(t) 6= f y
′
(t) or ǫy(t) 6= ǫy
′
(t). Suppose that t /∈ PJ(ǫy
′
j ) ∪ PJ(ǫ
y
j )
for all j ∈ I. Then by (P.i) and (P.iv), t /∈ DP (ǫyj ) ∪DP (ǫ
y′
j ) for all j ∈ I.
Hence t ∈ DP (ǫyj )∪DP (ǫ
y′
j ) for some j ∈ I implies that t /∈ PJ(ǫ
y′
k )∪PJ(ǫ
y
k)
for some k ∈ I, a contradiction. If wy(t) = wy
′
(t) then f y+(t) 6= f
y
+(t) by
(DP.i) and (P.iv) as otherwise there is ε > 0 such that wy(τ) = wy
′
(τ) for
49
Chapter 1
Repeated Games in Continuous Time as Extensive Form Games
all τ ∈ [0, t + ε[, contradicting the choice of t. But f y+(t) 6= f
y
+(t) implies
t ∈ J(f yj )∪J(f
y′
j ) for some j ∈ I and hence t ∈
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫ
y
i ), a contradiction.
Thus t ∈
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫ
y
i ) ∩ PJ(ǫ
y′
i ) and xt(w
y) = xt(w
y′) ∈ N . If wy(t) =
wy
′
(t) then xR
t
(wy) = xR
t
(wy
′
) and f y+(t) 6= f
y′
+ (t) by deﬁnition of t which
implies ∅ 6= IJ(f y, t) = IJ(f y
′
, t) ( I. Let i ∈ I \ IJ(f y, t) be such that
f yi+(t) 6= f
y′
i+(t), and set c := ci(x
R
t (w
y), f yi+(t)) and c
′ := ci(x
R
t (w
y), f y
′
i+(t)).
Then y ⊆ c, y′ ⊆ c′ and c∩c′ = ∅. If wy(t) 6= wy
′
(t) then either f y(t) 6= f y
′
(t)
or ǫy(t) 6= ǫy
′
(t). If f y(t) 6= f y
′
(t) let i ∈ I be such that f yi (t) 6= f
y′
i (t) and
deﬁne c := ci(xt(w
y), f yi (t)) and c
′ := (xt(w
y), f y
′
i (t)). Then y ⊆ c, y
′ ⊆ c′
and c ∩ c′ = ∅. If f y(t) = f y
′
(t) and ǫy(t) 6= ǫy
′
(t) let i ∈ I be such that
ǫyi (t) 6= ǫ
y′
i (t) and deﬁne c := ci(x
P
t
(wy), ǫyi (t)) and c
′ := (xP
t
(wy
′
), ǫy
′
i (t)).
Then y ⊆ c, y′ ⊆ c′ and c ∩ c′ = ∅.
(EDP.iv) Let x ) y ∈ N and i ∈ I(x). Then tx ≤ ty which implies
wx(τ) = wy(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tx[. If x = xtx(w
x) let ci = ci(x, w
y
i (t
x)). If
x = xRtx(w
x) then fx(tx) = f y(tx). Let ci = ci(x, f
y
+i(t
x)). If x = xPtx(w
x)
then fx(tx) = f y(tx) and fx+(t
x) = f y+(t
x). Let ci = ci(x, ǫ
y
i (t
x)). In any case
y ⊆ ci.
Now we turn to the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. As in the proof of Proposition 1, for x ∈ N , let tx ∈ R+
and wx = (fx, ǫx) ∈ W be such that x = xtx(w
x), x = xRtx(w
x), or x =
xPtx(w
x).
We ﬁrst show that T is regular. Let x ∈ N . If x = xRtx(w
x) then ∅ 6=
IJ(fx, tx) ⊆ IPJ(ǫx, tx) (where the last inclusion follows from (P.i)) and
hence xtx(w
x) ∈ N . Thus xtx(w
x) = min ↑ x \ {x}. If x = xPtx(w
x) we
distinguish two cases. If ∅ ( IJ(ǫ, tx) ( I then xRtx(w
x) ∈ N and xRtx(w
x) =
min ↑ x \ {x}. Otherwise xRtx(w
x) /∈ N and IPJ(ǫx, tx) 6= ∅ as x ∈ N
(recall (1.1)). Then xtx(w
x) ∈ N and xtx(w
x) = min ↑ x \ {x}. If x =
xtx(w
x) we again distinguish two cases. If Prev(ǫxi , t
x) < tx for all i ∈ I let
t = maxi∈I Prev(ǫ
x
i , t
x). By Lemmata A.1(i) and A.5(“only if”) we obtain
IPJ(ǫx, t) 6= ∅ and hence xP
t
(wx) ∈ N . Then xP
t
(wx) = min ↑ x \ {x} as
otherwise there would be xP
t
(wx) ) xPt′ (w
x) ) x implying t < t′ < t. As then
IDP (ǫx, t′) 6= ∅ by Lemma A.5(“if”) this would contradict the construction of
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t. If on the other hand Prev(ǫxi , t
x) = t for some i ∈ I, let y ∈↑ x\{x}. Since
then ty < tx and Prev(ǫxi , t
x) = t there is ty < t < tx such that t ∈ DP (εi).
By Lemma A.5 IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅ and hence y ) xt(w
x) ∈↑ x \ {x}. As x ( y
for all y ∈↑ x \ {x} we obtain x = inf ↑ x \ {x}.
It remains to show that T is up-discrete. Let h ∈ 2N be a nonempty
chain and let w = (f, ǫ) ∈
⋂
x∈h x, which exists by (BD). Note that if xt(w),
xRt (w), or x
P
t (w) ∈ N for some t ∈ R+ then by construction of T (recall
(1.1)), t ∈
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫi). Since
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫi) is well-ordered by Lemma A.3 we
obtain that t := min{t|xt(w) or x
R
t (w) or x
P
t (w) ∈ h} exists. Hence either
xt(w), x
R
t
(w) or xP
t
(w) is a maximum of h.
Appendix 1.B: Proofs from Section 1.4
The proofs of results from Sections 1.4 and 1.5 make use of the machinery of
ordinal numbers; we refer the reader to Jech (2002, chap. 2).
Let Ord be the class of all ordinal numbers. Given an ordinal α ∈ Ord,
a transﬁnite sequence of (possibly extended) real numbers (tβ)β<α is a set
{tβ |tβ ∈ R ∪ {∞}, β < α}. A transﬁnite sequence (tβ)β<α is increasing if
γ < β implies tγ ≤ tβ and strictly increasing if γ < β implies tγ < tβ. If α is
a limit ordinal the limit limβ→α t
β of the sequence is deﬁned by limβ→α t
β =
sup{tβ|β < α}. A sequence (tβ)β<α is continuous if t
γ = limβ→γ t
β for every
limit ordinal γ < α. For the sake of clarity we will write (tβ)β≤α for (t
β)β<α+1.
The following deﬁnitions and lemmata are used in the proof of Proposition
2 and also elsewhere.
Definition 11. Given f ∈ F , t ∈ R+ and a ∈ ×i∈IAi, deﬁne
G−(f, t, a) =

f(τ), if τ ∈ [0, t[,a, if τ ≥ t
and
G+(f, t, a) =

f(τ), if τ ∈ [0, t],a, if τ > t
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Lemma B.1. Let f ∈ F , t ∈ R+, and a ∈ ×i∈IAi. Then
(i) G−(f, t, a) ∈ F .
(ii) If a is such that for all i ∈ I, ai = fi(t) if t ∈
(⋂
j∈I LC(fj)
)
∪ J(fi),
then G+(f, t, a) ∈ F .
Proof. (i) By construction G−(f, t, a) is piecewise constant and hence (DP.i)
holds. To prove (DP.ii), let τ ∈ R+. If τ /∈ LC(G
−
i (f, t, a)), then by con-
struction, τ ≤ t and hence τ ∈ RK(G−i (f, t, a)) by construction. To see
(DP.iii), let τ ∈ R(G−i (f, t, a)) for some i ∈ I. Then, as τ /∈ RK(G
−
i (f, t, a)),
τ < t and since f ∈ F , there is j ∈ I such that τ ∈ J(fj) and hence
τ ∈ J(G−j (f, t, a)). Thus (DP.iii) holds.
(ii) Let a be as given. By construction G+(f, t, a) is piecewise constant
and hence (DP.i) holds. To prove (DP.ii), let τ ∈ R+. If τ /∈ LC(G
+
i (f, t, a)),
then by construction τ ≤ t. If τ < t, τ ∈ RK(G+i (f, t, a)) since f ∈ F .
Suppose τ = t. Then t /∈ LC(G+i (f, t, a)) implies t /∈ LC(fi) and hence
by (DP.ii) for f , t ∈ J(fi). Then by hypothesis, ai = fi(t) and hence τ ∈
RK(G+i (f, t, a)). Hence (DP.ii) holds. To see (DP.iii), let τ ∈ R(G
+
i (f, t, a))
for some i ∈ I. Then by construction of G+i (f, t, a), τ ≤ t. If τ < t then
τ ∈ R(fi) and by (DP.iii) for f it follows that τ ∈ J(fj) and hence τ ∈
J(G+j (f, t, a)) for some j ∈ I. Suppose τ = t. That t ∈ R(G
+
i (f, t, a)) implies
that ai 6= fi(t) which by hypothesis implies t /∈
(⋂
j∈I LC(fj)
)
∪ J(fi). As
t /∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj) we get that t ∈ J(fj) and hence (since (DP.ii) has already
been shown for G+(f, t, a)) t ∈ J(G+j (f, t, a)) for some j ∈ I.
Lemma B.2. Let α ∈ Ord be a limit ordinal and let (tβ)β<α ⊆ R+ be
a strictly increasing and continuous transfinite sequence. Then for every
t0 ≤ t < limβ→α t
β there is a unique δ ∈ Ord such that t ∈ [tδ, tδ+1[.
Proof. Let t0 ≤ t < limβ<α t
β . Then γ = min{β < α|tβ > t} exists as the
set {β|β < α} is well-ordered. Further, γ > 0 as t ≥ t0 and γ is a successor
ordinal as otherwise limβ<γ t
β = tγ by continuity and hence there would be
β < γ with t < tβ < tγ. This would contradict that γ = min{β < α|tβ > t}.
Thus γ = δ + 1 for some δ < α and t ∈ [tδ, tδ+1[.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Note that f t+i+ (t) = fi+(t) by deﬁnition of f
t+
i . If E
σi(f, t)
6= ∅ then ε = inf Eσi(f, t) exists. We claim that ε > 0. In order to see this
we distinguish two cases. First, suppose that t ∈
(⋂
j∈I LC(f
t+
j )
)
∪ J(f t+i ).
In this case, t ∈ RK(f t+i ) by (DP.ii) and (DP.iii) and hence f
t+
i+ (t) = f
t+
i (t)
which implies f t+i (t) = fi+(t). Now by (CRM.ii) there is ε > 0 such that
σ1i (f
t+, τ) = f t+i (t) = fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. Thus E
σi(f, t) is bounded
away from zero, and hence ε > 0. Second, suppose that t /∈
(⋂
j∈I LC(f
t+
j )
)
∪
J(f t+i ), hence (by (DP.ii)), t ∈ LC(f
t+
i ) ∩
(⋃
j∈I J(f
t+
j )
)
. In this case, by
(CRM.iii) there is ε′ > 0 such that σ1i (f
t+, τ) = f t+i+ (t) = fi+(t) for all
τ ∈]t, t + ε′[. Again, Eσi(f, t) is bounded away from zero, and hence ε > 0.
This proves the claim.
Suppose now that ε /∈ Eσi(f, t). As f t+ is constant on ]t,∞[ and t+ε > t,
t + ε ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(f
t+
j ) and hence by (CRM.ii) there is ε > 0 such that
σ1i (f
t+, τ) = f t+i (t + ε) for all τ ∈]t + ε, t + ε + ε[. Since f
t+
i is constant
on ]t,∞[, we have that f t+i (t+ε) = f
t+
i+ (t) = fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t+ε, t+ε+ε[.
This contradicts the construction of ε = inf Eσi(f, t).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let Eσi(f, t) and εσi(f, t) be deﬁned as in Lemma
2. Fix r ∈ R++ and deﬁne εσir (f, t) by ε
σi
r (f, t) = ε
σi(f, t) if Eσi(f, t) 6= ∅ and
εσir (f, t) = r otherwise.
We are going to use transﬁnite recursion to construct a sequence of
functions (fα)α∈Ord and a sequence of extended real numbers (t
α)α∈Ord ⊆
R+ ∪ {∞} such that for all α ∈ Ord the following properties are satisﬁed.
(TR.i) fα ∈ F .
(TR.ii) If β < α then fα(τ) = fβ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tβ[.
(TR.iii) (tβ)β≤α is continuous.
(TR.iv) Either tα =∞ or (tβ)β≤α ⊆ R++ and is strictly increasing.
(TR.v) σ1i (f
α, τ) = fαi (τ) and σ
2
i (f
α, τ) = fαi+(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t
α[ and all i ∈ I.
In order to apply transﬁnite recursion, we need to complete three steps.
First, we will deﬁne (f 0, t0) trivially fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v). Second, we will
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show that, if (TR.i)-(TR.v) are fulﬁlled for an ordinal α then (fα+1, tα+1)
fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v) can be deﬁned for the successor ordinal α+1. Third,
we will show that, for any limit ordinal α, if (fβ, tβ) fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v)
have been deﬁned for all β < α, then (fα, tα) fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v) can
be deﬁned. Applying transﬁnite recursion then yields existence of the full
sequences (fα)α∈Ord, (t
α)α∈Ord.
Step 1. For all i ∈ I, deﬁne f 0i by f
0
i (τ) = σ
1
i (f, 0) for all τ ∈ R+ for
any f ∈ F . Note that by (CRM.i), σ1i (f, 0) is independent of f . Set t
0 :=
mini∈I ε
σi
r (f
0, 0) which exists and is strictly positive by Lemma 2. For t0 and
f 0 (TR.i)-(TR.iv) are trivially fulﬁlled. To see that (TR.v) holds, ﬁrst note
that σ1i (f
0, τ) = f 0i+(τ) = f
0
i (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t
0[ and all i ∈ I by deﬁnition
of εσir (f
0, 0). Second, σ2i (f
0, τ) = f 0i (τ) = f
0
i+(τ) for all τ ∈ R+ and all i ∈ I
by (CRM.ii) since f 0 is a constant function, and so (TR.v) is satisﬁed.
Step 2. Let α + 1 ∈ Ord be a successor ordinal and suppose that fα and
tα ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} satisfying (TR.i)-(TR.v) have been constructed.
We ﬁrst construct fα+1. For all i ∈ I, deﬁne an intermediate function
f
α+1
i = G
−
i (f
α, tα, a), where for all i ∈ I, ai = σ
1
i (f
α, tα) and G− is as
in Deﬁnition 11. By Lemma B.1(i), f
α+1
∈ F . Now, for all i ∈ I, deﬁne
fα+1i = G
+
i (f
α+1
, tα, b), where for all i ∈ I, bi = σ
2
i (f
α+1
, tα) and G+ is as
given in Deﬁnition 11. Note that for all i ∈ I, if tα ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(f
α+1
j )∪J(f
α+1
i )
then σ2i (f
α+1
, tα) = f
α+1
i (t
α) by (CRM.ii). Hence (σ2i (f
α+1
, tα))i∈I satisﬁes
the conditions in Lemma B.1(ii) and it follows that fα+1 ∈ F , i.e. (TR.i)
holds.
To prove that (TR.ii) is satisﬁed let β < α+1. By construction, fα+1(τ) =
fα(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tα[. If β = α this already shows (TR.ii). If β < α, by
(TR.ii) for α, fβ(τ) = fα(τ) = fα+1(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tβ[, where the last
equality holds because tβ ≤ tα by (TR.iv) for α, and the conclusion follows.
Now deﬁne tα+1 := tα+mini∈I ε
σi
r (f
α+1, tα). As α+1 is a successor ordinal
(tβ)β≤α+1 is continuous if (t
β)β≤α is continuous. The latter sequence is contin-
uous by induction hypothesis and hence (TR.iii) holds. To see that (TR.iv) is
fulﬁlled, note that by induction hypothesis either tα =∞ or (tβ)β≤α ⊆ R+ is
strictly increasing. If tα =∞ then tα+1 =∞ by construction. If, on the other
hand (tβ)β≤α ⊆ R+ is strictly increasing then by construction tα < tα+1 <∞
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because 0 < εσir (f
α+1, tα) <∞ by Lemma 2. Thus (tβ)β≤α+1 ⊆ R+ is strictly
increasing.
To prove (TR.v), ﬁrst note that for all τ ∈ [0, tα[ and all i ∈ I, σi(f
α+1, τ) =
σi(f
α, τ) = (fαi (τ), f
α
i+(τ)) = (f
α+1
i (τ), f
α+1
i+ (τ)) . The ﬁrst equality follows
by construction of fα+1 and both parts of (CRM.i), the second from the in-
duction hypothesis, and the third from the construction of fα+1. If tα =∞,
this already shows (TR.v). Hence we can now assume that tα <∞ (and, by
construction, tα+1 < ∞). We now prove the ﬁrst part of (TR.v). By con-
struction of fα+1 and (CRM.i) σ1i (f
α+1, tα) = σ1i (f
α, tα) and since fα+1i (t
α) =
σ1i (f
α, tα) by construction of fα+1, we obtain σ1i (f
α+1, tα) = fα+1i (t
α) for
all i ∈ I. Since tα+1 = tα + εσir (f
α+1, tα), by deﬁntion of εσir (f
α+1, tα)
it follows that σ1i (f
α+1, τ) = fα+1i+ (t
α) for all τ ∈]tα, tα+1[. Since fα+1 is
constant on ]tα,∞[, we obtain fα+1i (τ) = f
α+1
i+ (t
α) for all τ ∈]tα,∞[ and
all i ∈ I and hence σ1i (f
α+1, τ) = fα+1i (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t
α+1[. Now we
turn to the second part of (TR.v). By construction of fα+1 and (CRM.i)
σ2i (f
α+1, tα) = σ2i (f
α+1
, tα) and since fα+1i+ (t
α) = σ2i (f
α+1
, tα) by construc-
tion of fα+1, we obtain σ2i (f
α+1, tα) = fα+1i+ (t
α) for all i ∈ I. Since fα+1 is
constant on ]tα,∞[, (CRM.ii) yields σ2i (f
α+1, τ) = fα+1i (τ) = f
α+1
i+ (τ) for all
τ ∈]tα,∞[ and hence σ2i (f
α+1, τ) = fα+1i+ (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t
α+1[.
Step 3. Let α be a limit ordinal and assume that fβ and tβ ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}
satisfying (TR.i)-(TR.v) have been constructed for all β < α. Set tα :=
limβ→α t
β. We distinguish two cases. Suppose ﬁrst that tα =∞. Let α∗ ≤ α
be the ﬁrst limit ordinal such that tα
∗
= ∞. Then by induction hypothesis,
(tβ)β<α∗ ⊆ R+ is strictly increasing and continuous and hence by Lemma B.2
for every τ ∈ [t0,∞[ there is a unique β < α∗ such that τ ∈ [tβ, tβ+1[. Hence
every τ ∈ R+ is contained in some interval [0, tβ[ for some β < α∗ and by
induction hypothesis (TR.ii), fα deﬁned by fα(τ) = fβ(τ) if τ ∈ [0, tβ[ is
well-deﬁned. (TR.i)-(TR.iv) hold by induction hypothesis and construction
of fα and tα. To see (TR.v) let τ ∈ [0,∞[. Then there is β < α∗ such
that τ ∈ [0, tβ[. By induction hypothesis σi(f
β, τ) = (fβi (τ), f
β
i+(τ)). By
construction of fα, fα(τ ′) = fβ(τ ′) for all τ ′ ∈ [0, tβ[ and hence by (CRM.i)
σi(f
α, τ) = σi(f
β, τ). This yields σi(f
α, τ) = (fαi (τ), f
α
i+(τ)).
Suppose now that tα < ∞. Then by induction hypothesis (tβ)β<α ⊆ R+
55
Chapter 1
Repeated Games in Continuous Time as Extensive Form Games
is strictly increasing and continuous and by Lemma B.2, for every τ ∈ [t0, tα[
there is a unique β < α such that τ ∈ [tβ, tβ+1[. In particular every τ ∈ [0, tα[
is contained in some interval [0, tβ[ for some β < α and by (TR.ii) and for
each i ∈ I, the following intermediate function is well-deﬁned.
f˜αi (τ) :=

f
β
i (τ), if τ < t
α and τ ∈ [0, tβ[
ai, if τ ≥ t
α.
(Where ai ∈ Ai is arbitrary.) By construction (as in the proof of Lemma
B.1(i)) f˜α ∈ F . Then for each i ∈ I, deﬁne f
α
i = G
−
i (f˜
α, tα, a), where
for all i ∈ I, ai = σ
1
i (f˜
α, tα) and G− is as in Deﬁnition 11. Note that by
Lemma B.1(i), f
α
∈ F . Now, for all i ∈ I, deﬁne fαi = G
+
i (f
α
, tα, b), where
for all i ∈ I, bi = σ
2
i (f
α
, tα) and G+ is as given in Deﬁnition 11. Note
that for all i ∈ I, if tα ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(f
α
) ∪ J(fi) then σ
2
i (f
α
, tα) = f
α
i (t
α) by
(CRM.ii). Hence (σ2i (f
α
, tα))i∈I satisﬁes the conditions in Lemma B.1(ii)
and hence fα ∈ F , so (TR.i) is satisﬁed. (TR.ii) and (TR.iii) follow directly
by induction hypothesis and the constructions of fα and tα. To see (TR.iv)
note that by induction hypothesis (tβ)β<α is strictly increasing and hence,
as tα = limβ→α t
β, (tβ)β≤α is strictly increasing. To see (TR.v) let τ ∈
[0, tα[. Then there is β < α such that τ ∈ [0, tβ[. By induction hypothesis
σi(f
β, τ) = (fβi (τ), f
β
i+(τ)). By construction of f
α, fα(τ ′) = fβ(τ ′) for all τ ′ ∈
[0, tβ[ and hence by (CRM.i) σi(f
α, τ) = σi(f
β, τ). This yields σi(f
α, τ) =
(fαi (τ), f
α
i+(τ)) for all τ ∈ [0, t
α[.
This completes the construction. Transﬁnite recursion now yields se-
quences (fα)α∈Ord and (t
α)α∈Ord satisfying (TR.i)-(TR.v) for all α ∈ Ord.
Then there exists a limit ordinal α such that tα = ∞.11 Let α∗ be the ﬁrst
limit ordinal such that tα
∗
= ∞. As by (TR.iii) limα→α∗ t
α = ∞, Lemma
B.2 implies that for all τ ∈ [t0,∞[ there is a unique β < α∗ such that
τ ∈ [tβ , tβ+1[. Hence for all τ ∈ R+ there is β ∈ Ord such that τ ∈ [0, tβ[.
Then, using (TR.ii), fi given by fi(τ) := f
β
i (τ) for τ ∈ [0, t
β[ is well-deﬁned.
From the construction of f and because fα ∈ F by (TR.iii) for every
11Otherwise, we would have a strictly increasing mapping from the class of ordinals to
R, which is impossible (e.g. by Lemma III.2 in Stinchcombe, 1992).
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α ∈ Ord, it follows that f ∈ F . To see that σi(f, τ) = (fi(τ), fi+(τ)) for
all τ ∈ R+ and all i ∈ I let τ ∈ R+. Then there is β < α∗ such that
τ ∈ [0, tβ[. As fβ satisﬁes (TR.v) it follows that σi(f
β, τ) = (fβi (τ), f
β
i+(τ)).
By construction of f , f(τ ′) = fβ(τ ′) for all τ ′ ∈ [0, tβ[ and hence by (CRM.i)
σi(f, τ) = σi(f
β, τ). This yields σi(f, τ) = (fi(τ), fi+(τ)) for all τ ∈ [0,∞[.
Finally, we will prove that f is unique. Let f ′ ∈ F be such that σ1i (f
′, τ) =
f ′i(τ) and σ
2
i (f
′, τ) = f ′i+(τ) for all τ ∈ R+ and all i ∈ I. Assume f
′ 6= f .
Then t := inf{τ ∈ R+|f ′(τ) 6= f(τ)} exists. We claim that t > 0. To see this,
note that f ′(0) = f(0) by (CRM.i). By (CRM.ii) there is ε > 0 such that
f ′(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, ε[. This proves the claim. Because f ′(τ) = f(τ)
for all τ ∈ [0, t[, (CRM.i) implies that f ′i(t) = σ
1
i (f
′, t) = σ1i (f, t) = fi(t)
for all i ∈ I. Further, it follows from (CRM.i) that f ′i+(t) = σ
2
i (f
′, t) =
σ2i (f, t) = fi+(t) for all i ∈ I. Hence, as f
′, f ∈ F , by (DP.i) there is ε > 0
such that f ′(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t+ε[, which contradicts the construction
of t = inf{τ ∈ R+|f ′(τ) 6= f(τ)}.
(ii) Given f ∈ F and t ∈ R++, deﬁne a0i = σi(f, t) for all i ∈ I. Deﬁne
f 0 = G−(f, t, a0) and set t0 = t+mini∈I ε
σi
r (f, t) where ε
σi
r (f, t) is deﬁned as
in the proof of (i). The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of (i).
(iii) Let f ∈ F . For each i ∈ I ﬁx some arbitrary ai ∈ Ai. For all i ∈ I,
f ∈ F , and τ ∈ R+ deﬁne
σ1i (f, t) =


f i(t), if f(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[
lim
τ→t−
fi(τ), if f(τ) 6= f(τ) for some τ ∈ [0, t[ and ∃ lim
τ→t−
f(τ),
ai, otherwise,
and
σ2i (f, t) =

f i+(t), if f(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t],fi(t), otherwise.
(CRM.i) holds by construction of σi.
To see (CRM.ii) let i ∈ I, f ∈ F and t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj)∪J(fi). Note that by
(DP.ii) and (DP.iii), t ∈ RK(fi). Hence by (DP.i) there is ε > 0 such that fi is
constant on [t, t+ε[ and in particular, limr→τ− f(r) = f(τ) for all τ ∈]t, t+ε[.
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To show the ﬁrst part of (CRM.ii), we will distinguish two cases. First, if
f(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t] then also t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(f j)∪ J(f i) which implies
t ∈ RK(f i) and hence f i+(t) = f i(t). Hence by construction, σ
2
i (f, t) =
f i+(t) = f i(t) = fi(t). Second, if there is τ ≤ t such that f(τ) 6= f(τ) then
σ2i (f, t) = fi(t) by construction. To prove the second part of (CRM.ii), we will
again distinguish two cases. First, if there is ε′ > 0 such that f(τ) = f(τ) for
all τ ∈ [0, t+ ε′[ then σ1i (f, τ) = f i(τ) for all τ ∈]t, t+ ε
′[. Since t ∈ RK(fi),
fi(τ) = fi(t) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[ and hence σ
1
i (f, τ) = f i(τ) = fi(τ) = fi(t)
for all τ ∈]t, t + min{ε, ε′}[. Second, if for every τ > t there is τ ′ < τ such
that f(τ ′) 6= f(τ ′), then by construction σ1i (f, τ) = limr→τ− fi(r) = fi(τ) for
all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. As t ∈ RK(fi), fi(τ) = fi(t) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[ and hence
σ1i (f, τ) = fi(τ) = fi(t) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[.
To establish (CRM.iii) let i ∈ I, f ∈ F , and t ∈ LC(fi) ∩
⋃
j∈I J(fj).
Note that by (DP.i) there is ε > 0 such that f is constant on ]t, t + ε[ and
in particular limr→τ− f(r) = f(τ) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. We distinguish two
cases. First, if there is ε′ > 0 such that f(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t+ ε′[ then
σi(f, τ) = f i(τ) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε
′[. Since f is constant on ]t, t + ε[, fi(τ) =
fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t+ε[. We thus obtain σi(f, τ) = f i(τ) = fi(τ) = fi+(t) for
all τ ∈]t, t +min{ε, ε′}[. Second, if for every τ > t there is τ ′ < τ such that
that f(τ ′) 6= f(τ ′), then by construction σ1i (f, τ) = limr→τ− fi(r) = fi(τ) for
all τ ∈]t, t+ ε[. As f is constant on ]t, t+ ε[, fi(τ) = fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t+ ε[
and hence σ1i (f, τ) = fi(τ) = fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[.
This shows that σi is a CRM for every i ∈ I. Since σ
1
i (f, t) = f i(t) and
σ2i (f, t) = f i+(t) for all t ∈ R+ and all i ∈ I, σ induces f .
Appendix 1.C: Proofs from Section 1.5
This appendix contains the proofs of Lemmata 3, and 4, Propositions 3 and
4, and Theorem 2. We start with a few preliminary results.
Lemma C.1. (i) Let f ∈ F and t1, t2 ∈ R+ be such that ]t1, t2[∩J(fi) = ∅
for all i ∈ I. Then f is constant on ]t1, t2[.
(ii) Let (f, t) ∈ F × R+ and t ∈ [t(f, t), t]. Then f t+(τ) = f(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, t[.
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Proof. (i) By (DP.i), fi is piecewise constant for all i ∈ I. Hence there is
ε > 0 and a ∈ ×i∈IAi such that f(τ) = a for all τ ∈]t1, t1 + ε[. Suppose
by contradiction that there is t ∈ [t1 + ε, t2[ such that f(t) 6= a. Then
t∗ := inf{t ∈ [t1+ ε, t2[|f(t) 6= a} exists. By (DP.ii) t
∗ ∈ LC(fi)∪RK(fi) for
all i ∈ I. If t∗ /∈ RK(fi) for some i ∈ I, then t
∗ ∈ R(fi) = LC(fi) \ RK(fi)
and, by (DP.iii), there is j ∈ I, such that t∗ ∈ J(fj), which contradicts
]t1, t2[∩J(fj) = ∅. It follows that t
∗ ∈ RK(fi) for all i ∈ I. Further,
t∗ ∈ LC(fi) for all i ∈ I, as otherwise t
∗ ∈ RK(fi) \LC(fi) = J(fi) for some
i ∈ I which again contradicts ]t1, t2[∩J(fj) = ∅. Hence t
∗ ∈ LC(fi)∩RK(fi)
for all i ∈ I and since f(τ) = a for all τ ∈]t1, t
∗[ by construction of t∗, we
obtain f(t∗) = a. Further, by (DP.i), there is ε′ > 0 and b ∈ ×i∈IAi such
that f(τ) = b for all τ ∈]t∗, t∗ + ε′[. As t∗ ∈ RK(fi) for all i ∈ I, we obtain
f(t∗) = b and hence a = b. Thus there is ε′ > 0 such that f(τ) = a for all
]t1, t
∗ + ε′[, which contradicts the deﬁnition of t∗.
(ii) If t = t(f, t) the conclusion follows by construction. Hence suppose
that t > t(f, t). By construction f t+(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t]. By (i),
f is constant on ]t(f, t), t[ and hence f(τ) = f+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t[. Thus
f(τ) = f t+(τ) for all τ ∈]t, t[ and the conclusion follows.
For f ∈ F and t ∈ R+ deﬁne
t+(f, t) :=


min
⋃
i∈I
J(fi)∩]t,+∞[, if
⋃
i∈I
J(fi)∩]t,+∞[6= ∅
t, otherwise.
That is, t+(f, t) is the next time after t that some player jumps. Note that
the minimum used in the construction exists by Lemma A.2.
The following lemma shows that every decision path can be “completed”
to a play by appropriately specifying the inertia times.
Lemma C.2. For every f ∈ F there is ǫ ∈ E such that (f, ǫ) ∈ W .
Proof. Fix f ∈ F and let t∗ = maxJ (f) be the last jump of f if maxJ (f)
exists and t∗ = +∞ otherwise. Note that if t ∈ J (f) \ {t∗} then t+(f, t) > t
since then by construction of t∗,
⋃
i∈I J(fi)∩]t,+∞[6= ∅. Further, if t
∗ < ∞
then t+(f, t∗) = t∗.
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For each i ∈ I deﬁne ǫi : R+ → R+ as follows
ǫi(t) :=


t+(f, t)− t, if t ∈ J (f) \ {t∗},
73, if t = t∗ + 73n for some n ∈ N0,
0, otherwise.
Note that as 0 ∈ J(fi) for all i ∈ I it follows that ǫi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ I and
hence ǫ = (ǫi)i∈I ∈ E. By construction, for all i ∈ I,
DP (ǫi) = J (f) ∪ {t ∈ R+|t = t
∗ + 73n for some n ∈ N}. (1.3)
It remains to show that w = (f, ǫ) ∈ W , i.e. that (P.i)-(P.iv) in Deﬁnition 4
hold. To prove (P.i), let t ∈ J(fi) for some i ∈ I. If t = t(f, t) it follows from
(1.3) that t = Prev(ǫi, t) and hence t ∈ PJ(ǫi) by deﬁnition of the latter. If
t > t(f, t), then t = t+(t(f, t)) > t(f, t) where the inequality holds because
t ≤ t∗. As t∗ ≥ t > t(f, t) ∈ J (f), it follows that ǫi(t(f, t)) = t
+(t(f, t)) −
t(f, t) > 0, i.e. t = t(f, t) + ǫi(t(f, t)). By Lemma C.1, f is constant on
]t(f, t), t[ and hence ǫi(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t(f, t), t[. Thus t(f, t) = Prev(ǫi, t),
which implies that t = Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)) and t ∈ PJ(ǫi). To see (P.ii),
let again t ∈ J(fi) for some i ∈ I. Then, by construction, ǫj(t) > 0 for
all j ∈ I and hence by (1.3) t ∈
⋂
j∈I DP (ǫj). To establish (P.iii), let
t ∈ PJ(ǫi) for some i ∈ I. If Prev(ǫi, t) = t, which by (1.3) is only possible
if t = t(f, t), then t ∈ J (f) and hence ǫi(t) > 0, i.e. t ∈ DP (ǫi). Otherwise
t = Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)). Then, by (1.3), either Prev(ǫi, t) ∈ J (f) \ {t
∗} or
Prev(ǫi, t) = t
∗+73n for some n ∈ N0 implying that either t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) or
t = t∗+73n for some n ∈ N0. In any case it follows from (1.3) that ǫi(t) > 0.
To see (P.iv), let t ∈ DP (ǫi) for some i ∈ I. Then
⋃
j∈I J(fj)∩]t,Next(ǫi, t)[=
∅ and ǫi(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t,Next(ǫi, t)[ by (1.3). Hence (P.iv) holds.
Lemma C.3. (i) Let (f, ǫ) ∈ W , t ∈ R+. If t(f, t) = t then t ∈ PJ(ǫi)
for all i ∈ I.
(ii) Let f ∈ F , i ∈ I, si ∈ Si, and t ∈ R+. If t(f, t) = t then t ∈ PJ(ǫi)
for any ǫ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W and (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) agrees with si
on [t(f, t),∞[.
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Proof. (i) If t = 0 then Prev(ǫi, 0) = 0 and hence 0 ∈ PJ(ǫi) by deﬁnition. If
t > 0 then, since t(f, t) = sup
(⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ [0, t[
)
= t and
⋃
j∈I J(fj)∩[0, t[⊆
DP (ǫi) ∩ [0, t[ by (P.ii), Prev(ǫi, t) = sup (DP (ǫi) ∩ [0, t[) = t and hence
t ∈ PJ(ǫi).
(ii) This follows from (i) since (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W by hypothesis.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) First note that f t+ = G+(f, t, f+(t)) (recall Deﬁnition
11 in Section 1.7). Since f ∈ F , it follows that fj+(t) = fj(t) if t(f, t) ∈⋂
k∈I LC(fk) ∪ J(fj) for all j ∈ I, and hence f
t+ ∈ F by Lemma B.1(ii).
We are going to use transﬁnite recursion to construct a sequence of
functions (ǫα)α∈Ord and a sequence of extended real numbers (t
α)α∈Ord ⊆
R+ ∪ {∞} such that for all α ∈ Ord the following properties are satisﬁed.
(TR.i) (f t+, ǫα) ∈ W .
(TR.ii) If β < α then ǫα(τ) = ǫβ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tβ[.
(TR.iii) (tβ)β≤α is continuous.
(TR.iv) Either tα = ∞ or (tβ)β≤α ⊆]t,∞[∩
(⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j )
)
and is strictly in-
creasing.
(TR.v) If ǫαi (τ) > 0 then si
(
xPτ ((f
t+, ǫα))
)
= ci
(
xPτ ((f
t+, ǫα)) , ǫα(τ)
)
for all
τ ∈ [t, tα[
In order to apply transﬁnite recursion, we need to complete three steps.
First, we will deﬁne (ǫ0, t0) trivially fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v). Second, we will
show that, if (TR.i)-(TR.v) are fulﬁlled for an ordinal α then (ǫα+1, tα+1)
fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v) can be deﬁned for the successor ordinal α+1. Third,
we will show that, for any limit ordinal α, if (ǫβ , tβ) fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v)
have been deﬁned for all β < α, then (ǫα, tα) fulﬁlling (TR.i)-(TR.v) can
be deﬁned. Applying transﬁnite recursion then yields existence of the full
sequences (ǫα)α∈Ord, (t
α)α∈Ord.
Step 1. Let ǫ ∈ E be such that (f t+, ǫ) ∈ W which exists by Lemma
C.2. Note that xPt ((f
t+, ǫ)) ∈ N and player i has to make a choice at this
node. This is because either t ∈ J(fj) for some j ∈ I, in which case i ∈
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IDP (ǫ, t) by (P.ii) or t = t(f, t) in which case t = Prev(ǫ, t) by (P.ii) and
deﬁnition of Prev(·, ·) and hence i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t). In both cases, by Lemma
A.5, IPJ(ǫ, t) 6= ∅ and xP ((f t+, ǫ)) ∈ Xi. Set t
0 := t + ε0, where ε0 > 0
is such that si
(
xPt ((f
t+, ǫ))
)
= ci
(
xPt ((f
t+, ǫ)) , ε0
)
. Since (f t+, ǫ) ∈ W ,
by (P.i) t ∈ J(f t+j ) only if t ∈ PJ(ǫj). Further, since t ∈ J (f), it follows
that t ∈ J (f t+) by construction of f t+. Then, by Lemma A.4(ii), there is
ǫ0 ∈ E such that ǫ0(τ) = ǫ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[, ǫ0j (t) = ε
0 for all j ∈ I,
and (f t+, ǫ0) ∈ W . Thus (TR.i) holds. (TR.ii) and (TR.iii) are trivially
fulﬁlled. (TR.iv) holds by construction, since (f t+, ǫ0) ∈ W and hence by
(P.iv) ǫ0j (τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t, t
0[ and all j ∈ I. (TR.v) holds since by
construction ǫ0i (t) = ε
0 and ǫ0i (τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t, t
0[.
Step 2. Let α+1 ∈ Ord be a successor ordinal and suppose that ǫα and tα ∈
R+ ∪ {∞} satisfying (TR.i)-(TR.v) have been constructed. We distinguish
two cases. Suppose ﬁrst that tα = ∞. In this case set tα+1 = ∞ and
deﬁne ǫα+1 = ǫα. Then (TR.i)-(TR.v) are satisﬁed by induction hypothesis.
Suppose now that tα <∞. Since tα ∈
⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j ) by induction hypothesis,
it follows from (P.iii) that xPtα ((f
t+, ǫα)) ∈ Xi. Set t
α+1 = tα + εα, where
εα > 0 is such that si
(
xPtα ((f
t+, ǫα))
)
= ci
(
xPtα ((f
t+, ǫα)) , εα
)
. Applying
Lemma A.4(i) to f t+, tα, and εα yields that there is ǫα+1 ∈ E such that
ǫα+1(τ) = ǫα(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tα[, ǫα+1j (t
α) = εα for all j ∈ IPJ(ǫα, tα) = I
and (f t+, ǫα+1) ∈ W . Hence (TR.i) holds. To see (TR.ii) let β < α + 1.
By construction, ǫα+1(τ) = ǫα(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tα[. If β = α this already
shows (TR.ii). If β < α, by (TR.ii) for α, ǫβ(τ) = ǫα(τ) = ǫα+1(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, tβ[, where the last equality holds because tβ ≤ tα by (TR.iv) for α,
and the conclusion follows. To see (TR.iii) note that (tβ)β≤α is continuous by
induction hypothesis and hence (tβ)β≤α+1 is continuous as α+1 is a successor
ordinal. To see (TR.iv), note that since tα < ∞ by induction hypothesis
(tβ)β≤α ⊆]t,∞[∩
(⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j )
)
is strictly increasing. Then by construction
tα < tα+1 <∞ because 0 < εα <∞ by construction of Ci. Further, that t
α ∈⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j ) implies t
α ∈
⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α+1
j ) by construction. Since (f
t+, ǫα+1) ∈
W , it follows by (P.iv) that ǫα+1(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]tα, tα+1[, and hence tα+1 ∈
]t,∞[∩
(⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α+1
j )
)
. Thus (tβ)β≤α+1 ⊆]t,∞[∩
(⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j )
)
is strictly
increasing. (TR.v) is satisﬁed by construction and induction hypothesis.
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Step 3. Let α be a limit ordinal and assume that ǫβ and tβ ⊆ R+ ∪ {∞}
satisfying (TR.i)-(TR.v) have been constructed for all β < α. Set tα =
limβ→α t
β. Suppose ﬁrst that tα = ∞. Let α∗ ≤ α be the ﬁrst limit ordinal
such that tα
∗
=∞. Then by induction hypothesis, (tβ)β<α∗ ⊆]t,∞[ is strictly
increasing and continuous and hence by Lemma B.2 for every τ ∈ [t0,∞[
there is a unique β < α∗ such that τ ∈ [tβ, tβ+1[. Hence every τ ∈ R+ is
contained in some interval [0, tβ[ for some β < α∗ and by induction hypothesis
(TR.ii), ǫα deﬁned by ǫα(τ) = ǫβ(τ) if τ ∈ [0, tβ[ is well-deﬁned. (TR.i)-
(TR.v) hold by induction hypothesis and construction of ǫα and tα.
Suppose now that tα <∞. Then by induction hypothesis (tβ)β<α ⊆]t,∞[
is strictly increasing and continuous and by Lemma B.2, for every τ ∈ [t0, tα[
there is a unique β < α such that τ ∈ [tβ, tβ+1[. In particular every τ ∈ [0, tα[
is contained in some interval [0, tβ[ for some β < α and by (TR.ii) and for
each i ∈ I, the following function is well-deﬁned.
ǫαj (τ) :=


ǫβj (τ), if τ < t
α and τ ∈ [0, tβ[
73, if τ = tα + 73n for some n ∈ N0
0, otherwise.
To see (TR.i), let τ ∈ J(f t+j ) for some j ∈ I. By deﬁnition of f
t+ and
construction of tα, τ ≤ t < tα. There is β < α such τ ∈ [0, tβ[ and
we obtain τ ∈ PJ(ǫβj ) ∩
⋂
k∈I DP (ǫ
β
k) by (TR.i) for (f
t+, ǫβ). Hence τ ∈
PJ(ǫαj ) ∩
⋂
k∈I DP (ǫ
α
k ) by construction. This establishes (P.i) and (P.ii). To
see (P.iii) let τ ∈ PJ(ǫαj ) for some j ∈ I. We distinguish two cases. First, if
τ < tα then τ ∈ DP (ǫβj ) for some β < α by induction hypothesis. Hence by
construction τ ∈ DP (ǫαj ). Second, if τ ≥ t
α then τ ∈ PJ(ǫαj ) implies that
τ is of the form tα + 73n for some n ∈ N0 and hence τ ∈ DP (ǫαj ) by con-
struction of ǫα. To prove (P.iv), let τ ∈ DP (ǫαj ). We again distinguish two
cases. First, if τ < tα then τ ∈ [0, tβ[ for some β < α. By (P.iv) for (f t+, ǫβ),⋃
k 6=j J(f
t+
k )∩]τ, τ
′] 6= ∅ for any τ ′ ∈ DP (ǫβ)∩]τ,Next(ǫβj , τ)[. Hence by con-
struction of ǫα,
⋃
k 6=j J(f
t+
k )∩]τ, τ
′] 6= ∅ for any τ ′ ∈ DP (ǫα)∩]τ,Next(ǫαj , τ)[.
Second, if τ ≥ tα note that
⋃
j∈I J(f
t+
j )∩]τ,∞[= ∅ by deﬁnition of f
t+. Since
DP (ǫαj )∩]τ,Next(ǫ
α
j , τ)[= ∅ by construction of ǫ
α, the conclusion follows.
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(TR.ii) and (TR.iii) follow directly by induction hypothesis and the con-
structions of ǫα and tα. To see (TR.iv) note that by induction hypothesis
(tβ)β<α is strictly increasing and hence, as t
α = limβ→α t
β , (tβ)β≤α is strictly
increasing. Further, by induction hypothesis tβ ∈
⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j ) for all β < α
and hence by construction tβ ∈
⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j ) for all β < α. It follows from
(P.iii) that for all j ∈ I, tα = Prev(ǫαj , t
α) and thus that tα ∈
⋂
j∈I PJ(ǫ
α
j ).
(TR.v) holds by construction and induction hypothesis.
This completes the construction of the sequences. Transﬁnite recursion
now yields sequences (ǫα)α∈Ord and (t
α)α∈Ord satisfying (TR.i)-(TR.v) for all
α ∈ Ord. Then there exists a limit ordinal α such that tα = ∞.12 Let α∗
be the ﬁrst limit ordinal such that tα
∗
=∞. As by (TR.iii) limβ→α∗ t
β =∞,
Lemma B.2 implies that for all τ ∈ [t0,∞[ there is a unique β < α∗ such that
τ ∈ [tβ , tβ+1[. Hence for all τ ∈ R+ there is β ∈ Ord such that τ ∈ [0, tβ[.
Then, using (TR.ii), ǫj deﬁned by ǫj(τ) := ǫ
β
j (τ) if τ ∈ [0, t
β[ is well-deﬁned.
From the construction of ǫ and because (f t+, ǫβ) ∈ W by (TR.iii) for
every β ∈ Ord, it follows that (f t+, ǫ) ∈ W . To see that (f t+, ǫ) agrees with
si on [t,∞[ let τ ∈ [t,∞[ be such that ǫi(τ) > 0. Then there is β < α
∗ such
that τ ∈ [0, tβ[ and ǫi(τ
′) = ǫβi (τ
′) for all τ ′ ∈ [0, tβ[. Further, by (TR.v)
si
(
xPτ
(
(f t+, ǫβ)
))
= ci
(
xPτ
(
(f t+, ǫβ)
)
, ǫβi (τ)
)
. Because xPτ
(
(f t+, ǫβ)
)
=
xPτ ((f
t+, ǫ)), it follows that si
(
xPτ ((f
t+, ǫ))
)
= si
(
xPτ
(
(f t+, ǫβ)
))
and as
ǫi(τ) = ǫ
β
i (τ) the conclusion follows.
It remains to show that ǫi(t) > 0. If t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fi) then t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(f
t+
i )
and hence ǫi(t) > 0 by (P.ii). If t = t(f, t) = t(f
t+, t) then ǫi(t) > 0 by (P.i)
and (P.iii).
(ii) Let ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ E be such that w = (f t+, ǫ) and w′ = (f t+, ǫ′) agree with
si on [t,∞[ and assume ǫi(τ) 6= ǫ
′
i(τ) for some τ ∈ [t,∞[. Since t ∈ J (f)
and w,w′ ∈ W it follows from (P.i) and (P.iii) that t ∈ DP (ǫi) ∩ DP (ǫ
′
i).
Further, si(x
P
t (w)) = si(x
P
t (w
′)) since w and w′ have the same decision path
and t ∈ DP (ǫi) ∩ DP (ǫ
′
i). Hence, as w and w
′ agree with si on [t,∞[, it
follows that ǫi(t) = ǫ
′
i(t). Thus τ > t and K := {τ
′ > t|ǫi(τ
′) 6= ǫ′i(τ
′)} ⊆
DP (ǫi) ∪ DP (ǫ
′
i) is non-empty and well-ordered which by Lemma A.3(i)
implies that t := minK exists. By Lemma A.5, because t ∈ DP (ǫi)∪DP (ǫ
′
i)
12Recall footnote 11.
64
Chapter 1
Repeated Games in Continuous Time as Extensive Form Games
and f t+ is constant on ]t,+∞[, we obtain t ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∪ PJ(ǫ
′
i). Note that
t ∈ PJ(ǫi) if and only if t ∈ PJ(ǫ
′
i) as ǫi(τ) = ǫ
′
i(τ) for all τ ∈ [t, t[. Hence
t ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∩ PJ(ǫ
′
i). Then, by (P.iii), t ∈ DP (ǫi) ∩ DP (ǫ
′
i) which yields
ǫi(t) = ǫ
′
i(t). This contradicts the construction of t.
(iii) Let ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ E be such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) and (f t(f,t)+, ǫ′) agree with si on
[t(f, t),∞[. We start by claiming that t′ ∈ PJ(ǫi) if and only if t
′ ∈ PJ(ǫ′i) for
all t′ ∈]t(f, t),∞[. To prove this, let t′ > t(f, t) be such that t′ ∈ PJ(ǫi). By
(i), t(f, t) ∈ DP (ǫi)∩DP (ǫ
′
i) and hence Prev(ǫi, t
′) ≥ t(f, t) and Prev(ǫ′i, t
′) ≥
t(f, t). By (ii), ǫi(τ) = ǫ
′
i(τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t),∞[ and hence Prev(ǫi, t
′) =
Prev(ǫ′i, t
′). Since t′ ∈ PJ(ǫi), either t = Prev(ǫi, t
′) = Prev(ǫ′i, t
′) or t =
Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t
′)) = Next(ǫ′i,Prev(ǫ
′
i, t
′)) where the second equality holds
because ǫi(τ) = ǫ
′
i(τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t),∞[ and Prev(ǫi, t
′) ≥ t(f, t). In
either case t′ ∈ PJ(ǫ′i) which proves the claim. If t(f, t) < t this already
proves PJ(ǫi) ∩ [t,∞[= PJ(ǫ
′
i) ∩ [t,∞[. If t(f, t) = t then by Lemma C.3
t ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∩ PJ(ǫ
′
i) and it follows that PJ(ǫi) ∩ [t,∞[= PJ(ǫ
′
i) ∩ [t,∞[.
Lemma C.4. Let f ∈ F and t ∈ R+. If t(f, t) = t then t ∈ M(f, si) for all
i ∈ I and all si ∈ Si.
Proof. By Lemma 3(i) there is ǫ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W and it agrees
with si on [t(f, t),∞[. Hence, by Lemma C.3(ii), t ∈M(f, si).
Proof of Proposition 3. To see the ﬁrst part of (CRM.i) consider ﬁrst the
case t = 0. Note that by deﬁnition t(fˆ , 0) = 0 for all fˆ ∈ F and hence by
Lemma C.4, 0 ∈ M(fˆ , si). Thus, for any f, fˆ ∈ F , by construction of σ
si,1,
we obtain σsi,1(f, 0) = ai(f, 0, si) = ai(fˆ , 0, si) = σ
si,1(fˆ , 0), where the second
equality follows from the fact that x0((f
′, ǫ)) = W for any (f ′, ǫ) ∈ W . Now
let t ∈ R++ and f, fˆ ∈ F be such that f(τ) = fˆ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[. Then
t(f, t) = t(fˆ , t). We claim that t ∈ M(f, si) if and only if t ∈ M(fˆ , si). If
t > t(f, t) = t(fˆ , t) then f t(f,t)+ = fˆ t(f,t)+ and hence t ∈ M(f, si) if and only
if t ∈ M(fˆ , si) by Lemma 3(iii). If t = t(f, t) = t(fˆ , t) then t ∈ M(f, si) ∩
M(fˆ , si) by Lemma C.4. This proves the claim. In view of this claim, we
distinguish two cases. First, if t /∈ M(f, si) ∪M(fˆ , si) then by construction
σsi,1i (f, t) = fi−(t) = fˆi−(t) = σ
si,1
i (fˆ , t). Second, if t ∈ M(f, si) ∩M(fˆ , si)
then σsi,1i (f, t) = ai(f, t, si) and σ
si,1
i (fˆ , t) = ai(fˆ , t, si). Further, there are
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ǫ, ǫˆ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ), (fˆ t(f,t)+, ǫˆ) ∈ W and t ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∩ PJ(ǫˆi).
Note that by Lemma C.1(ii) f t(f,t)+(τ) = f(τ) = fˆ(τ) = fˆ t(f,t)+(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, t[. By deﬁnition si(xt((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ)), ai(f, t, si))
and si(xt((fˆ
t(f,t)+, ǫˆ))) = ci(xt((fˆ
t(f,t)+, ǫˆ)), ai(fˆ , t, si)). It follows from the
construction of the EDP that xt((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ)) and xt((fˆ
t(f,t)+, ǫˆ)) are in the
same information set and hence that ai(f, t, si) = ai(fˆ , t, si) implying that
σsi,1i (f, t) = σ
si,1
i (fˆ , t).
To see the second part of (CRM.i), let f, fˆ ∈ F , and t ∈ R+ be such
that f(τ) = fˆ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t]. Then t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ LC(fi) if and
only if t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fˆj) ∩ LC(fˆi). We distinguish two cases. First, if t /∈⋃
j∈I J(fj)∩LC(fi) (in which case t /∈
⋃
j∈I J(fˆj)∩LC(fˆi)) by construction
σsi,2(f, t) = fi(t) = fˆi(t) = σ
si,2(fˆ , t). Second, if t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ LC(fi)
(in which case t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fˆj) ∩ LC(fˆi)) we obtain σ
si,2
i (f, t) = a
R
i (f, t, si)
and σsi,2i (fˆ , t) = a
R
i (fˆ , t, si). By Lemma C.2 there are ǫ, ǫˆ ∈ E such that
(f, ǫ), (fˆ , ǫˆ) ∈ W . By construction of the game tree xRt ((f, ǫ)), x
R
t ((fˆ , ǫˆ)) ∈
Xi. Further, by deﬁnition si(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))) = ci(x
R
t ((f, ǫ)), a
R
i (f, t, si)) and
si(x
R
t ((fˆ , ǫˆ))) = ci(x
R
t ((fˆ , ǫˆ)), a
R
i (fˆ , t, si)). Since f(τ) = fˆ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t],
xRt ((f, ǫ)) and x
R
t ((fˆ , ǫˆ)) are in the same information set. Hence a
R
i (f, t, si) =
aRi (fˆ , t, si) and it follows that σ
si,2(f, t) = σsi,2(fˆ , t).
To show (CRM.ii) let f ∈ F and t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj) ∪ J(fi). The ﬁrst part
holds because by construction σsi,2(f, t) = fi(t). To see the second part,
note that by (DP.i) there is ε > 0 such that f is constant on ]t, t + ε[. We
distinguish two cases. First, if t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj) then t(f, τ) = t(f, t) for
all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. We claim that PJ(f, τ, si) = PJ(f, t, si) ∩ [τ,∞[ for all
τ ∈]t, t + ε[. To see this let τ ∈]t, t + ε[. Since t(f, τ) = t(f, t) it follows
that f t(f,τ)+ = f t(f,t)+. Hence, if ǫ ∈ E is such that (f t(f,τ)+, ǫ) ∈ W and
(f t(f,τ)+, ǫ) agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[ then also (f
t(f,t)+, ǫ) agrees with si on
[t(f, t),∞[. By deﬁnition it follows that PJ(f, τ, si) = PJ(f, t, si) ∩ [τ,∞[,
proving the claim. As f t(f,t)+ is constant on ]t(f, t),∞[, if ǫ ∈ E is such
that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W and (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[ then by
(P.iv) there is ε′ > 0 such that PJ(ǫi)∩]t, t+ ε
′[= ∅. Hence, by Lemma 3(ii),
PJ(ǫi)∩]t, t+ε
′[= ∅ for all ǫ ∈ E is such that (f t+, ǫ) ∈ W and (f t+, ǫ) agrees
with si on [t,∞[ implying that PJ(f, t, si)∩]t, t+ ε
′[= ∅. We obtain that for
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all τ ∈]t, t + min{ε, ε′}[, PJ(f, τ, si)∩]t, t + min{ε, ε
′}[= ∅ and hence τ /∈
M(f, si). Thus σ
si,1(f, τ) = fi−(τ) = fi(t) for all τ ∈]t, t+min{ε, ε
′}[, where
the ﬁrst equality holds by construction and the second because t ∈ RK(fi)
and f is constant on ]t, t+ε[. The latter in turn follows from t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj)
and (DP.iii). Second, if t ∈ J(fi) then t(f, τ) = t for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. As f
t+
is constant on ]t,∞[, if ǫ ∈ E is such that (f t+, ǫ) ∈ W and (f t+, ǫ) agrees
with si on [t,∞[ then by (P.iv) there is ε
′ > 0 such that PJ(ǫi)∩]t, t+ε
′[= ∅.
Hence, by Lemma 3(ii), PJ(ǫi)∩]t, t + ε
′[= ∅ for all ǫ ∈ E is such that
(f t+, ǫ) ∈ W and (f t+, ǫ) agrees with si on [t,∞[. As f
t(f,τ)+ = f t+ for all
τ ∈]t, t + ε[, this implies that PJ(f, τ, si)∩]t, t + ε
′[= ∅ for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[
and hence τ /∈ M(f, si). We thus obtain σ
si,1(f, τ) = fi−(τ) = fi(t) for all
τ ∈]t, t +min{ε, ε′}[, where the second equality holds because t ∈ J(fi) and
f is constant on ]t, t + ε[.
To prove (CRM.iii), let f ∈ F and t ∈ LC(fi) ∩
⋃
j∈I J(fj). By (DP.i)
there is ε > 0 such that f is constant on ]t, t+ε[ which implies that t(f, τ) = t
for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. Since f t+ is constant on ]t,∞[ if ǫ ∈ E is such that
(f t+, ǫ) ∈ W and (f t+, ǫ) agrees with si on [t,∞[ then by (P.iv) there is ε
′ > 0
such that PJ(ǫi)∩]t, t + ε
′[= ∅. As f t(f,τ)+ = f t+ for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[, this
implies that PJ(f, τ, si)∩]t, t+ ε
′[= ∅ for all τ ∈]t, t+ ε[. Hence σsi,1i (f, τ) =
fi−(τ) = fi+(t) for all τ ∈]t, t +min{ε, ε
′}[, where the second equality holds
because f is constant on ]t, t + ε[.
The remaining proofs in this section are simpliﬁed if one relies on the
following auxiliary concept and its characterization in Lemma C.5 below.
Definition 12. For player i s1i , s
2
i ∈ Si are CRM-equivalent if σ
s1i = σs
2
i .
Lemma C.5. Let i ∈ I. Then s1i , s
2
i ∈ Si are CRM-equivalent if and only if
(O.i) For all potential jump nodes x = xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi, if t ∈ M(f, s
1
i ) ∩
M(f, s2i ) then s
1
i (x) = s
2
i (x).
(O.ii) For all potential jump nodes x = xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi, if t ∈ M(f, s
k
i ) \
M(f, sli) for k 6= l then s
k
i (xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), fi−(t)).
(O.iii) For all reaction nodes x = xRt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi, s
1
i (x) = s
2
i (x).
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Proof of Lemma C.5. “If”: Let s1i and s
2
i satisfy (O.i)-(O.iii) and let (f, t) ∈
F × R+. To prove that σs
1
i ,1(f, t) = σs
2
i ,1(f, t) we distinguish three cases.
First, if t /∈ M(f, s1i ) ∪ M(f, s
2
i ) then σ
s1i ,1(f, t) = fi−(t) = σ
s2i ,1(f, t) by
construction. Second, if t ∈ M(f, s1i ) ∩M(f, s
2
i ), then by (O.i) we obtain
s1i (xt((f, ǫ))) = s
2
i (xt((f, ǫ))) for all potential jump nodes xt(f, ǫ) ∈ Xi. In
particular ai(f, t, s
1
i ) = ai(f, t, s
2
i ) and hence by construction σ
s1i ,1(f, t) =
σs
2
i ,1(f, t). Third, if t ∈M(f, s1i ) \M(f, s
2
i ) (and analogously if superindices
are exchanged) then by (O.ii) we obtain s1i (xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), fi−(t))
for all potential jump nodes xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi. Then by construction σ
s1i ,1(f, t) =
fi−(t) and σ
s2i ,1(f, t) = fi−(t) and hence σ
s1i ,1(f, t) = σs
2
i ,1(f, t).
To see that σs
1
i ,2(f, t) = σs
2
i ,2(f, t) we distinguish two cases. First, if
t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ LC(fi) then by construction σ
s1i ,2(f, t) = aRi (f, t, s
1
i ) and
σs
2
i ,2(f, t) = aRi (f, t, s
2
i ). By (O.iii) it follows that a
R
i (f, t, s
1
i ) = a
R
i (f, t, s
2
i )
and hence σs
1
i ,2(f, t) = σs
2
i ,2(f, t). Second, if t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj)∪ J(fi) then by
construction σs
1
i ,2(f, t) = fi(t) = σ
s2i ,2(f, t).
“Only if”: Let s1i , s
2
i ∈ Si be such that σ
s1i = σs
2
i . To prove (O.i)
let x = xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi be such that t ∈ M(f, s
1
i ) ∩ M(f, s
2
i ). We have
s1i (x) = ci(x, ai(f, t, s
1
i )) and s
2
i (x) = ci(x, ai(f, t, s
2
i )). Further, since t ∈
M(f, s1i ) ∩M(f, s
2
i ), by construction σ
s1i ,1(f, t) = ai(f, t, s
1
i ) and σ
s2i ,1(f, t) =
ai(f, t, s
2
i ). Since σ
s1i (f, t) = σs
2
i (f, t) we obtain ai(f, t, s
1
i ) = ai(f, t, s
2
i ) and
hence s1i (x) = s
2
i (x). To see (O.ii) let x = xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi be such that t ∈
M(f, s1i ) \M(f, s
2
i ). Since t /∈ M(f, s
2
i ), we obtain σ
s1i ,1(f, t) = σs
2
i ,1(f, t) =
fi−(t). Since t ∈ M(f, s
1
i ), σ
s1i ,1(f, t) = ai(f, t, s
1
i ) and hence s
1
i (x) =
ci(x, ai(f, t, s
1
i )) = ci(x, fi−(t)). The case where t ∈M(f, s
2
i )\M(f, s
1
i ) works
analogously. Finally, to see (O.iii) let x = xRt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi be a reaction node.
Then s1i (x) = ci(x, a
R
i (f, t, s
1
i )) and s
2
i (x) = ci(x, a
R
i (f, t, s
2
i )). Since x is a
reaction node for player i, t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ LC(fi) and hence σ
s1i ,2(f, t) =
aRi (f, t, s
1
i ) and σ
s2i ,2(f, t) = aRi (f, t, s
2
i ). Hence, since σ
s1i ,2(f, t) = σs
2
i ,2(f, t),
we obtain s1i (x) = s
2
i (x).
Proof of Lemma 4. We will rely on Lemma C.5 and prove that if s1i and
s2i satisfy (O.i)-(O.iii) then s
1
i ∼ s
2
i . Fix s−i ∈ S−i. Let w
k = (fk, ǫk)
be the play induced by (ski , s−i) for k = 1, 2. Then, by construction w
k
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agrees with ski on [t(f, t),∞[ for every t ∈ R+, i.e. ǫ
k
i (τ) > 0 implies that
si(x
P
τ (w
k)) = ci(x
P
τ (w
k), ǫi(τ)) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t),∞[.
Assume by contradiction that f 1 6= f 2. Since t(f 1, 0) = 0 by deﬁnition,
Lemma C.4 implies 0 ∈ M(f 1, s1i ) ∩ M(f
1, s2i ). Since W = x0(w
1), (O.i)
yields s1i (W ) = s
2
i (W ). Since for all j 6= i the action prescribed at W
is the same in both strategy proﬁles, we obtain f 1(0) = f 2(0). Then, by
(DP.ii), f 1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, ε[ for some ε > 0. Since f 1 6= f 2,
t := inf{τ > 0|f 1(τ) 6= f 2(τ)} exists and t > 0.
We claim that t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(f
1
j ) ∪
⋃
j∈I J(f
2
j ). Suppose t /∈
⋃
j∈I J(f
1
j ) ∪⋃
j∈I J(f
2
j ). Then t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(f
1
j ) ∩
⋂
j∈I LC(f
2
j ) which implies f
1(t) =
f 2(t). By (DP.i) and (DP.iii) there is ε′ > 0 such that f 1(τ) = f 1(t) =
f 2(t) = f 2(τ) for all τ ∈ [t, t+ ε′[, which contradicts the deﬁnition of t. This
proves the claim. By (P.i) it follows that t ∈
⋃
j∈I PJ(ǫ
1
j ) ∪
⋃
j∈I PJ(ǫ
2
j ).
Claim A. ǫ1j (τ) = ǫ
2
j (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ and all j ∈ I \ {i}.
To see this suppose that there is j ∈ I \ {i} such that ǫ1j (τ) 6= ǫ
2
j (τ) for
some τ ∈ [0, t[. Then {τ < t|ǫ1j(τ) 6= ǫ
2
j (τ)} ⊆ DP (ǫ
1
j)∪DP (ǫ
2
j) is nonempty
and well-ordered by Lemma A.3(i) and hence t∗ := min{τ < t|ǫ1j (τ) 6= ǫ
2
j (τ)}
exists. Note that since f 1(0) = f 2(0) and IPJ((ǫ1, 0) = IPJ((ǫ2, 0) = I, it
follows from the construction of the EDP that xP0 (w
1) and xP0 (w
2) are in the
same information set and hence that sj(x
P
0 (w
1)) = sj(x
P
0 (w
2)) which implies
ǫ1j (0) = ǫ
2
j (0) and hence t
∗ > 0. Further, note that f 1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, t∗], since t∗ < t and that t∗ ∈ PJ(ǫ1j) if and only if t
∗ ∈ PJ(ǫ2j) since
ǫ1j (τ) = ǫ
2
j (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t
∗[. Suppose that t∗ ∈ PJ(ǫ1j) ∩ PJ(ǫ
2
j ). Then by
construction of the EDP xPt∗(w
1) and xPt∗(w
2) are in the same information set
of player j. Hence sj(x
P
t∗(w
1)) = sj(x
P
t∗(w
2)) and it follows that ǫ1j (t
∗) = ǫ2j (t
∗)
which contradicts the construction of t∗. Hence t∗ /∈ PJ(ǫ1j) ∪ PJ(ǫ
2
j). If
ǫ1j (t
∗) = 0 then t∗ /∈
⋃
k∈I J(f
1
k ) by (P.ii) and since t
∗ < t, this implies
t∗ /∈
⋃
k∈I J(f
2
k ). Further, note that t(f
2, t∗) < t∗ by Lemma C.3(i) because
t∗ /∈ PJ(ǫ2j). Hence by Lemma C.1(i) f
2 is constant on ]t(f 2, t∗), t∗[. Since
t∗ /∈
⋃
k∈I J(f
2
k ) it follows that f
2 is constant on ]t(f 2, t∗), t∗]. Since t∗ /∈
PJ(ǫ2j ), t(f
2, t∗) ≤ Prev(ǫ2j , t
∗) < t∗ < Next(ǫ2j ,Prev(ǫ
2
j , t
∗)) and hence (P.iv)
yields ǫ2j (t
∗) = 0, which contradicts the deﬁnition of t∗. We thus obtain
ǫ1j (t
∗) > 0 and analogously ǫ2j (t
∗) > 0. Hence t∗ ∈ DP (ǫ1j) ∩ DP (ǫ
2
j) and
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in particular xPt∗(w
1), xPt∗(w
2) ∈ Xj . Further, t
∗ < t yields f 1+(t
∗) = f 2+(t
∗)
and from the construction of the EDP it follows that xPt∗(w
1) and xPt∗(w
2) are
in the same information set which implies sj(x
P
t∗(w
1)) = sj(x
P
t∗(w
2)). Thus
ǫ1j (t
∗) = ǫ2j (t
∗), a contradiction to the construction of t∗. This proves the
claim.
For each j ∈ I \ {i}, since ǫ1j (τ) = ǫ
2
j (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[, we obtain that
t ∈ PJ(ǫ1j ) if and only if t ∈ PJ(ǫ
2
j).
Claim B. For k = 1, 2, t ∈ PJ(ǫki ) if and only if t ∈M(f
k, ski ).
If t(fk, t) = t, then by Lemma C.3(i) and Lemma C.4, t ∈ PJ(ǫki ) ∩
M(fk, ski ). Hence, suppose t(f
k, t) < t. Let ǫ ∈ E be such that ((fk)t(f
k ,t)+, ǫ)
agrees with ski on [t(f
k, t),∞[ and suppose there is τ ∈ [t(fk, t), t[ such that
ǫi(τ) 6= ǫ
k
i (τ). Then, let t
′ := min{τ ∈ [t(fk, t), t[ |ǫi(τ) 6= ǫ
k
i (τ)}, which
exists since {τ ∈ [t(fk, t), t[ |ǫi(τ) 6= ǫ
k
i (τ)} ⊆ DP (ǫi) ∪ DP (ǫ
k
i ) is well-
ordered by Lemma A.3(i). Note that t′ < t(fk, t) because ǫi(t(f
k, t)) > 0 by
Lemma 3(i) and then by deﬁnition of agreeing (Deﬁnition 8, equation (1.2))
ǫi(t(f
k, t)) = ǫki (t(f
k, t)). Since ǫi(τ) = ǫ
k
i (τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f
k, t), t′[ it follows
that t′ ∈ PJ(ǫi) if and only if t
′ ∈ PJ(ǫki ). Since t
′ ∈ DP (ǫi) ∪DP (ǫ
k
i ) and
both (fk)t(f
k ,t)+ and fk are constant on ]t(fk, t), t[ by Lemma C.1(i), Lemma
A.5 yields t′ ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∪ PJ(ǫ
k
i ) and hence t
′ ∈ PJ(ǫi) ∩ PJ(ǫ
k
i ). Thus
xPt′ (((f
k)t(f
k ,t)+, ǫ)) and xPt′ (w
k) are in the same information set of player i,
thus ski (x
P
t′ (((f
k)t(f
k ,t)+, ǫ))) = ski (x
P
t′ (w
k)) and ǫi(t
′) = ǫki (t
′), a contradiction
with our choice of t′. Thus ǫi(τ) = ǫ
k
i (τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f
k, t), t[ implying that
t ∈ PJ(ǫki ) if and only if t ∈ PJ(ǫi). This proves the claim.
Claim C. f 1(t) = f 2(t).
We ﬁrst prove f 1j (t) = f
2
j (t) for all j ∈ I \ {i}. By Claim A, either
t ∈ PJ(ǫ1j ) ∩ PJ(ǫ
2
j) or t /∈ PJ(ǫ
1
j) ∪ PJ(ǫ
2
j). In the ﬁrst case sj(xt(w
1)) =
sj(xt(w
2)) and hence f 1j (t) = f
2
j (t). In the second case, by (P.i) f
1
j (t) =
f 1j−(t) = f
2
j−(t) = f
2
j (t).
It remains to show that f 1i (t) = f
2
i (t). We distinguish three cases. First ,
if t /∈ PJ(ǫ1i )∪PJ(ǫ
2
i ), then by (P.i) f
1
i (t) = f
1
i−(t) and f
2
i (t) = f
2
i−(t). Since
f 1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[, f 1i−(t) = f
2
i−(t) and we obtain f
1
i (t) = f
2
i (t).
Second, suppose that t ∈ PJ(ǫ1i )∩PJ(ǫ
2
i ). Note that since f
1(τ) = f 2(τ)
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for all τ ∈ [0, t[, by construction of the EDP s1i (xt(w
1)) = s1i (xt(w
2)). By
Claim B, we obtain t ∈ M(f 1, s1i ) ∩ M(f
2, s2i ). We now prove that t ∈
M(f 1, s2i ). Since f
1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[, it follows that t(f 1, t) =
t(f 2, t). We distinguish two cases. If t(f 1, t) = t(f 2, t) < t then (f 1)t(f
1,t) =
(f 2)t(f
1,t) and by Lemma 3(iii), PJ(f 2, t, s2i ) = PJ(f
1, t, s2i ) implying that
t ∈ M(f 1, s2i ). If on the other hand t(f
1, t) = t(f 2, t) = t then by Lemma
C.3(i) t ∈ PJ(ǫi) for any ǫ ∈ E such that (f
1, ǫ) ∈ W . In particular t ∈
PJ(ǫi) for any ǫ ∈ E such that (f
1, ǫ) ∈ W and (f 1, ǫ) agrees with s2i on
[t(f 1, t,∞[ implying that t ∈ PJ(f 1, t, s2i ). This proves that t ∈ M(f
1, s2i ).
Thus t ∈ M(f 1, s1i ) ∩ M(f
1, s2i ) and (O.i) yields s
1
i (xt(w
2)) = s2i (xt(w
2))
which implies s1i (xt(w
1)) = s2i (xt(w
2)); hence f 1i (t) = f
2
i (t).
Third, if t ∈ PJ(ǫ1i )\PJ(ǫ
2
i ) (and analogously if t ∈ PJ(ǫ
2
i )\PJ(ǫ
1
i )), we
obtain t ∈ M(f 1, s1i ) \M(f
2, s2i ) by Claim B. We claim that t /∈ M(f
1, s2i ).
Since t(f 1, t) = t(f 2, t) = t would imply t ∈ M(f 2, s2i ) by Lemma C.4, we
obtain t(f 1, t) = t(f 2, t) < t. By Lemma 3(iii) PJ(f 1, t, s2i ) = PJ(f
2, t, s2i )
and since t /∈ PJ(f 2, t, s2i ) this implies t /∈ PJ(f
1, t, s2i ) which proves the
claim. (O.ii) now yields s1i (xt(w
1)) = ci(xt(w
1), f 1i−(t)) implying that f
1
i (t) =
f 1i−(t). Further, since t /∈ PJ(ǫ
2
i ), it follows by (P.i) that f
2
i (t) = f
2
i−(t).
Since f 1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[, f 1i−(t) = f
2
i−(t) holds and we obtain
f 1i (t) = f
2
i (t). This proves the claim.
Hence f 1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t] and in particular IJ(f 1, t) =
IJ(f 2, t). Since t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(f
1
j )∪
⋃
j∈I J(f
2
j ) we obtain IJ(f
1, t) = IJ(f 2, t) 6=
∅ and by (DP.ii) it follows that f 1j+(t) = f
1
j (t) = f
2
j (t) = f
2
j+(t) for all
j ∈ IJ(f 1, t) = IJ(f 2, t). Further, by construction of the EDP, sj(x
R
t
(w1)) =
sj(x
R
t
(w2)) and hence f 1j+(t) = f
2
j+(t) for all j ∈ I \ IJ(f
1, t), j 6= i. We
now distinguish two cases. If i ∈ IJ(f 1, t) then by (DP.ii) f 1i+(t) = f
2
i+(t).
If on the other hand, i /∈ IJ(f 1, t) then xR
t
(w1), xR
t
(w2) ∈ Xi which by
(O.iii) implies that s1i (x
R
t
(w1)) = s2i (x
R
t
(w1)). Since f 1(τ) = f 2(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, t], by construction of the EDP s2i (x
R
t
(w1)) = s2i (x
R
t
(w2)). This yields
s1i (x
R
t
(w1)) = s2i (x
R
t
(w2)) and hence f 1i+(t) = f
2
i+(t). In both cases, we obtain
f 1+(t) = f
2
+(t), which by (DP.i) contradicts our choice of t.
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Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Fix ε > 0 and Let si : Xi → Ci be a mapping
fulﬁlling (IS.i)-(IS.iii) and si(x
P
t ((f, ǫ))) = ci(x
P
t ((f, ǫ)), ε) for all peek nodes
xPt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi such that E
σi(f, t) = ∅. We will show that s−1i (c) = P (c)
for all c ∈ si(Xi). Let (f, ǫ) ∈ W . Note that ci(xt((f, ǫ)), σ
1
i (f, t)) =
ci(xt′((f
′, ǫ′)), σ1i (f
′, t′)) ∈ Ci if and only if t = t
′, f(τ) = f ′(τ) for all τ ∈
[0, t[, and t ∈ PJ(ǫi) and t
′ ∈ PJ(ǫ′i). Hence if c = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), σ
1
i (f, t)) ∈ Ci
then by (IS.i)
s−1i (c) = {xt((f
′, ǫ′)) ∈ N | f(τ) = f ′(τ) ∀ τ ∈ [0, t[, t ∈ PJ(ǫ′i) } = P (c).
Analogously s−1i (c) = P (c) follows if c = ci(x
R
t (w), σ
2
i (f, t)) ∈ Ci, c =
ci(x
P
t (w), ε
σi(f, t)) ∈ Ci, or c = ci(x
P
t (w), ε) ∈ Ci.
(ii) Let si, s
′
i ∈ S(σi). We will show that si and s
′
i are CRM-equivalent by
showing that (O.i)-(O.iii) are satisﬁed (Lemma C.5). Lemma 4 then yields
si ∼ s
′
i. By (IS.i) si(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), σ
1
i (f, t)) = s
′
i(xt((f, ǫ))) for all
potential jump nodes xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi and hence in particular (O.i) holds.
To see (O.ii), let xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi be such that t ∈ M(f, si) \M(f, s
′
i). As
t /∈M(f, s′i), t(f, t) < t (by Lemma C.4) and there is τ
′ ∈ [t(f, t), t[ such that
ǫi(f, t, si)(τ
′) 6= ǫi(f, t, s
′
i)(τ
′). We claim that Eσi(f t(f,t)+, τ ) = ∅ for some τ ∈
[t(f, t), t[. Suppose Eσi(f t(f,t)+, τ) 6= ∅ for all τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[. By deﬁnition of
agreeing (Deﬁnition 8, Equation 1.2) and Lemma 3(ii) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[ if
ǫi(f, t, si)(τ) > 0 then si(x
P
τ ((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ))) = ci(x
P
τ ((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ)), ǫi(f, t, si)) for
any ǫ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[. By (IS.iii),
since Eσi(f t(f,t)+, τ) 6= ∅, this implies ǫi(f, t, si)(τ) = ε
σi(f t(f,t)+, τ) for all
τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[ such that ǫi(f, t, si)(τ) > 0. An analogous argument yields
ǫi(f, t, s
′
i)(τ) = ε
σi(f t(f,t)+, τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[ such that ǫi(f, t, s
′
i)(τ) > 0.
Hence ǫi(f, t, si)(τ) = ǫi(f, t, s
′
i)(τ) for all τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[, a contradiction. This
proves the claim that Eσi(f t(f,t)+, τ) = ∅ for some τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[. Since f t(f,t)+
is constant on ]t(f, t),∞[ and τ ∈ [t(f, t), t[, Eσi(f t(f,t)+, τ ) = ∅ implies
that σ1i (f
t(f,t)+, τ) = f
t(f,t)+
i+ (τ ) for all τ ∈]τ ,∞[. Since by Lemma C.1(ii)
f t(f,t)+(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ we hence obtain σ1i (f, t) = σ
1
i (f
t(f,t)+, t) =
f
t(f,t)+
i+ (τ) where the ﬁrst equality follows by (CRM.i). Further f
t(f,t)+
i+ (τ) =
f
t(f,t)+
i− (t) and by Lemma C.1(ii) f
t(f,t)+
i− (t) = fi−(t). Hence σ
1
i (f, t) = fi−(t).
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Finally (O.iii) holds since by (IS.ii), si(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))) = ci(x
R
t ((f, ǫ)), σ
2
i (f, t)) =
s′i(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))) for all reaction nodes x
R
t ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi.
Lemma C.6. Let (f, t) ∈ F × R+, i ∈ I, σi ∈ Σi, and si ∈ S(σi). If
t /∈M(f, si) then σ
1
i (f, t) = fi−(t).
Proof. By Lemma 3(i) there is ǫ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W agrees with
si on [t(f, t),∞[. By Lemma 3(iii), t /∈ M(f, si) yields t /∈ PJ(ǫi) and hence
t := Prev(ǫi, t) < t < Next(ǫi, t). By Lemma A.1(i), t ∈ DP (ǫi). Since
ǫi(t(f, t)) > 0 by Lemma 3(i), t(f, t) ≤ t < t and hence f(τ) = f
t+(τ)
for all τ ∈ [0, t[ by Lemma C.1(ii). We distinguish two cases. First, if
Eσi(f, t) = ∅, then σ1i (f, t) = σ
1
i (f
t+, t) = fi+(t) = fi−(t). The ﬁrst equal-
ity holds by (CRM.i), the second because Eσi(f, t) = ∅ and the third be-
cause f is constant on ]t(f, t), t[ by Lemma C.1(i). Second, if Eσi(f, t) 6= ∅,
then, since t < t and f(τ) = f t(f,t)+(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ by Lemma C.1(ii),
we obtain Eσi(f, t) = Eσi(f t(f,t)+, t) and (IS.iii) yields si(x
P
t
(f t(f,t)+, ǫ)) =
ci(xt((f
t(f,t)+, ǫ)), εσi(f t(f,t)+, t)). Since (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[
and t ∈ DP (ǫi), it follows that ǫi(t) = ε
σi(f t(f,t)+, t) and Next(ǫi, t) =
t + εσi(f t(f,t)+, t) implying that t < t < t + εσi(f t(f,t)+, t). Since Eσi(f, t) =
Eσi(f t(f,t)+, t) 6= ∅ we obtain εσi(f, t) = εσi(f t(f,t)+, t) and hence σ1i (f, t) =
σ1i (f
t+, t) = fi+(t) = fi−(t). The ﬁrst equality follows from (CRM.i), the
second from the deﬁnition of εσi(f, t) and t < t + εσi(f, t), and the third
holds because f is constant on ]t(f, t), t[ by Lemma C.1(i).
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) Let (f, t) ∈ F × R+, σi ∈ Σi, and si ∈ S(σi). To
show σsi,1(f, t) = σ1i (f, t) we distinguish two cases. First, if t /∈M(f, si) then
σ1i (f, t) = fi−(t) by Lemma C.6. Since σ
si,1(f, t) = fi−(t) by construction,
we obtain σsi,1(f, t) = σi(f, t). Second, if t ∈ M(f, si) then by construction
σsi,1(f, t) = ai(f, t, si). As by (IS.i) si(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), σ
1
i (f, t)) for
all potential jump nodes xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi, it follows that ai(f, t, si) = σ
1
i (f, t)
since by Lemma 3(i) there is ǫ ∈ E such that (f t(f,t)+, ǫ) ∈ W agrees with si
on [t(f, t),∞[. Hence σsi,1(f, t) = σ1i (f, t).
To prove σsi,2i (f, t) = σ
2
i (f, t), we again distinguish two cases. First, if
t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj) ∪ J(fi) then σ
2
i (f, t) = fi(t) = σ
si,2(f, t) where the ﬁrst
equality holds by (CRM.ii) and the second by construction. Second, if t /∈
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⋂
j∈I LC(fj)∪J(fi) then by (IS.ii) si(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))) = ci(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))), σ
2
i (f, t)) for
all reaction nodes xRt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi. Hence σ
si,2(f, t) = σ2i (f, t) by construction
of σsi,2.
(ii) Let si ∈ Si and s
′
i ∈ S(σ
si). We will show that si, s
′
i satisfy (O.i)-
(O.iii) and hence are CRM-equivalent by Lemma C.5. By Lemma 4 si ∼ s
′
i.
To see (O.i), let xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi with t ∈M(f, si)∩M(f, s
′
i). By construction,
σsi,1(f, t) = ai(f, t, si). By (IS.i), s
′
i(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), σ
si,1(f, t)).
Hence s′i(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), ai(f, t, si)) = si(xt((f, ǫ))).
To prove (O.ii), ﬁrst let xt((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi with t ∈ M(f, s
′
i) \M(f, si). By
construction, σsi,1(f, t) = fi−(t). Since s
′
i(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), σ
si,1(f, t))
by (IS.i), we have s′i(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), fi−(t)). Second, let xt((f, ǫ)) ∈
Xi with t ∈ M(f, si) \M(f, s
′
i). By Lemma C.6, σ
si,1(f, t) = fi−(t). Since
t ∈ M(f, si), σ
si,1(f, t) = ai(f, t, si) by construction of σ
si and it follows by
construction of ai(f, t, si) that si(xt((f, ǫ))) = ci(xt((f, ǫ)), fi−(t)).
Finally, we prove (O.iii). Let xRt ((f, ǫ)) ∈ Xi be a reaction node. Then
t ∈
⋃
j∈I J(fj) ∩ LC(fi) by construction of the game tree, implying that
σsi,2(f, t) = aRi (f, t, si) by construction of σ
si. By (IS.ii), s′i(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))) =
ci(x
R
t ((f, ǫ)), σ
si,2(f, t)) which yields aRi (f, t, s
′
i) = a
R
i (f, t, si). We thus obtain
s′i(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))) = si(x
R
t ((f, ǫ))).
(iii) Let σ = (σi)i∈I ∈ Σ and (si)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IS(σi). Further denote by
w = (f, ǫ) = w(si)i∈I the play induced by (si)i∈I . Suppose that f 6= f
σ. Then
t := inf{t|f(t) 6= fσ(t)} exists. Since W = x0(f, ǫ
′) for any ǫ′ ∈ E such that
(f, ǫ′) ∈ W , by (IS.i) si(W ) = ci(W,σ
1
i (f, 0)) for all i ∈ I and we obtain
fi(0) = σ
1
i (f, 0) = σ
1
i (f
σ, 0) = fσi (0) for all i ∈ I where the ﬁrst equality
follows from the fact that f is the outcome induced by (si)i∈I , the second
equality follows from (CRM.i) and the third from the deﬁnition of fσ. By
(DP.ii), f+(0) = f(0) and f
σ
+(0) = f
σ(0). Hence (by (DP.i)) there is ε > 0
such that f(τ) = fσ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, ε[ which implies t > 0. We claim that
t ∈
⋃
i∈I J(fi)∪
⋃
i∈I J(f
σ
i ). Otherwise t ∈ LC(fi)∩LC(f
σ
i ) for all i ∈ I and
hence by (DP.iii) t ∈ RK(fi)∩RK(f
σ
i ) for all i ∈ I. This implies (by (DP.i))
that there is ε > 0 such that f(τ) = fσ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t+ ε[ contradicting
the deﬁnition of t. This proves the claim.
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Claim: t ∈
⋃
i∈I PJ(ǫi).
If t ∈ J (f) this immediately follows from (P.i) and Lemma C.3(i).
Hence, suppose t /∈ J (f). Then t ∈
⋃
i∈I J(f
σ
i ). Since f(τ) = f
σ(τ)
for all τ ∈ [0, t[ it follows that t(fσ, t) = t(f, t) < t. By Lemma C.1(ii),
(fσ)t(f,t)+(τ) = fσ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ implying that σ1i ((f
σ)t(f,t)+, t) =
σ1i (f
σ, t) by (CRM.i). Now let i ∈ I be such that t ∈ J(fσi ). Then
σ1i (f
σ, t) = fσi (t) 6= f
σ
i−(t) = f
σ
i+(t(f
σ, t)) where the inequality follows be-
cause fσi−(t) exists since by Lemma C.1(i) f
σ is constant on ]t(fσ, t), t[ and the
last equality holds for the same reason. This implies that Eσi(fσ, t(f, t)) 6= ∅
and that εσi(fσ, t(fσ, t)) = minEσi(fσ, t(fσ, t)) exists and is strictly positive
(by Lemma 2). Further, that (fσ)t(f,t)+(τ) = fσ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[ im-
plies that σ1i ((f
σ)t(f,t)+, τ) = σ1i (f
σ, τ) = fσi (τ) = fi+(τ) for all τ ∈]t(f, t), t[
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (CRM.i), the second follows because fσ
is the outcome induced by σ, and the third follows because f is constant
on ]t(f, t), t[. This yields εσi(fσ, t(fσ, t)) = t − t(fσ, t). Since si ∈ S(σi)
and Eσi(f, t(f, t)) 6= ∅ we obtain si(x
P
t(f,t)
(w)) = ci(x
P
t(f,t)
(w), εσi(f, t(f, t)))
by (IS.iii) and hence that ǫi(t(f, t)) = ε
σi(f, t(f, t)). This yields ǫi(t(f, t)) =
t− t(f, t) > 0. By (P.iv) ǫi(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈]t(f, t), t[ because f is constant
on ]t(f, t), t[. Thus t(f, t) = Prev(ǫi, t) implying that t = Next(ǫi,Prev(ǫi, t)).
This proves the claim.
Claim: f(t) = fσ(t).
To prove this, we distinguish two cases. First, if IPJ(ǫ, t) = I, then
si(xt(w)) = ci(xt(w), σ
1
i (f, t)) holds by (IS.i) implying that fi(t) = f
σ
i (t)
for all i ∈ I. Second, if IPJ(ǫ, t) ( I, then by Lemma C.3(i), t(f, t) < t.
For all i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t), si(xt(w)) = ci(xt(w), σ
1
i (f, t)) holds by (IS.i) and we
obtain that fi(t) = f
σ
i (t) for all i ∈ IPJ(ǫ, t). By (P.i) fi(t) = fi−(t) for all
i /∈ IPJ(ǫ, t). Further since t /∈ PJ(ǫi) and w agrees with si on [t(f, t),∞[
we obtain (by Lemma 3(iii)) t /∈ M(f, si) for all i /∈ IPJ(ǫ, t). By Lemma
C.6, σ1i (f, t) = fi−(t) and hence fi(t) = f
σ
i (t) for all i /∈ IPJ(ǫ, t). This
proves the claim.
As t ∈
⋃
i∈I (J(fi) ∪ J(f
σ
i )), by the last claim t ∈
⋃
i∈I (J(fi) ∩ J(f
σ
i ))
and IJ(f, t) = IJ(fσ, t). For all i ∈ IJ(f, t) we obtain fi+(t) = fi(t) =
fσi (t) = f
σ
i+(t), where the ﬁrst and third equalities hold by (DP.ii). For all i /∈
75
Chapter 1
Repeated Games in Continuous Time as Extensive Form Games
IJ(f, t), xR
t
(w) ∈ Xi and by (IS.ii) si(x
R
t
(w)) = ci(x
R
t
(w), σ2i (f, t)). Hence
fi+(t) = σ
2
i (f, t) = σ
2
i (f
σ, t) = fσi+(t), where the ﬁrst and third equalities
hold since f and fσ are the outcomes induced by s and σ, respectively, and
the second follows from (CRM.i). Thus f(τ) = fσ(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t] and
f+(t) = f
σ
+(t). By (DP.i) there is ε > 0 such that f(τ) = f
σ(τ) for all
τ ∈ [0, t+ ε[, a contradiction with the choice of t. Hence f = fσ.
(iv) Let s ∈ S and denote f := f (σ
si )i∈I . For each i ∈ I, let si ∈ S(σ
si).
By (ii), si ∼ si for all i ∈ I implying that f
s = f (s1,s−1). Applying (ii)
again, yields f (s1,s2,(si)i6=1,2) = f (s1,s2,(si)i6=1,2). Iteratively proceeding this way,
we obtain f (si)i∈I = f s. By (iii), f (si)i∈I = f implying that f = f s.
Appendix 1.D: Proposition 5
Proposition 5. Let B = {(bi)i∈I |bi : H×R+ → Ai satisfies (B.i)-(B.v) ∀i ∈
I}. Then {h ∈ H|∃b ∈ B s.t. bi(h, t) = hi(t) for all t ∈ R+, i ∈ I} = F.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let
H ′ := {h ∈ H|∃b ∈ B s.t. bi(h, t) = hi(t) for all t ∈ R+, i ∈ I}.
“⊆:” Let h = (hi)i∈I ∈ H
′ and b = (bi)i∈I ∈ B be such that bi(h, t) = hi(t)
for all t ∈ R+ and all i ∈ I. (DP.i) holds because by (B.ii)-(B.v) for every
t ∈ R+ and every i ∈ I there is ε > 0 such that hi
∣∣
(t,t+ε) is constant. To
see (DP.ii), let t ∈ R+ and i ∈ I be such that t /∈ LC(hi). If t = 0 then
t ∈ RK(hi) by (B.ii). If t > 0, by (B.iv) there is ε > 0 such that hi(τ) =
bi(h, τ) = bi(h, t) = hi(t) for all τ ∈ [t, t+ε[, i.e. t ∈ RK(hi). To prove (DP.iii)
we will show the contrapositive. Let t ∈ R+ be such that t /∈
⋃
i∈I Ji(hi).
Then by (B.iii) there is ε > 0 such that hi(τ) = bi(h, τ) = bi(h, t) = hi(t) for
all τ ∈ [t, t+ ε[ and all i ∈ I, i.e t ∈
⋂
i∈I RK(hi) and hence t /∈
⋃
i∈I R(hi).
“⊇:” Fix f ∈ F . For h ∈ H , deﬁne
tf (h) :=

inf{t ∈ R+|h(t) 6= f(t)} if h 6= f,∞, if h = f.
76
Chapter 1
Repeated Games in Continuous Time as Extensive Form Games
For each i ∈ I deﬁne
bi(h, t) =

fi(t), if h(τ) = f(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t[fi(tf(h)), otherwise.
Fix i ∈ I. Property (B.i) is satisﬁed by construction. To see (B.ii), note that
since 0 ∈ RK(fi) there is ε > 0 such that fi(τ) = fi(0) for all τ ∈ [0, ε[. If
tf (h) = 0 then bi(h, τ) = fi(0) = bi(h, 0) for all τ ∈ [0, ε[. If tf(h) > 0 then
bi(h, τ) = fi(τ) = fi(0) = bi(h, 0) for all τ ∈ [0,min{ε, tf(h)}[.
To prove (B.iii), let h ∈ H and t ∈ R+ be such that t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(hj).
We distinguish two cases. First, if tf (h) ≤ t, then by construction bi(h, τ) =
fi(tf(h)) = bi(h, t) for all τ ∈ [t,∞[. Second, if tf (h) > t then by construction
there is ε > 0 such that bi(h, τ) = fi(τ) for all τ ∈ [t, t + ε[. Further
t ∈
⋂
j∈I LC(fj) since f(τ) = h(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, tf(h)[. By (DP.ii) and
(DP.iii) it follows that t ∈ RK(fi) and hence there is ε
′ > 0 such that
bi(h, τ) = fi(τ) = fi(t) = bi(h, t) for all τ ∈ [t, t+ ε
′[.
To show (B.iv), let h ∈ H and t ∈ R+ be such that t /∈ LC(hi). If
tf (h) ≤ t then bi(h, τ) = fi(tf (h)) = bi(h, t) for all τ ∈ [t,∞[. If t < tf(h)
then there is ε > 0 such that bi(h, τ) = fi(τ) for all τ ∈ [t, t + ε[. Since
t /∈ LC(fi), by (DP.ii) t ∈ RK(fi). Hence there is ε
′ > 0 such that bi(h, τ) =
fi(τ) = fi(t) = bi(h, t) for all τ ∈ [t, t+ ε
′[.
Finally, we will prove (B.v). Let h ∈ H and t ∈ R+ be such that t ∈
LC(hi)\
⋂
j 6=i LC(hj). Once more, we distinguish two cases. First, if tf(h) ≤ t
then bi(h, τ) = fi(tf (h)) = bi(h, t) for all τ ∈ [t,∞[. Second, if t < tf (h) then
there is ε > 0 such that bi(h, τ) = fi(τ) for all τ ∈]t, t + ε[. Since by (DP.i)
f is piecewise constant, the conclusion follows.
Thus bi ∈ Bi for every i ∈ I and by construction bi(f, t) = fi(t) for all
t ∈ R+ and all i ∈ I. Thus f ∈ H ′.
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Comment on “Trees and Extensive Forms”
2.1 Introduction
This paper corrects the formulation of a property in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger
(2008) (henceforth referred to as AR) which determines when an Extensive
Decision Problem1 (EDP) is called an Extensive Form (EF). We present a
corrected formulation of the property and show which and how results in
AR are aﬀected by the reformulation. We further present a counterexample
which shows that some of the original results do not hold under the restated
version of the property.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
necessary notation. Section 2.3 presents the correctly stated version of the
property and illustrates in detail which and how results in AR change under
the new formulation. Finally, Section 2.4 contains a counterexample for the
results that do not hold under the new version of the property.
2.2 Preliminaries
We will rely on the notation and concepts introduced in Sections 1.2.1 and
1.3.1. Some additional notation is required, however. For a game tree T =
(N,⊇), a history is a nonempty chain h in N that is not maximal in T and
for which ↑ x ⊆ h for all x ∈ h. For as history h in T a continuation is
the complement of h in a play that contains h. A game tree is weakly up-
discrete if all maximal chains in ↓ x \ {x} have maxima, for all nodes x ∈ N
for which ↓ x \ {x} 6= ∅. A game tree is coherent if every history without
1See Deﬁnition 2 in Section 1.2.1.
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minimum has at least one continuation with a maximum.2 Given a move
x ∈ X and a play w ∈ x the perfect information choice γ(x, w) ⊆ W is
the set of plays γ(x, w) =
⋃
{z | w ∈ z ∈↓ x \ {x}} . A game tree (N,⊇)
has available choices if γ(x, w) ( x for all w ∈ x and all x ∈ X. Let
Γ(T ) = {γ(x, w) | w ∈ x ∈ X } be the set of perfect information choices and
S(N) be the set of strange nodes in N . If a game tree T has available choices
then Π(T ) = (T, C1) where C1 = Γ(T ) ∪ S(N) is a single-player EDP (AR,
Theorem 1).3 A game tree is selective, if for all w,w′ ∈ W , w 6= w′ implies
that there is x ∈ X such that w,w′ ∈ x and γ(x, w) 6= γ(x, w′).
For an EDP, given a strategy proﬁle s = (si)i∈I ∈ S and a history h,
a node x ∈ N is discarded at h, if x ( W (h) =
⋂
y∈h y and there are z ∈
↑ x \ {x}, i ∈ I(z), and c ∈ Ai(z) such that z ⊆ W (h) and x ⊆ c 6= si(z).
Dh(s) denotes the set of all nodes discarded at h and Uh(s) = {x | x ⊆
W (h)} \ Dh(s) is the set of undiscarded nodes at h. The strategy proﬁle
(si)i∈I ∈ S induces an outcome after history h if there is w ∈ W (h) such that
w ∈ Rhs (w), where R
h
s (w) =
⋂
{si(x) | w ∈ x ⊆ W (h), x ∈ X, i ∈ I(x)}. If
every strategy proﬁle induces an outcome after every history then the EDP
is everywhere playable.
2.3 Corrected Formulation and Changes
In AR, an EF is deﬁned as an EDP which satisﬁes a stronger version of
property (EDP.iii), namely
(EDP.iii’) for all y, y′ ∈ N , if y ∩ y′ = ∅ then there are i ∈ I and c, c′ ∈ Ci
such that y ⊆ c, y′ ⊆ c′, c ∩ c′ = ∅, and P (c) ∩ P (c′) 6= ∅.
This property is misstated in AR. The correct formulation is as follows:
(EDP.iii’) for all y, y′ ∈ N , if y ∩ y′ = ∅ then there are x ∈ X, i ∈ I(x) and
c, c′ ∈ Ci such that x ∈ P (c) ∩ P (c
′), y ⊆ x ∩ c, y′ ⊆ x ∩ c′, and c ∩ c′ = ∅.
2It can be shown (AR, Corollary 3) that for regular game trees weak up-discreteness
and coherence is equivalent to up-discreteness.
3Theorem 1 in AR actually states that a game tree T having available choices is equiv-
alent to Π(T ) being a single-player EDP.
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In what follows the numbering of results and deﬁnitions corresponds to
that in AR. With the corrected formulation of (EDP.iii’) provided here,
Proposition 7, Proposition 9, Theorem 5, and Corollary 4 are true as stated.
Propositions 5 and 8(b) do not hold with the new version of (EDP.iii’).
Proposition 10 remains true as stated, but requires a diﬀerent proof. Fi-
nally, Theorem 6 and Corollary 5 remain true with a (slight) change of the
hypotheses. We now explain the necessary changes in more detail.
Proposition 7, Proposition 9, Theorem 5, and Corollary 4
All those results are true as stated, with the corrected formulation of (EDP.iii’)
stated here. The proofs (with minor, straightforward adaptations) remain as
in AR.
Proposition 7. An EDP (T, C) satisfies (EDP.iii’) if and only if T is selec-
tive and
(EDP.ii’) x ∩ [
⋂
i∈I(x) ci)] = γ(x, w) for some w ∈ x ∩ [
⋂
i∈I(x) ci)] for all
(ci)i∈I(x) ∈ ×i∈I(x)Ai(x) and for all x ∈ X.
This is not true for the version of (EDP.iii’) incorrectly stated in the paper,
but holds under the new formulation.
Proposition 9. An EDP (T, C) with a weakly up-discrete tree T = (N,⊇)
is an EF if and only if T is selective.
Theorem 5. Consider an EF and fix a pure strategy combination s ∈ S. If
w ∈ Rs(w) then (a) Rs(w) = {w}, and (b) if w
′ ∈ Rs(w
′) then w′ = w.
Corollary 4. The tree of an EF is selective and, hence, regular.
Propositions 5 and 8(b)
These results are not true for the corrected version of (EDP.iii’) (see Example
14 in Section 2.4). There is a common mistake in the proofs of Propositions
5 and 8(b) that is as follows. The construction of a strategy s selecting both
w and w′ fails when, for a node x with w ∈ x but w′ /∈ x, si(x) is required
to pick up the choice leading to w. For a diﬀerent node x′ with w′ ∈ x′ but
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w /∈ x′, si(x
′) will be required to pick up the choice leading to w′. However, it
might be the case that x and x′ belong to the same information set of player
i, in which case an incompatibility arises.
This problem cannot appear under perfect information. Therefore, the
statement remains true for the game Π(T ). In this case, it follows from
Proposition 7 that the corrected version of (EDP.iii’) reduces to selective-
ness, because (EDP.ii’) is always fulﬁlled for Π(T ). The resulting property
coincides with the original formulation of Proposition 8(a) in AR. The fol-
lowing result replaces the original versions of both Proposition 5 and 8.
Proposition 5. Consider a game tree T with available choices. If T is not
selective, then the perfect information EDP Π(T ) fails outcome uniqueness.
Consider the class of weakly up-discrete trees. This includes the class on
which every EDP is everywhere playable. By Theorem 5, Proposition 9,
and the new version of Proposition 5 above, a weakly up-discrete tree T is
selective if and only if every EDP (T, C) satisﬁes outcome uniqueness.
Proposition 10
The statement of Proposition 10 is the following.
Proposition 10. Fix a history h for a game tree T = (N,⊇). If for an
arbitrary EF (T, C) every strategy combination induces outcomes after h,
then for the problem Π(T ) every strategy induces outcomes after h.
Proposition 10 is correct as stated also with the version of (EDP.iii’) given
here. But its proof contains the same mistake pointed out for Propositions
5 and 8(b). The correct proof is as follows..
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose for some history h there is a strategy s′ for
Π(T ) that does not induce an outcome after h. Let h′ be a maximal chain
in Uh(s′) (the undiscarded nodes after h) and W (h′) =
⋂
x∈h′ x. Fix a play
w as follows. If h′ has a minimum z (which then cannot be a terminal node
by hypothesis), let w ∈ s′(z). Otherwise, let w ∈ W (h′). If Uh(s′) = ∅ (and
hence there is no such chain h′), ﬁx an arbitrary w ∈ W (h).
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Consider now an arbitrary EF (T, C). By Proposition 7 T is selective.
We construct a strategy proﬁle in (T, C) as follows. For all y ∈ N such that
w ∈ y ⊆ W (h) and i ∈ I(y), choose si(y) such that y
⋂[⋂
i∈I(y) si(y)
]
=
s′(y). This is possible by (EDP.ii’) and (EDP.iv). If y ∈ h′, then of course
s′(y) = γ(y, w). For any other node, specify the strategy proﬁle s arbitrarily.
Notice that we determine s only along a play, which is possible by (EDP.iv).
We claim that w /∈ Rhs (w). For, if it were, by construction of s, we would
obtain w ∈ Rhs′(w) for Π(T ), a contradiction.
Let w′ ∈ W (h) with w′ 6= w. By selectiveness there exists x ∈ X such
that w,w′ ∈ x and γ(x, w)
⋂
γ(x, w′) = ∅ (by Proposition 1(a) in AR).
Notice that, necessarily, x ⊆ W (h). There are two possibilities. If x /∈ h′,
x ∈ Dh(s′) for Π(T ) which implies by construction that x ∈ Dh(s) for (T, C).
Hence w′ /∈ Rhs (w
′). If x ∈ h′, then s′(x) = γ(x, w) 6= γ(x, w′). Since
s′(x) = x
⋂[⋂
i∈J(x) si(x)
]
, it follows that w′ /∈ Rhs (w
′). Since w′ ∈ W (h)
was arbitrary, we conclude that s does not induce an outcome after h in
(T, C).
Theorem 6 and Corollary 5
The “only if” direction of Theorem 6 relied on (the original version of)
Proposition 5 and needs to be (slightly) reformulated by changing the hy-
pothesis that (T, C) is an EDP to the hypothesis that it is an EF:
Theorem 6. An EF (T, C) satisfies (A1) and (A2) if and only if the (rooted)
game tree T = (N,⊇) is regular, weakly up-discrete, and coherent.4
The proof of the “if” implication remains essentially the same as in AR. The
only caveat is that Proposition 9 refers to the corrected version of (EDP.iii’)
provided here and hence Theorem 5, which requires this version, can be
used. To see the “only if” direction, note that Proposition 7 implies that T is
selective. Hence it is also regular by Proposition 6(a) in AR. By Proposition
10 the game Π(T ) fulﬁlls (A1). By Corollary 2 in AR, every EDP deﬁned on
T satisﬁes (A1). Theorem 3 in AR then implies that T is up-discrete, hence
4See Section 1.3.1 for the statements of (A1) and (A2).
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weakly up-discrete and coherent by Corollary 3 in AR. This argument does
not make use of Proposition 5.
The statement of Corollary 5 remains true when EDP is replaced by EF
in its formulation:
Corollary 5. (a) If an EF satisfies (A1) and (A2), then so does every EF
with the same tree.
(b) An EF satisfies (A1) and (A2) if and only if its tree is regular and up-
discrete. Furthermore, the EDP is then everywhere playable.
2.4 Example
Consider the direct approach to modeling repeated games in continuous time
presented in Section 1.2.2 where W is the set of functions f : R+ → A, and
A is some ﬁxed set of actions containing at least two elements. Deﬁning
N = {xt(f) | t ∈ R+, f ∈ W }, where xt(f) = {g ∈ W | g(τ) = f(τ) ∀ τ ∈
[0, t[} for f ∈ W and t ∈ R+ it can be shown that T = (N,⊇) is a game
tree (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2005). One can deﬁne an EDP on this tree
using choices ct(f, a) = {g ∈ xt(f) | g(t) = a} for every t ∈ R+, f ∈ W , and
a ∈ A (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2005, Example 16). The resulting EDP
is referred to as the differential game.
There is a mistake in Example 7 of AR concerning the computation of
the perfect information choices for the tree of the diﬀerential game. There it
is falsely stated that for a play g ∈ xt(f) ∈ N , the perfect information choice
γ(xt(f), g) = ct(f, a). The correct expression, however, is as follows:
γ(xt(f), g) = {h ∈ W
∣∣ ∃ τ > t such that h ∣∣[0,τ [ = g ∣∣[0,τ [ }
The diﬀerential game is hence diﬀerent from Π(T ) for the tree T . In Example
13 in AR, this gives rise to another mistake. There it is stated that the tree
of the diﬀerential game is not selective. In fact, the tree of the diﬀerential
game is selective. To see this, let f, g ∈ W with f 6= g. If f(0) 6= g(0), then
γ(W, f) 6= γ(W, g). If f(0) = g(0), let t∗ = sup{τ > 0 | f
∣∣
[0,τ [ = g
∣∣
[0,τ [}.
Then xt∗(f) = xt∗(g) and γ(xt∗(f), f) 6= γ(xt∗(f), g).
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The point of Example 13 in AR was to provide a counterexample showing
that a regular game tree is not necessarily selective, i.e. that the converse of
Proposition 6(a) in AR does not hold. Yet, this is already accomplished by
Example 4 in AR.
The diﬀerential game actually fails (EDP.ii’) and hence (by Proposition
7) also the corrected version of (EDP.iii’). On the other hand, the game Π(T )
based on the same tree is, in fact, an EF. The comment after the statement
on Proposition 7 needs to be adjusted accordingly (AR, p. 240-241).
We now provide a common counterexample to the statements of Propo-
sitions 5 and 8(b) under the corrected formulation of (EDP.iii’) given here.
Example 14. Let T be the tree of the diﬀerential game as above. Consider an
EDP (T, C) based on this tree as follows. There is a continuum of players,
I = R+. Each player chooses an action a ∈ A. Player t is the only player
who plays at time t. All nodes at period t belong to the same information
set, i.e. no player ever learns any previous decision. That is, the choices of
player t are of the form ct(a) = {f ∈ W |f(t) = a}. The set of nodes where
player t is active is the “slice” Xt = {xt(f)|f ∈ W}. Further, each such slice
is the only information set of the corresponding player, where all choices of
the form ct(a) are available, P (ct(a)) = Xt for all a ∈ A.
This game is just the “cascading information sets” version of the normal-
form game where each player in I = R+ chooses an action a ∈ A. The
strategy of player t is simply an action a ∈ A and the outcomes (plays) of
the game are simply functions f : R+ → A. Hence, (A1) and (A2) follow
immediately.
Recalling the expression of γ(xt(f), g) given above, it is immediate that
this EDP fails (EDP.ii’), hence (by Proposition 7) also (EDP.iii’). Since
outcome uniqueness (A2) is satisﬁed, this shows that Propositions 5 and
8(b) as stated in AR do not hold with the corrected version of (EDP.iii’).
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3.1 Introduction
Games with cyclical structures are ubiquitous in game theory. Simple ex-
amples like Matching Pennies and Rock-Paper-Scissors are routinely used to
illustrate the concepts of mixed strategies and mixed strategy Nash equi-
libria in any introductory class to game theory. Beyond their pedagogical
value, these simple examples have a wide range of application in game theory.
Evolutionary game theory is one prominent example and, e.g., the mating
strategies of the common side-blotched lizard have been shown to follow a
rock-paper-scissors pattern (Sinervo and Lively, 1996). A cyclical game struc-
ture can be captured by circulant payoﬀ matrices, in which each row vector
is rotated by one element relative to the preceding row vector (Hofbauer,
Schuster, Sigmund, and Wolﬀ, 1980; Diekmann and van Gils, 2009). Games
with circulant payoﬀ matrices have been studied extensively in the literature
on evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) and population
dynamics (Hofbauer, Schuster, Sigmund, and Wolﬀ, 1980; Diekmann and van
Gils, 2009). Circulant payoﬀ matrices also underly certain classes of coordi-
nation games, starting with matching games, that have been studied in the
literature on symmetries and focal points (Casajus, 2000; Janssen, 2001).1
The class of games we study here is important for at least two ﬁelds
of applications. First, the analysis of the convergence properties of various
evolutionary dynamics for cyclical game structures has often focused on uni-
formly mixed strategies. Games in which this strategy proﬁle is the unique
equilibrium constitute important examples of convergence failure (see, e.g.,
1The simplest example of a matching game is Heads and Tails. If both players match
the strategy of the other player each player gets a payoﬀ of 1, otherwise each player receives
a payoﬀ of zero.
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Sandholm, 2010, Chapter 9.2.1, pp. 327-330). Still, many games with a cycli-
cal structure have more than one equilibrium and the non-convergence to one
particular equilibrium may not be conclusive for the convergence properties
of the whole system. Second, matching games and more general coordination
games constitute an archetypal framework to analyze features external to the
games’ formal structure. The cyclical game structure provides a framework
where strategies cannot be diﬀerentiated according to diﬀerences in payoﬀs.
Yet, matching games are just one particular representation of such symmetric
frameworks and many diﬀerent, equally appropriate cyclical game structures
may exist (see, e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics, 2013). A rigorous characteri-
zation of the set of Nash equilibria of cyclical game structures in general is
still missing.
The aim of this paper is to bridge these gaps and provide a more general
analysis of games with a cyclical structure. More precisely, we investigate a
class of ﬁnite two-player normal-form n×n games we coin circulant games, in
which the players’ payoﬀ matrices are circulant. We also require that the ﬁrst
row of each matrix is ordered. This approach allows us to integrate classical
examples from Game Theory into one single class of games. Well-known
games such as the ones mentioned above, as well as subclasses of common-
interest and coordination games (including matching games) belong to the
class of circulant games.
Our results shed new light on the common features shared by these games.
Our main results identify the exact number of (pure or mixed) Nash equilib-
ria in circulant games. We also obtain necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and, in case of non-existence,
for the uniqueness of the uniformly mixed Nash equilibrium (a proﬁle which
we show to be a Nash equilibrium for all circulant games). As a consequence
of our main results we obtain that the maximal number of Nash equilibria in
these games is exactly 2n − 1. The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria
is either 0, 1, 2, or n. Further, we are also able to characterize the structure
of the set of mixed Nash equilibria. The best response correspondences in-
duce an equivalence relation on each player’s set of pure strategies. In any
Nash equilibrium all strategies within one equivalence class are either played
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with strictly positive or with zero probability. We show how to derive the
equivalence classes, allowing for a characterization of the support of all Nash
equilibrium strategies.
Our results also contribute to the literature on the number of Nash equi-
libria in ﬁnite two-player normal-form n × n games. Provided that such a
game is non-degenerate the number of Nash equilibria is ﬁnite and odd (see,
e.g., Shapley, 1974). Quint and Shubik (1997) show that for any odd integer
number y between 1 and 2n − 1, there exists a game with exactly y Nash
equilibria. However, as shown in von Stengel (1997), 2n − 1 is not an upper
bound on the number of Nash equilibria in such games. New upper bounds
on the number of distinct Nash equilibria are established in Keiding (1998)
and von Stengel (1999). For the class of coordination games 2n − 1 is the
(tight) upper bound on the number of equilibria (Quint and Shubik, 2002).
Our results show that this is also true for the class of circulant games.
Recently, several other articles have analyzed subclasses of games with
a special focus on diﬀerent notions of cyclicity. Duersch, Oechssler, and
Schipper (2012) consider symmetric two-player zero-sum normal-form games
and deﬁne generalized rock-paper-scissors matrices (gRPS ) in terms of best
response cycles. In their setting, a game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
if and only if it is not a gRPS. Bahel (2012) and Bahel and Haller (2013)
examine zero-sum games that are based on cyclic preference relations on the
set of actions and characterize the set of Nash equilibria. In the former paper,
actions are distinguishable, i.e., one speciﬁc actions is the beginning of the
cyclic relation, and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. In the latter,
actions are anonymous, i.e., each action can be seen as the beginning of the
cycle without aﬀecting the relation, and depending on the number of actions
the Nash equilibrium is unique or there exists an inﬁnite number of Nash
equilibria.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 intro-
duces the class of circulant games. Section 3.3 states the main results and
presents a recipe to characterize the support of all Nash equilibrium strategies
for a given circulant game. Section 3.4 presents generalizations of circulant
games and Section 3.5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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3.2 Circulant Games
Let Γ = ((S1, S2), (π1, π2)) be a ﬁnite two-player normal-form game where
Si = {0, 1, . . . , ni − 1} denotes player i’s set of pure strategies and πi :
S1 × S2 → R denotes player i’s payoﬀ function for i = 1, 2.2 We will write
player i’s payoﬀ function as the n1 × n2 matrix Ai = (a
i
kl)k∈S1,l∈S2 given by
aikl = πi(k, l). Thus in both matrices each row corresponds to a pure strategy
of player 1 and each column to a pure strategy of player 2. Following the
notation in e.g. Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013), we will also write πi(s|s
′)
for player i’s payoﬀ if he chooses a strategy s and player −i chooses strategy
s′. The set of mixed strategies for player i is denoted by Σi. For σi ∈ Σi,
σi(s) denotes the probability that σi places on the pure strategy s ∈ Si. The
set of all pure strategies played with strictly positive probability is denoted
by supp(σi). Payoﬀ functions are extended to the sets of mixed strategies
through expected payoﬀs. Given a mixed strategy σ−i of player −i, a best
response for player i against σ−i is a strategy σi such that πi(σi|σ−i) ≥
πi(σ
′
i|σ−i) for all σ
′
i ∈ Σi. The set of best responses for player i against a
strategy σ−i of the other player is denoted by BRi(σ−i). A ﬁnite two-player
normal-form game is non-degenerate (Quint and Shubik, 1997) if for any
mixed strategy σi of player i with | supp(σi)| = m, player −i has at most m
pure strategy best responses against σi. In what follows Γn denotes a ﬁnite
two-player normal-form game in which S1 = S2 = S
n = {0, . . . , n− 1}.
The following two results are well-known and will be used throughout the
paper.
Proposition 1 (Best Response Condition, Nash, 1951). Let Γ be a finite
two-player normal-form game. Then σi ∈ Σi is a best response to σ−i ∈ Σ−i
if and only if for all si ∈ Si
σi(si) > 0⇒ πi(si|σ−i) = max
s∈Si
πi(s|σ−i).
2We choose to label players’ strategies from 0 to ni−1 as this will later simplify notation
signiﬁcantly.
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Proposition 2 (Shapley, 1974; Quint and Shubik, 1997). Let Γ be a finite
non-degenerate two-player normal-form game with strategy set S1 = S2 = S.
Then
(i) Γ has a finite and odd number of Nash equilibria.
(ii) if T1, T2 ⊆ S then Γ has at most one Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) such
that supp(σ1) = T1 and supp(σ2) = T2.
Circulant games will be deﬁned through circulant matrices (see Davis,
1979) which we introduce now.
Definition 1. A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is circulant if it has the form
A =


a0 a1 a2 · · · an−1
an−1 a0 a1 . . . an−2
an−2 an−1 a0 . . . an−3
...
...
...
. . .
...
a1 a2 a3 · · · a0


and anti-circulant if
A =


a0 · · · an−3 an−2 an−1
a1 · · · an−2 an−1 a0
a2 · · · an−1 a0 a1
... . .
. ...
...
...
an−1 · · · an−4 an−3 an−2


.
Circulant and anti-circulant matrices are hence fully speciﬁed by the ﬁrst
row vector. Each remaining row vector is rotated by one element relative to
the preceding row vector. We are now ready to deﬁne a circulant game.
Definition 2. A two-player normal-form game Γn is a circulant game if
(i) each player’s payoﬀ matrix is either circulant or anti-circulant,
(ii) a10 > a
1
1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
1
n−1, and
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(iii) either a2n−k > a
2
n−k+1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−1 ≥ a
2
0 ≥ a
2
1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−k−1 or
a2n−k > a
2
n−k−1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
1 ≥ a
2
0 ≥ a
2
n−1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−k+1 for some
1 ≤ k ≤ n.
The parameter k is called the shift of Γn.
The shift describes the position of player 2’s largest payoﬀ in the ﬁrst row
of his payoﬀ matrix. As we will see later, knowing the shift and the number
of pure strategies suﬃces to determine the exact number and structure of
Nash equilibria in circulant games.
Note that if Ai is circulant then aij = aj−i and if Ai is anti-circulant
then aij = ai+j where the indices are to be read modulo n, e.g. −1 =
n − 1, n + 1 = 1, etc. In a circulant game, if player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is
circulant then π1(s|s
′) = a1s′−s and if player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant
then π1(s|s
′) = a1s+s′. Similarly if player 2’s payoﬀ matrix is circulant then
π2(s|s
′) = a2s−s′ and if player 2’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant then π2(s|s
′) =
a2s+s′. Throughout the paper the sum and diﬀerence of two strategies (and
the multiplication of a strategy with an integer) in a circulant game is to be
read modulo n.
In a circulant game the entries in the ﬁrst row of player 1’s payoﬀ matrix
(weakly) decrease when moving from left to right with a10 being the unique
maximum payoﬀ. The entries in the ﬁrst row of player 2’s payoﬀ matrix
(weakly) decrease either when moving from the largest payoﬀ to the right, or
when moving from the largest payoﬀ to the left. The shift k is determined
by the position of the unique maximum payoﬀ in the ﬁrst row of player 2’s
payoﬀ matrix. A shift of k = n corresponds to a20 being player 2’s largest
payoﬀ. A shift of k = 0 is of course possible but for notational convenience
is formally represented by a shift of k = n.
Since in a circulant game the sum of the payoﬀs in each row and each
column is constant, if one player plays the completely uniformly mixed strat-
egy, then all of the other player’s pure strategies yield the same payoﬀ. An
immediate consequence of this is the following.
Lemma 1. Let Γn be a circulant game. Then σ
∗ = (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) where σ
∗
i (s) =
1/n for all s ∈ Sn, i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium of Γn.
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We can classify circulant games according to whether the players’ payoﬀ
matrices “rotate” in the same or in opposite directions.
Definition 3. A circulant game is iso-circulant if the players’ payoﬀ matri-
ces are either both circulant or both anti-circulant matrices. It is counter-
circulant if one player’s payoﬀ matrix is circulant and the other player’s
payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant.
For n = 2 every iso-circulant game is also counter-circulant and vice versa,
as any circulant 2 × 2 matrix is also anti-circulant. For n ≥ 3, however, the
class of iso-circulant games is disjoint from the class of counter-circulant
games. Iso-circulant games with shift k = n capture the class of (weakly
ordered) circulant coordination games.
Example 15 (Matching Pennies).
The game given by
A1 =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
, A2 =
(
−1 1
1 −1
)
is the well-known Matching Pennies game. Both players’ payoﬀ matrices are
circulant (and anti-circulant) and for player 2, a2n−1 = a
2
1 = 1 is the largest
payoﬀ. Hence, it is an iso-circulant (and also a counter-circulant) game with
shift k = 1. [(1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)] is a Nash equilibrium of this game. As we
will show later it is the unique one.
Example 16 (Rock-Paper-Scissors).
The game given by
A1 =


3 2 1
2 1 3
1 3 2

 , A2 =


1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2

 .
is Rock-Paper-Scissors. Strategies are labeled such that for player 1, strategy
0 is ‘Rock’, strategy 1 is ‘Scissors’, and strategy 2 is ‘Paper’ and for player
2, strategy 0 is ‘Scissors’, strategy 1 is ‘Rock’, and strategy 2 is ‘Paper’.
Both players’ payoﬀ matrices are anti-circulant and for player 2, a2n−1 =
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a22 = 3 is the largest payoﬀ. This is an iso-circulant game with shift k = 1.
[(1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)] is a Nash equilibrium of this game. As we
will see later it is the unique one.
Example 17 (4× 4 Coordination Game).
The game given by
A1 =


5 4 3 2
2 5 4 3
3 2 5 4
4 3 2 5

 , A2 =


5 4 3 2
2 5 4 3
3 2 5 4
4 3 2 5


is an example of an iso-circulant game with shift k = 4 as both play-
ers’ payoﬀ matrices are circulant and for player 2, a2n−4 = a
2
0 = 5 is the
largest payoﬀ. The uniform probability distribution over all pure strategies,
[(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)], constitutes a Nash equilibrium. It
is, however, not the only one. As we will see later, our results immediately
imply that this game has 15 Nash equilibria.
The following two games are examples of counter-circulant games. In
both games player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant and player 2’s payoﬀ
matrix is circulant.
Example 18.
A1 =


4 3 2 1
3 2 1 4
2 1 4 3
1 4 3 2

 , A2 =


1 4 3 2
2 1 4 3
3 2 1 4
4 3 2 1


This is a counter-circulant game with shift k = 3 as for player 2, a2n−3 = a
2
1 =
4 is the largest payoﬀ. The uniform probability distribution over all pure
strategies [(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)] is a Nash equilibrium of
this game. As we will see later this game has 3 Nash equilibria.
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Example 19.
A1 =


5 4 3 2 1
4 3 2 1 5
3 2 1 5 4
2 1 5 4 3
1 5 4 3 2


, A2 =


3 2 1 5 4
4 3 2 1 5
5 4 3 2 1
1 5 4 3 2
2 1 5 4 3


This is a counter-circulant game with shift k = 2 as for player 2, a2n−2 = a
2
3 =
5 is the largest payoﬀ. The uniform probability distribution over all pure
strategies [(1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5), (1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5)] is a Nash equi-
librium of this game. As we will see later this game has 7 Nash equilibria.
3.3 Main Results
In this section we present the main results on the number and the structure of
Nash equilibria in circulant games. We start by presenting some preliminary
lemmata. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
Lemma 2. Let Γn be a circulant game with shift k in which player 1’s payoff
matrix is anti-circulant and let d = gcd(k, n).
(i) If Γn is iso-circulant, then in any Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2), for all
s ∈ Sn, σi(s) = 0 if and only if σi(s+km) = 0 for all m = 0, . . . ,
n
d
−1,
i = 1, 2.
(ii) If Γn is counter-circulant, then in any Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2), for all
s ∈ Sn, σ1(s) = 0 if and only if σ1(−s + k) = 0 and σ2(s) = 0 if and
only if σ2(−s− k) = 0
Given an iso-circulant game Γn, we can deﬁne an equivalence relation ∼
on the set Sn by s ∼ s′ if and only if s = s′ +mk for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n
d
− 1,
where d = gcd(n, k). Denote the equivalence class of s ∈ Sn by I(s).
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Note that, s′ + m1k 6= s
′ + m2k for all 0 ≤ m1 < m2 ≤
n
d
− 1. Hence
I(s) = {s + mk|0 ≤ m ≤ n
d
− 1} contains n/d elements and there are d
diﬀerent equivalence classes. Let I(Sn) = {I(s)|s ∈ Sn} be the set of equiv-
alence classes. Suppose player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant. By Lemma
2(i) two strategies are equivalent if and only if in any Nash equilibrium ei-
ther both are simultaneously played with positive probability or both are
simultaneously played with zero probability.
For a counter-circulant game let C1(s) = {s,−s+k} and C2(s) = {s,−s−
k} for all s ∈ Sn. Note that any class C1(s) contains at least one and at
most two elements. It contains one element if −s + k ≡ s mod n and two
elements if −s+k 6≡ s mod n. The former occurs if and only if either 2s = k
or 2s = n+ k. Thus there is a singleton class if and only if either k
2
∈ Sn or
(n+k)
2
∈ Sn, i.e. if either k or (n + k) is an even number. In particular there
can be at most two singleton classes. Similarly, any class C2(s) contains one
element if −s− k ≡ s mod n and two elements if −s− k 6≡ s mod n. The
former occurs if and only if either 2s = n − k or 2s = 2n − k. Thus there
is a singleton class if and only if either n − k or 2n − k is an even number,
which holds if and only if either k or (n + k) is an even number, i.e. if and
only if k
2
∈ Sn or (n+k)
2
∈ Sn. We deﬁne Ci(S
n) := {Ci(s)|s ∈ S
n}, i = 1, 2.
Suppose player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant. Then, by Lemma 2(ii),
s′ ∈ Ci(s) if and only if in any Nash equilibrium either both s and s
′ are
simultaneously played with positive probability or both are simultaneously
played with zero probability. It can be shown (Lemma B.3 in the appendix)
that the sets Ci(S
n), i = 1, 2, form a partition of Sn.
The following lemma covers the connection between the support of a
strategy of player i and the best response of player −i against that strategy.
Lemma 3. Let Γn be a circulant game in which player 1’s payoff matrix is
anti-circulant.
(i) If Γn is iso-circulant then if σi ∈ Σi and I(s) ∈ I(S
n) are such that
supp(σi) ∩ I(s) = ∅ then BR−i(σi) ∩ I(−s) = ∅.
(ii) If Γn is counter-circulant then if supp(σ−i) ∩ C−i(s) = ∅ for C−i(s) ∈
C−i(S
n) then BRi(σ−i) ∩ Ci(−s) = ∅.
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3.3.2 The Number of Nash Equilibria
Theorem 1. Let Γn be an iso-circulant game with shift k and let d =
gcd(k, n) denote the greatest common divisor of k and n. Then Γn has 2
d−1
Nash equilibria.
Since by deﬁnition k ≤ n, necessarily gcd(k, n) ≤ n. It follows that an
iso-circulant game can have at most 2n − 1 Nash equilibria. Further, an iso-
circulant game has a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if gcd(k, n) = 1.
Together with Lemma 1, this implies that if gcd(k, n) = 1 then the unique
Nash equilibrium is the one where both players choose the uniformly mixed
strategy. Some immediate consequences of these results are the following.
Matching Pennies (Example 15) is an iso-circulant game with shift k = 1.
Hence, [(1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)] is the unique Nash equilibrium. Rock-Paper-
Scissors (Example 16) is an iso-circulant game with shift k = 1. Hence, the
unique Nash equilibrium is [(1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)].
Proposition 3. Let Γn be an iso-circulant game with shift k. Γn has n pure
strategy Nash equilibria if and only if k = n. Further, Γn has no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium if and only if k 6= n.
By the last proposition an iso-circulant game Γn has either 0 or n pure
strategy Nash equilibria. The 4 × 4 coordination game in Example 17 is an
iso-circulant game with shift k = 4. As gcd(4, 4) = 4, by Theorem 1, this
game has 24 − 1 = 15 Nash equilibria. By Proposition 3 four of these are in
pure strategies.
Theorem 2. Let Γn be a counter-circulant game with shift k.
(i) If n is odd, then Γn has exactly 2
n+1
2 − 1 Nash equilibria.
(ii) If both n and k are even, then Γn has exactly 2
n
2
+1− 1 Nash equilibria.
(iii) If n is even and k is odd, then Γn has exactly 2
n
2 − 1 Nash equilibria.
It follows that a counter-circulant game can have at most 2
n
2
+1 − 1 Nash
equilibria. Further, a counter-circulant game has a unique Nash equilibrium
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if and only if n = 2 and k = 1. Example 18 is a counter-circulant game
with shift k = 3. As n is even and k is odd, by Theorem 2(iii) the game
has 22− 1 = 3 Nash equilibria. Example 19 is a counter-circulant game with
shift k = 2. As n is odd, by Theorem 2(i) the game has 23 − 1 = 7 Nash
equilibria.
Proposition 4. Let Γn be a counter-circulant game with shift k.
(i) Γn has exactly one pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if n is
odd.
(ii) Γn has exactly two pure strategy Nash equilibria if and only if both n
and k are even.
(iii) Γn has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if n is even and
k is odd.
In Example 18 n is even and k is odd, hence by Proposition 4(iii) none of
its three Nash equilibria are in pure strategies. In Example 19 n is odd, hence
by Proposition 4(i) one of its seven Nash equilibria is in pure strategies.
It follows from (i) and (ii) in Proposition 4 that the class of counter-
circulant games with even shift is a class of games for which a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium always exists.
3.3.3 The Structure of Nash Equilibria
The next lemma shows that only speciﬁc subsets of Sn can arise as the
support of a Nash equilibrium strategy of player 1.
Lemma 4. Let Γn be a circulant game in which player 1’s payoff matrix is
anti-circulant.
(i) If Γn is iso-circulant then for any union U =
⋃m
j=1 I(s
j) of elements of
I(Sn) there is a unique Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) such that supp(σ1) =
U . Further, for any Nash Equilibrium (σ1, σ2) there is a union U =⋃m
j=1 I(s
j) of elements of I(Sn) such that supp(σ1) = U .
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(ii) If Γn is counter-circulant then for any union U =
⋃m
j=1C1(s
j) of ele-
ments of C1(S
n) there is a unique Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) such that
supp(σ1) = U . Further, for any Nash Equilibrium (σ1, σ2) there is a
union U =
⋃m
j=1C1(s
j) of elements of C1(S
n) such that supp(σ1) = U .
By Lemma 4, there exists a straightforward way to characterize the sup-
port of all Nash equilibrium strategies for a given circulant game. Moreover,
once we know what to look for the weights of the strategies in the support
can be easily derived.
Consider ﬁrst the case of an iso-circulant game with n and k, and let d =
gcd(n, k). We can transform the game so that player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-
circulant (see Lemma A.1(i) in the appendix). Recall that by Lemma 2(i) the
circulant structure of the payoﬀ matrices allows us to deﬁne an equivalence
relation on the set of pure strategies Sn for each player. For a pure strategy
s ∈ Sn, the corresponding equivalence class I(s) = {s+mk|0 ≤ m ≤ n
d
− 1}
contains n/d elements and there are d diﬀerent equivalence classes. In any
Nash equilibrium all strategies within one equivalence class are either played
with strictly positive or with zero probability. It follows from Lemma 4(i)
that in any Nash equilibrium the support of either player’s strategy is the
union of classes in I(Sn) = {I(s)|s ∈ Sn} and further that for any such union
of classes in I(Sn) there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which player 1’s
strategy has this union as its support. Further, if the mixed strategy proﬁle
(σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium with supp(σ1) =
⋃m
j=1 I(s
j) for some strategies
s1, . . . , sm ∈ Sn then by Lemma 3(i) it follows that supp(σ2) =
⋃m
j=1 I(−s
j).
The actual probabilities for each pure strategy of course depend on the actual
payoﬀs, however, the structure of the supports is the same for all iso-circulant
games with the same shift and the same number of pure strategies.
Let us revisit the 4 × 4 Coordination game from Example 17. We can
transform this game so that both payoﬀ matrices are anti-circulant (see Ta-
ble 3.1 in appendix 3.C and Lemma A.1(i) in Appendix 3.A). In this game
n = k = d = 4 and hence there are four (singleton) classes: I(0) = {0},
I(1) = {1}, I(2) = {2}, and I(3) = {3}. Each class is part of a (pure
strategy) Nash equilibrium in which supp(σ1) = I(s) and supp(σ2) = I(−s),
and there are four such combinations. For instance, in one Nash equilibrium
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player 1 plays the strategy s = 1, i.e. chooses support I(1) and player 2 plays
s = 3, chooses support I(−1) = I(3). Analogously, the three remaining pure
strategy Nash equilibria are given by the proﬁles (0, 0), (2, 2), and (3, 1). Fur-
ther, each union of two classes is part of a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium
in which supp(σ1) = I(s
1) ∪ I(s2) and supp(σ2) = I(−s
1) ∪ I(−s2). There
are six such combinations, e.g., in one Nash equilibrium player 1 puts posi-
tive probability only on I(0) and I(1) and player 2 puts positive probability
on I(−0) ∪ I(−1) = I(0) ∪ I(3). The probabilities are easily derived from
the corresponding indiﬀerence conditions and the Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁle is [(1/4, 3/4, 0, 0), (3/4, 0, 0, 1/4)]. Similarly, there are four Nash equi-
libria in which the support of player 1’s (and player 2’s) strategy is the union
of three classes, e.g., [(1/4, 1/4, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/4, 1/4)]. Finally, there is
one Nash equilibrium where player 1’s (and player 2’s) strategy put posi-
tive probability on all four equivalence classes, i.e. plays a completely mixed
strategy: [(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)].3
Consider now the case of a counter-circulant game with given n and k.
We can transform this game so that player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant
(see Lemma A.1(ii) in the appendix). Recall that by Lemma 2(ii) we can
deﬁne an equivalence relation on set of pure strategies for each player. For
all s ∈ S let C1(s) = {s,−s+ k} denote the corresponding equivalence class
of player 1 and C2(s) = {s,−s − k} the one of player 2. Note that any
class C1(s), C2(s) contains at least one and at most two elements. It follows
from Lemma 4(ii) that in any Nash equilibrium the support of player 1’s
strategy is a union of classes in C1(S
n) = {C1(s)|s ∈ S
n} and that for any
union of classes in C1(S
n) there is a Nash equilibrium in which the support of
player 1’s strategy has this union as its support. Further, if (σ1, σ2) is a Nash
equilibrium with supp(σ1) =
⋃m
j=1C1(s
j) for some strategies s1, . . . , sm ∈ Sn
then by Lemma 3(ii) it follows that supp(σ2) =
⋃m
j=1C2(−s
j).
Let us revisit the game in Example 18. Here, n = 4 and k = 3. There are
two classes for player 1: C1(0) = C1(3) = {0, 3} and C1(1) = C1(2) = {1, 2}.
Correspondingly there are two classes for player 2: C2(0) = C2(1) = {0, 1}
and C2(2) = C2(3) = {2, 3}. There are two Nash equilibria in which the
3Table 3.1 in the appendix contains the remaining Nash equilibrium proﬁles.
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support of player 1’s (and player 2’s) strategy consists of a single class, e.g.
[(1/4, 0, 0, 3/4), (1/4, 3/4, 0, 0)]. Further there is one equilibrium in which
both players play the completely mixed strategy [(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)].4
3.4 Generalizations
By our deﬁnition there are games that are not circulant games, but can be
transformed into one by a simple relabeling of strategies. We chose to exclude
those games from our deﬁnition for ease of exposition. However, the results
presented above also apply for these games.
It is not necessary to insist on each row containing the same entries. All
our proofs go through if payoﬀs are transformed in a way that preserves the
order of entries in each row and in each column of the payoﬀ matrices.
Example 20. In the 3× 3 game with payoﬀ matrices
A1 =


3.1 1.9 0.8
1.5 0.9 3.4
0.5 3.2 2.1

 , A2 =


0.7 2.2 3.5
1.8 2.6 0.1
3.0 0.5 2.8

 .
the order of payoﬀs in each row and in each column is the same as in Rock-
Paper-Scissors (Example 16). The proof of Theorem 1 can easily be general-
ized to this case to show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium. As
the sum of payoﬀs in each row is not constant, however, the unique Nash equi-
librium is not the strategy proﬁle in which both players play the uniformly
mixed strategies.
In this sense, our results on the number and the structure of Nash equi-
libria only depend on the order of payoﬀs in the rows and columns of the
payoﬀ matrices.
Our results further generalize to coordination games in which players
obtain a strictly positive payoﬀ if and only if they use the same strategy
4Table 3.2 in the appendix shows the Nash equilibria and the equivalence classes for
the two counter-circulant games we introduced in Example 18 and 19.
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and a payoﬀ of 0 otherwise i.e., so-called games of pure coordination. The
resulting payoﬀ matrices are of the form
A1 =


a0 0 0 · · · 0
0 a1 0 . . . 0
0 0 a2 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · an−1


, A2 =


a0 0 0 · · · 0
0 a1 0 . . . 0
0 0 a2 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · an−1


Proving that such games have 2n − 1 Nash equilibria works analogously to
the proof of Theorem 1.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce and investigate a class of two-player normal-form
games we coin circulant games. Such games have a straightforward repre-
sentation in form of circulant matrices. Each player’s payoﬀ matrix is fully
characterized by a single row vector, which is rotated to obtain the rest of the
matrix. All circulant games have a Nash equilibrium where players random-
ize between all pure strategies with equal probability (uniformly mixed Nash
equilibrium), but might have many other pure and mixed Nash equilibria.
The circulant structure underlying the payoﬀ matrices has interesting
implications. First, the best response correspondences induce a partition on
each players’ set of pure strategies into equivalence classes. In any Nash
Equilibrium all strategies within one class are either played with strictly
positive or with zero probability. Second, there exists a simple one-to-one
correspondence between the players’ respective equivalence classes. If some
player puts zero probability on one class, the other has one corresponding
equivalence class he plays with zero probability. Finally, a single parameter
k fully determines the strategy classes and the relation between the players’
classes. The parameter itself only depends on the position of the largest
payoﬀ in the ﬁrst row of a player’s payoﬀ matrix. For a given circulant
game, knowing k and the number of pure strategies n suﬃces to calculate
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the exact number of Nash equilibria and to describe the support of all Nash
equilibrium strategies. As an immediate consequence of our main results we
establish 2n − 1 as the tight upper bound on the number of Nash equilibria
in these games.
The class of circulant games contains a large variety of games with cycli-
cal payoﬀ structures including well-known games such as Matching Pen-
nies, Rock-Paper-Scissors or subclasses of coordination and common interest
games. We shed new light on the features these games have in common
focusing on the circulant structure of their payoﬀ matrices. For example
Matching Pennies is the two-strategy variant of Rock-Paper-Scissors. Be-
yond their zero-sum property the two games belong to the same sub-class
circulant games. Both are characterized by k = 1 and the only Nash equilib-
rium is the uniformly mixed one. The common denominator that connects
these games is the balanced payoﬀ structure induced by the circulant ma-
trices with a shift of k = 1. Moreover, this reinterpretation is robust in the
sense that only relative payoﬀs matter. We can write down many variants of
Rock-Paper-Scissors, including asymmetric evaluations of wins or losses and
variants that cannot be transformed into zero-sum games. Yet, the balanced
structure is preserved and the best players can do is to randomize between
all pure strategies with equal probability.
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Appendix 3.A: Transformation of Games
Lemma A.1. (i) Let Γn be an iso-circulant game in which both players’
payoff matrices are circulant. There is a permutation of row vectors
that fixes the first row in both matrices and transforms both players’
payoff matrices into anti-circulant matrices.
(ii) Let Γn be a counter-circulant game in which player 1’s payoff matrix
is circulant. There is a permutation of row vectors that fixes that first
row in both matrices and transforms player 1’s payoff matrix into an
anti-circulant matrix and player 2’s matrix into a circulant matrix.
Proof. (i) A matrix A is anti-circulant if and only if A = PC, where C is a
circulant matrix and
P =


1 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 1
0 0 · · · 0 1 0
0 0 · · · 1 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 1 · · · 0 0 0


(Davis, 1979, p. 162, Corollary). The matrix P switches rows i and n+1− i
and ﬁxes the ﬁrst row. Using this result, we obtain that PA1 and PA2 are
anti-circulant matrices since both A1 and A2 are circulant matrices.
(ii) Using the matrix P deﬁned as in (i), we obtain that PA1 is anti-
circulant (Davis, 1979, p. 162, Corollary). As A2 is anti-circulant, A2 = PC
for some circulant matrix C (Davis, 1979, p. 162, Corollary). Hence PA2 =
P (PC) and since P = P−1 (Davis, 1979, p.28, equ. (2.4.22)), we obtain that
PA2 is a circulant matrix.
106
Chapter 3
Circulant Games
Appendix 3.B: Proofs of Main Results
We remind the reader that the sum and the diﬀerence of strategies in a
circulant game as well as multiplications of integers with strategies are read
modulo n. Central to the proofs of our main results is Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5 identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions under which the number of
Nash equilibria of a ﬁnite two player normal-form game can be calculated
by merely identifying one parameter of the game. Under the hypotheses of
Proposition 5, each Nash equilibrium strategy of a player corresponds to one
speciﬁc combination of elements of a partition of that player’s strategy set.
Moreover, for each possible combination of elements of the partition there
exists exactly one corresponding Nash equilibrium strategy. The parameter
necessary to determine the number of Nash equilibria is the cardinality of
the partition.
The proof of Theorem 1 (Theorem 2) ﬁrst establishes that iso-circulant
(counter-circulant) games satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 5. Determin-
ing the cardinality of the partitions is then merely a counting exercise.
Proposition 5. For the two-player normal-form game Γn let S1 = {[s]1|s ∈
Sn} and S2 = {[s]2|s ∈ S
n} be partitions of Sn such that |S1| = |S2|. If Γn,
S1, and S2 satisfy
(a) for all Nash equilibria (σ1, σ2), and all s, s
′ ∈ Sn, if s′ ∈ [s]i then
σi(s) = 0 if and only if σi(s
′) = 0,
(b) for all σi ∈ Σi, i = 1, 2, supp(σi) ∩ [s]i = ∅ for [s]i ∈ Si implies
BR−i(σi) ∩ [−s]−i = ∅,
(c) for all s ∈ Sn, Γn has a Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) with supp(σ1) = [s]1
and supp(σ2) = [−s]2,
then
(i) for anyM ⊆ S1 Γn has a unique Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) with supp(σ1) =⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1;
(ii) Γn has exactly 2
|S1| − 1 Nash equilibria.
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Proof. (i) Given ∅ 6= M ⊆ S1 let −M := {[−s]2|[s]1 ∈ M} ⊆ and let Γ
M
n be
the reduced game where player 1’s set of strategies is
⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1 and player
2’s set of strategies is
⋃
[s]1∈M
[−s]2 (and the payoﬀ functions are restricted
accordingly).
Claim A: Let M ′ ⊆ M ⊆ S1 be a nonempty subset of S1 and let
(σM
′
1 , σ
M ′
2 ) be a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of Γ
M ′
n . Then (σ
M
1 , σ
M
2 )
deﬁned by σM1 (s) = σ
M ′
1 (s) if [s]1 ∈ M
′ and σM1 (s) = 0 otherwise, and
σM2 (s) = σ
M ′
2 (s) if [s]2 ∈ −M
′ and σM2 (s) = 0 otherwise is a Nash equilibrium
in ΓMn .
Since (σM
′
1 , σ
M ′
2 ) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of Γ
M ′
n , all strate-
gies in
⋃
[s]1∈M ′
[−s]2 yield the same payoﬀ for player 2 against σ
M
1 . By hy-
pothesis (b), since supp(σM1 ) =
⋃
[s]∈M ′[s], no strategy outside
⋃
[s]1∈M ′
[−s]2
can be a best response for player 2 against σM1 . Analogously all strate-
gies in
⋃
[s]1∈M ′
[s]1 yield the same payoﬀ for player 1 against σ
M
2 , and since
supp(σM2 ) = −
⋃
[s]1∈M ′
[−s]2, no strategy outside
⋃
[s]1∈M ′
[s]1 is a best re-
sponse for player 1 against σM2 . Hence, by Proposition 1, (σ
M
1 , σ
M
2 ) is a Nash
equilibrium in ΓMn . This proves the claim.
Claim B: For any ∅ 6= M ⊆ S1, the reduced game Γ
M
n has exactly one
completely mixed Nash equilibrium.
Let ∅ 6= M ⊆ S1 be such that |M | = m. We will prove the claim by
induction over m. Note ﬁrst, that by hypothesis (b), in any Nash equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) of Γ
M
n , supp(σ1) is a union of elements of M .
For m = 1, this follows by hypothesis (c). For m > 1, by induction
hypothesis we obtain that for all ∅ 6= M ′ ( M the reduced game ΓM
′
n has a
unique completely mixed Nash equilibrium. By Claim A, for every ∅ 6= M ′ (
M there is a Nash equilibrium (σM1 , σ
M
2 ) in Γ
M
n with supp(σ
M
1 ) =
⋃
[s]∈M ′[s].
As by Proposition 2(ii) for any ∅ 6= M ′ ( M there can be at most one
Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in Γ
M
n with supp(σ1) = M
′ we obtain that there is
exactly one such Nash equilibrium. This implies that ΓMn has at least 2
m− 2
Nash equilibria.
Suppose there is no completely mixed Nash equilibrium in ΓMn . Then Γ
M
n
has exactly 2m−2 Nash equilibria. From hypotheses (a) and (b) it follows that
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Γn is non-degenerate and hence that Γ
M
n is non-degenerate. By Proposition
2(i) ΓMn must have an odd number of Nash equilibria, which contradicts the
fact that 2m − 2 is even. Hence there is at least one completely mixed Nash
equilibrium and again because ΓMn is non-degenerate by Proposition 2(ii)
there is exactly one. This proves the claim.
By Claim B, for ∅ 6= M ⊆ S1, Γ
M
n has exactly one completely mixed
Nash equilibrium (σM1 , σ
M
2 ). By Claim A, this induces a Nash equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) in Γn with supp(σ1) =
⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1. Any Nash equilibrium (σ
′
1, σ
′
2) 6=
(σ1, σ2) with supp(σ
′
1) =
⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1 would induce a completely mixed Nash
equilibrium in ΓMn diﬀerent from (σ
M
1 , σ
M
2 ), a contradiction. Hence Γn has
exactly one Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) with supp(σ1) =
⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1.
(ii) From (i) it follows that for any ∅ 6= M ⊆ S1 there is a unique Nash
equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in Γn such that supp(σ1) =
⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1. Further, by
hypothesis (a), for any Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) of Γn there is ∅ 6= M ⊆ S1
such that supp(σ1) =
⋃
[s]1∈M
[s]1. As S1 has 2
|S1| − 1 nonempty subsets, Γn
has exactly 2|S1| − 1 Nash equilibria.
The following lemma is required in the proofs of Lemmata 2 and 3.
Lemma B.1. Let Γn be a circulant game with shift k in which player 1’s
payoff matrix is anti-circulant.
(i) For all σ2 ∈ Σ2 and all s ∈ S
n if σ2(s) = 0 then −s /∈ BR1(σ2) .
(ii) If Γn is iso-circulant, then for all σ1 ∈ Σ1 and all s ∈ S
n if σ1(s) = 0
then (−s− k) /∈ BR2(σ1) .
(iii) If Γn is counter-circulant, then for all σ1 ∈ Σ1 and all s ∈ S
n if σ1(s) =
0 then (s− k) /∈ BR2(σ1) .
Proof. (i) Let σ2 ∈ Σ2 be such that σ2(s) = 0 for some s ∈ S
n. Since player
1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant π1(s|s
′) = a1s+s′. We will show that there
exists a strategy for player 1 that yields a strictly higher payoﬀ against σ2
than strategy −s. Let l := min{s < l′ ≤ s+n−1|σ2(l
′) > 0}. Since n > 1 the
set {s < l′ ≤ s+n−1|σ2(l
′) > 0} is non-empty and l exists. By construction
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of l, σ2(s) = · · · = σ2(l − 1) = 0. We claim that π1(−s|σ2) < π1(−l|σ2). To
see this, note that
π1(−s|σ2) =
s+n−1∑
t=l
σ2(t)a
1
t−s
and
π1(−l|σ2) =
s+n−1∑
t=l
σ2(t)a
1
t−l.
Comparing these payoﬀs for t = l we obtain that a1t−l = a
1
0 > a
1
t−s = a
1
l−s,
where the strict inequality holds by part (ii) of Deﬁnition 2. Further, for
l < t ≤ s+n−1 we have 0 ≤ t− l < t−s ≤ n−1 and hence that a1t−l ≥ a
1
t−s
again by part (ii) of Deﬁnition 2. Since by construction of l, σ2(l) > 0 we
obtain π1(−s|σ2) < π1(−l|σ2) which proves the claim. Hence −s /∈ BR1(σ2).
(ii) Let σ1 ∈ Σ1 and s ∈ S
n be such that σ1(s) = 0. Since player 2’s payoﬀ
matrix is anti-circulant, π2(s|s
′) = a2s′+s for s, s
′ ∈ S. Since Γn is a circulant
game, by part (iii) of Deﬁnition 2 either a2n−k > a
2
n−k+1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−1 ≥ a
2
0 ≥
a21 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−k−1 or a
2
n−k > a
2
n−k−1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
1 ≥ a
2
0 ≥ a
2
n−1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−k+1.
We will only prove the result for the former case as the proof for the latter
works analogously .
Let l := min{s < l′ ≤ s + n − 1|σ1(l
′) > 0} which exists since {s < l′ ≤
s + n− 1|σ1(l
′) > 0} 6= ∅. Then σ1(s) = · · · = σ1(l − 1) = 0. We claim that
π2(−s− k|σ1) < π2(−l − k|σ1). To see this, note that
π2(−s− k|σ2) =
s+n−1∑
t=l
σ1(t)a
2
t−s−k
and
π2(−l − k|σ2) =
s+n−1∑
t=l
σ1(t)a
2
t−l−k.
For t = l we have a2t−l−k = a
2
n−k > a
2
t−s−k = a
2
l−s−k, where the strict
inequality holds by part (iii) of Deﬁnition 2. Further, for l < t ≤ s+n−1 we
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have a2t−l−k ≥ a
2
t−s−k by part (iii) of Deﬁnition 2 since t− l − k < t− s− k,
−k ≤ t − l − k < n − k − 1, and −k < t − s − k ≤ n − k − 1. Since by
construction of l, σ1(l) > 0 we obtain that π2(−s − k|σ1) < π2(−l − k|σ1)
which proves the claim. Hence (−s− k) /∈ BR2(σ1).
(iii) Let σ1 ∈ Σ1 and s ∈ S
n be such that σ1(s) = 0. Since player 2’s payoﬀ
matrix is circulant, π2(s|s
′) = a2s−s′ for s, s
′ ∈ S. Since Γn is a circulant game,
by deﬁnition either a2n−k > a
2
n−k+1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−1 ≥ a
2
0 ≥ a
2
1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−k−1
or a2n−k > a
2
n−k−1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
1 ≥ a
2
0 ≥ a
2
n−1 ≥ · · · ≥ a
2
n−k+1. We will
only prove the result for the former case as the proof for the latter works
analogously. Let l := min{s < l′ ≤ s + n − 1|σ1(l
′) > 0} which exists since
{s < l′ ≤ s + n − 1|σ1(l
′) > 0} 6= ∅. Then σ1(s) = · · · = σ1(l − 1) = 0. We
claim that π2(s− k|σ1) < π2(−l − k|σ1). To see this, note that
π2(s− k|σ2) =
s+n−1∑
t=l
σ1(t)a
2
s−k−t
and
π2(l − k|σ2) =
s+n−1∑
t=l
σ1(t)a
2
l−k−t.
For t = l we have a2l−k−t = a
2
n−k > a
2
s−k−t = a
2
s−k−l. Further, for l <
t ≤ s + n − 1 we have a2l−k−t ≥ a
2
s−k−t by part (iii) of the deﬁnition of
circulant game since l − k − t > s − k − t, −k ≥ l − k − t > −n − k + 1,
and −k > s − k − t ≥ −n − k + 1. Since by construction of l, σ1(l) > 0
we obtain that π2(s − k|σ1) < π2(l − k|σ1) which proves the claim. Hence
(s− k) /∈ BR2(σ1).
Lemma B.1 allows us to rule out certain strategies as best responses for
player i if player −i plays some strategy with zero probability in the case that
player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant. By (i) if player 2 plays a strategy s
with probability 0 then for player 1 strategy −s cannot be a best response.
Similarly, (ii) and (iii) state that if in an iso-circulant (counter-circulant)
game player 1 places probability 0 on strategy s then −s− k (s− k) cannot
be a best response for player 2.
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We are now ready to prove Lemmata 2 and 3. It follows from Lemma
2(i) and Lemma 3(i) that iso-circulant games satisfy hypotheses (a) and (b)
in Proposition 5. Analogously, Lemma 2(ii) and Lemma 3(ii) establish that
counter-circulant games fulﬁll (a) and (b) in Proposition 5.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) The “if” part is trivial. To see the “only if” part let
(σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium of Γn and let s ∈ S
n be such that σ1(s) = 0. By
Lemma B.1(ii), σ2(−s−k) = 0 and consequently by Lemma B.1(i) σ1(s+k) =
0. Iterating this argument yields σ1(s+mk) = 0 for all m = 0, . . . ,
n
d
− 1. If
σ2(s) = 0 the argument works analogously.
(ii) By Lemma B.1(i) and (iii) for any Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) and any
s ∈ Sn we obtain
σ1(s) = 0⇒ σ2(s− k) = 0⇒ σ1(−s+ k) = 0
and
σ1(−s + k) = 0⇒ σ2(−s) = 0⇒ σ1(s) = 0.
Analogously, for player 2, we obtain
σ2(s) = 0⇒ σ1(−s) = 0⇒ σ2(−s− k) = 0
and
σ2(−s− k) = 0⇒ σ1(s+ k) = 0⇒ σ2(s) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) First, let s ∈ Sn be such that supp(σ1) ∩ I(s) = ∅.
By Lemma B.1(ii), −s − (m + 1)k /∈ BR2(σ1) for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n/d − 1. As
{−s− (m+1)k|0 ≤ m ≤ n/d− 1} = I(−s) we obtain BR2(σ1)∩ I(−s) = ∅.
Next, let s ∈ Sn be such that supp(σ2) ∩ I(s) = ∅. By Lemma B.1(i),
−s − mk /∈ BR1(σ2) for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n/d − 1. As {−s − mk|0 ≤ m ≤
n/d− 1} = I(−s) we obtain BR1(σ2) ∩ I(−s) = ∅.
(ii) If supp(σ−i) ∩ C−i(s) = ∅ for C−i(s) ∈ C−i(S
n), then, since C−i(s) =
{s,−s+(−1)i−1k}, by Lemma B.1(i) and (iii), −s, s+(−1)i−1k /∈ BRi(σ−i).
Hence BRi(σ−i) ∩ Ci(−s) = ∅.
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The following Lemma B.2 establishes that iso-circulant games fulﬁll hy-
pothesis (c) in Proposition 5 and is used in the proofs of Theorem 1 and
Proposition 3.
Lemma B.2. Let Γn be an iso-circulant game in which both players’ payoff
matrices are anti-circulant. For every s ∈ Sn, there is a Nash equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) such that supp(σ1) = I(s) and supp(σ2) = I(−s).
Proof. Given s ∈ Sn, deﬁne σ1(s) = d/n for all s ∈ I(s) and σ2(s) = d/n
for all s ∈ I(−s). By construction supp(σ1) = I(s) and supp(σ2) = I(−s).
By Lemma 3(i), no strategy outside I(s) can be a best response for player 1
against σ2 and no strategy outside I(−s) can be a best response for player
2 against σ1. Further, π1(s|σ2) =
∑n/d−1
m=0
d
n
as+s+mk = π1(s
′|σ2) for all s, s
′ ∈
I(s) and analogously π2(s|σ1) = π2(s
′|σ1) for all s, s
′ ∈ I(−s). Proposition 1
yields that (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium of Γn.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1 and Proposition 3.
Proof of Theorem 1. If Γn is an iso-circulant game in which both players’
payoﬀ matrices are anti-circulant then by Lemma 2(i), Lemma 3(i) and
Lemma B.2, Γn and S1 = S2 = I(S
n) as deﬁned in section 3.3.1 then satisfy
the hypotheses of Proposition 5. As |I(Sn)| = d, it follows that Γn has 2
d−1
Nash equilibria. If Γn is an iso-circulant game in which both players’ payoﬀ
matrices are circulant, there is a permutation of row vectors that transforms
both players’ payoﬀ matrices into anti-circulant matrices while ﬁxing the ﬁrst
row in both matrices (Lemma A.1(i)). This permutation, which is essentially
a relabeling of the players’ strategies, does not aﬀect the number of equilibria.
Hence, the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note ﬁrst that if both players’ payoﬀ matrices are
circulant then by Lemma A.1(i) the game can be transformed into a diﬀerent
version of the same game in which both players’ payoﬀ matrices are anti-
circulant by a permutation of row vectors. Since such a permutation does
not aﬀect the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria, we assume wlog that
both players’ payoﬀ matrices are anti-circulant.
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To see the “if” part suppose k = n. Then by construction, each class I(s)
is a singleton set and there are n disjoint classes. Hence by Lemma B.2, Γn
has at least n pure strategy Nash equilibria. By Lemma 2(i), in any pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2), supp(σ1) = I(s) for some s ∈ S and hence
Γn has exactly n pure strategy Nash equilibria.
To prove the “only if” part let Γn have n pure strategy Nash equilibria
and let (s1, s2) be one of them. By Lemma 2(i), I(s1) must be a singleton
set. By construction, I(s1) is a singleton set if and only if k = n.
This proves the ﬁrst part of the theorem.
To see the second part, note that by construction of the classes I(s) is
a singleton set if and only if k = n for any s ∈ S. Further by Lemma 2(i)
and Lemma B.2, Γn has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if there
is a singleton equivalence class I(s). Hence, Γn has no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium if and only if k 6= n.
Before we can turn to the proofs of Theorem 2 and Proposition 4 we
require a couple more preliminary lemmata. One hypothesis in Proposition
5 requires the sets S1 and S2 to be partitions of the strategy set. While
this is true by construction for I(Sn) in the case of iso-circulant games, the
following Lemma B.3 shows that the C1(S
n) and C2(S
n) form a partition of
Sn.
Lemma B.3. Let Γn be a counter-circulant game. For i = 1, 2 the set Ci(S
n)
is a partition of Sn.
Proof. We will prove the result for i = 1 as the proof for i = 2 works
analogously. Since s ∈ C1(s) for all s ∈ S
n, it follows that
⋃
s∈Sn C1(s) = S
n.
If there is s ∈ C1(s) ∩ C1(s
′) for some s, s′ ∈ Sn, then then since s ∈ C1(s)
either s = s or s = −s + k. If s = s then Ci(s) = Ci(s). If s = −s + k
then −s + k = s − k + k = s. In any case it follows that C1(s) = C1(s).
Using the same argument one obtains C1(s) = C1(s
′) and hence that C1(s) =
C1(s
′).
The following Lemma B.4 establishes that counter-circulant games fulﬁll
property (c) in Proposition 5.
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Lemma B.4. Let Γn be a counter-circulant game in which player 1’s payoff
matrix is anti-circulant and let σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2.
(i) Ci(s) is a singleton set if and only if C−i(−s) is a singleton set.
(ii) For every s ∈ Sn, there is a Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) such that supp(σ1) =
C1(s) and supp(σ2) = C2(−s).
Proof. (i) Suppose that Ci(s) is a singleton. By construction, s ≡ −s +
(−1)i−1k mod n which is equivalent to −s ≡ s+(−1)ik mod n. This holds
if and only if C−i(−s) is a singleton.
(ii) Note that this follows from (i) and Lemma 3(ii) if C1(s) is a singleton
set. Hence, suppose that C1(s) = {s,−s + k} contains two elements. Then,
by (i), C2(−s) = {−s, s − k} contains two elements and neither 2s = k
nor 2s = n + k. Choose σ1(s) as the solution to xa
2
−2s + (1 − x)a
2
−k =
xa2−k + (1− x)a
2
2s−2k, i.e.
σs1(s) =
a22s−2k − a
2
n−k
a22s−2k − a
2
n−k + a
2
n−2s − a
2
n−k
.
By deﬁnition a2n−k is player 2’s largest payoﬀ implying that a
2
2s−2k−a
2
n−k < 0
since 2s 6= n+k and that a2n−2s−a
2
n−k < 0 since 2s 6= k. Hence σ1(s) ∈]0, 1[.
Choose σs2(−s) as the solution to xa
1
0+(1−x)a
1
2s−k = xa
1
−2s+k+(1−x)a
1
0,
i.e.
σs2(−s) =
a10 − a
1
2s−k
a10 − a
1
2s−k + a
1
0 − a
1
−2s+k
.
By deﬁnition a10 is player 1’s largest payoﬀ. Hence as 2s 6= k a
1
0 − a
1
2s−k > 0
and a10 − a
1
−2s+k > 0 implying that σ2(−s) ∈]0, 1[. By Lemma 3(ii) and
Proposition 1, (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium.
The set C1(S
n) is a partition of the strategy set for player 1 while C2(S
n)
is a partition of the strategy set for player 2. By Lemma 3(ii) a class C1(s) of
player 1 “corresponds” to a class C2(−s) of player 2 in the sense that if player
1 puts probability 0 on all strategies in C1(s) then none of the strategies in
C2(−s) are a best response for player 2 and vice versa. Part (i) of Lemma B.4
states that two corresponding classes contain the same number of elements.
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By (ii) for every class C1(s) there is always a Nash Equilibrium such that
player 1’s strategy has this class as its support while player 2’s strategy has
support C2(−s). The equilibrium constructed to prove (ii) is such that player
1 chooses his strategy (with support C1(s)) such that player 2 is indiﬀerent
between all strategies in C2(−s) (and vice versa). As Γn is a non-degenerate
game, by Proposition 2(ii) this is the unique equilibrium (σ1, σ2) such that
supp(σ1) = C1(s) and supp(σ2) = C2(−s).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2 and Proposition 4.
Proof of Theorem 2. If Γn is a counter-circulant game in which player 1’s
payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant and player 2’s payoﬀ matrix is circulant then
by Lemma B.3, C1(S
n) and C2(S
n) as deﬁned in section 3.3.1 are partitions
of Sn. Further, by Lemma B.4(i), |C1(S
n)| = |C2(S
n)| and by Lemmata
2(ii), 3(ii), and B.4(ii), Γn, S1 = C1(S
n), and S2 = C2(S
n) satisfy properties
(a)-(c) in Proposition 5 and hence Γn has 2
|C1(Sn)| − 1 Nash equilibria.
To prove (i)-(iii) it hence suﬃces to determine |C1(S
n)|. Note that any
class C1(s) contains either one or two elements. It contains one element if
and only if −s+k ≡ s which occurs if and only if either 2s = k or 2s = n+k.
Further, there are at most two singleton classes.
(i) If n is odd, then either n− k is odd (if k is even) or 2n− k is odd (if
k is odd). Hence there is one singleton class in C1(S
n) and since all other
elements of C1(S
n) contain two elements, |C1(S
n)| = (n−1)/2+1 = (n+1)/2.
(ii) If both n and k are even, then both k and n+k are even and k/2, (n+
k)/2 ∈ Sn. Hence there are two singleton classes in C1(S
n) and since all other
elements of C1(S
n) contain two elements, |C1(S
n)| = (n−2)/2+2 = (n+2)/2.
(iii) If n is even and k is odd, then n+k is odd and hence neither k/2 ∈ Sn
nor (n+ k)/2 ∈ Sn. Hence there is no singleton class and hence all elements
of C1(S
n) contain 2 elements, implying that |C1(S
n)| = n/2 = n/2.
If Γn is a counter-circulant game in which player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is
circulant and player 2’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant, there is a permutation
of row vectors that transforms player 1’s payoﬀ matrix into an anti-circulant
matrix. Applying the same permutation of row vectors to player 2’s payoﬀ
matrix yields a diﬀerent version of the same game in which strategies are
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diﬀerently labeled and player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant and player
2’s payoﬀ matrix is circulant (Lemma A.1(ii)). This permutation does not
aﬀect the number of Nash equilibria and hence the proof of Theorem 2 is
complete.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note ﬁrst that if player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is circulant
then by Lemma A.1(i) the game can be transformed into a diﬀerent version
of the same game in which player 1’s payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant by a
permutation of row vectors. Since such a permutation does not aﬀect the
number of pure strategy Nash equilibria, we assume wlog that player 1’s
payoﬀ matrix is anti-circulant.
(i) By Lemmata 2(ii) and B.4(ii), Γn has one pure strategy Nash equi-
librium if and only if one of the classes C1(s) is a singleton set, which by
construction happens if and only if n is odd.
(ii) By Lemmata 2(ii) and B.4(ii), Γn has two pure strategy Nash equi-
libria if and only if two of the classes C1(s) are singleton sets, which by
construction happens if and only if both n and k are even.
(iii) By Lemmata 2(ii) and B.4(ii), Γn has no pure strategy Nash equi-
librium if and only if none of the classes C1(s) is a singleton set, which by
construction happens if and only n is even and k is odd.
Finally, we prove Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) To see the ﬁrst part, letM =
⋃m
j=1 I(s
j) be a union of
elements of I(Sn). By Lemma 2(i) and Lemma B.2, Γn and S1 = S2 = I(S
n)
as deﬁned in section 3.3.1 then satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 5. Hence,
there is a unique Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) with supp(σ1) = M .
To prove the second part, let (σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma
2(i), supp(σ1) is a union of elements in I(S
n).
(ii) Too see the ﬁrst part, let M =
⋃m
j=1C1(s
j) be a union of elements
of C1(S
n). By Lemma B.3, C1(S
n) and C2(S
n) as deﬁned in section 3.3.1
are partitions of Sn. Further, by Lemma B.4(i), |C1(S
n)| = |C2(S
n)| and by
Lemma 2(ii), Lemma 3(ii), and B.4(ii), Γn, S1 = C1(S
n), and S2 = C2(S
n)
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satisfy properties (a)-(c) in Proposition 5. It follows that there is a unique
Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) with supp(σ1) = M .
To prove the second part, let (σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma
2(ii), supp(σ1) is a union of elements in C1(S
n).
118
Chapter 3
Circulant Games
Appendix 3.C: Tables
Table 3.1: Examples of iso-circulant games.
Matching Pennies Rock-Paper-Scissors 4× 4 Coordination
Matrix Player 1
(
1 −1
−1 1
) ( 3 2 1
2 1 3
1 3 2
) 
 5 4 3 24 3 2 5
3 2 5 4
2 5 4 3


Matrix Player 2
(
−1 1
1 −1
) ( 1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
)  5 4 3 24 3 2 5
3 2 5 4
2 5 4 3


Shift k 1 1 4
gcd(n, k) 1 1 4
Number of Equilibria 1 1 15
Equivalence Classes I(0)={0} I(0)={0} I(0)={0}
I(1)={1} I(1)={1} I(1)={1}
I(2)={2} I(2)={2}
I(3)={3}
Nash Equilibria
Pure s1 = 0, s2 = 0
s1 = 1, s2 = 3
s1 = 2, s2 = 2
s1 = 3, s2 = 1
Support 2 Classes σ1 = (1/2, 1/2) σ1 = (1/4, 3/4, 0, 0)
σ2 = (1/2, 1/2) σ2 = (3/4, 0, 0, 1/4)
σ1 = (1/2, 0, 1/2, 0)
σ2 = (1/2, 0, 1/2, 0)
σ1 = (3/4, 0, 0, 1/4)
σ2 = (1/4, 3/4, 0, 0)
σ1 = (0, 1/4, 3/4, 0)
σ2 = (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4)
σ1 = (0, 1/2, 0, 1/2)
σ2 = (0, 1/2, 0, 1/2)
σ1 = (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4)
σ2 = (0, 1/4, 3/4, 0)
Support 3 Classes σ1 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) σ1 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/2, 0)
σ2 = (1/2, 1/3, 1/3) σ2 = (1/2, 0, 1/4, 1/4)
σ1 = (1/4, 1/2, 0, 1/4)
σ2 = (1/4, 1/2, 0, 1/4)
σ1 = (1/2, 0, 1/4, 1/4)
σ2 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/2, 0)
σ1 = (0, 1/4, 1/4, 1/2)
σ2 = (0, 1/4, 1/4, 1/2)
Support 4 Classes σ1 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)
σ2 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4)
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Table 3.2: Examples of counter-circulant games.
Example 4 Example 5
Matrix Player 1

 4 3 2 13 2 1 4
2 1 4 3
1 4 3 2




5 4 3 2 1
4 3 2 1 5
3 2 1 5 4
2 1 5 4 3
1 5 4 3 2


Matrix Player 2

 1 4 3 22 1 4 3
3 2 1 4
4 3 2 1




3 2 1 5 4
4 3 2 1 5
5 4 3 2 1
1 5 4 3 2
2 1 5 4 3


Shift k 3 2
n 4 5
Number of Equilibria 3 7
Equivalence Classes
Player 1
Singleton C1(1) = {1}
2 Elements C1(0) = C1(3) = {0, 3} C1(0) = C1(2) = {0, 2}
C1(1) = C1(2) = {1, 2} C1(3) = C1(4) = {3, 4}
Player 2
Singleton C2(4) = {4}
2 Elements C2(0) = C2(1) = {0, 1} C2(0) = C2(3) = {0, 3}
C2(2) = C2(3) = {2, 3} C2(1) = C2(2) = {0, 3}
Nash Equilibria
Pure s1 = 1, s2 = 4
Support 1 Class mixed σ1 = (1/4, 0, 0, 3/4) σ1 = (3/5, 0, 2/5, 0, 0)
σ2 = (1/4, 3/4, 0, 0) σ2 = (3/5, 0, 0, 2/5, 0)
σ1 = (0, 3/4, 1/4, 0) σ1 = (0, 0, 0, 4/5, 1/5)
σ2 = (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4) σ2 = (0, 1/5, 4/5, 0, 0)
Support 2 Classes σ1 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) σ1 = (3/5, 1/5, 1/5, 0, 0)
σ2 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) σ2 = (3/5, 0, 0, 1/5, 1/5)
σ1 = (1/5, 0, 2/5, 1/5, 1/5)
σ2 = (1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 2/5, 0)
σ1 = (0, 2/5, 0, 2/5, 1/5)
σ2 = (0, 1/5, 2/5, 0, 2/5)
Support 3 Classes σ1 = (1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5)
σ2 = (1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5)
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4.1 Introduction
The concept of preference is of fundamental importance for decision theory
and economic analysis. Yet, preferences are not a primitive but a derived
object which structures choices as long as they exhibit some basic consistency,
e.g. in the form of the weak axiom of revealed preference. If choices are
consistent, a number of elementary predictions can be derived, which form the
basis for decision theory, microeconomics, consumer research, and judgment
and decision making. One such prediction is that choices should agree with
valuations: if a decision maker chooses one option over another, he should
value the former more than the latter.
This common-sense prediction is at odds with observed decisions under
risk. The preference reversal phenomenon, ﬁrst documented in psychology by
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and Lindman (1971), describes a situation in
which participants are asked to state monetary valuations for a series of lot-
teries (usually through minimum selling prices), and separately choose from
pairs of those lotteries. The pairs consist of a P -bet, which has a high prob-
ability of paying a moderate amount of money, and a $-bet , which has a low
probability of paying a high amount of money. A preference reversal occurs
if either the P -bet is chosen from a pair in which the $-bet is priced higher
or the $-bet is chosen from a pair in which the P -bet is priced higher. The
preference reversal phenomenon is characterized by a high rate of reversals
of the ﬁrst type (between 40 and 80 percent in most experiments), which are
called predicted reversals. Reversals of the second type, termed unpredicted,
are less frequent (between 5 and 30 percent). The asymmetry between both
types of reversals is especially problematic, for, if reversals were due to e.g.
participants’ errors, one should expect similar numbers of both types. In
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other words, while one could explain away unpredicted reversals as noisy ob-
servations, predicted reversals remain a serious challenge to basic economic
analysis.
It is no surprise that preference reversals have received a great deal of
attention in the last half century. After the ﬁrst replication in economics by
Grether and Plott (1979), a large number of experimental and theoretical
studies has shown that the phenomenon is extremely stable. It has been
replicated in various ways using hypothetical and real payments, diﬀerent
payment schemes, and diﬀerent elicitation methods for lottery prices (for a
survey, see e.g. Seidl, 2002). Preference reversals of this particular form have
been documented beyond lottery choice, e.g. in the ﬁeld of health utility
measurements (Stalmeier, Wakker, and Bezembinder, 1997; Bleichrodt and
Pinto Prades, 1994; Oliver, 2013). They have also been shown to be relevant
for decision making under ambiguity (Maaﬁ, 2011; Trautmann, Vieider, and
Wakker, 2011; Ball, Bardsley, and Ormerod, 2012). Furthermore, other forms
of inconsistencies between diﬀerent preference elicitation methods have been
established in the literature, including reversals between pricing and rat-
ing (Schkade and Johnson, 1989) as well as discrepancies between certainty
and probability equivalents (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Johnson and
Schkade, 1989; Delquié, 1993). In addition to their conceptual importance
for decision analysis, these phenomena are of great relevance for applied eco-
nomics, since they cast doubts on the validity of e.g. consumer valuations,
and, accordingly, on demand estimations and policy decisions based on those
valuations.
The present research provides new evidence on the determinants of pref-
erence reversals. We propose a simple, process-based model which predicts
the observed pattern of reversals. Speciﬁcally, we disentangle the causes be-
hind the existence of reversals and their asymmetry, i.e. the predominance of
predicted preference reversals. The key determinant behind the existence of
reversals of both types is the presence of noise in the evaluation phase, or,
in other words, imprecise preferences (Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Butler and
Loomes, 2007). The asymmetry of reversals, on the other hand, is caused by
an overpricing phenomenon due to anchoring of evaluations on the largest
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monetary outcomes of a lottery (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988; Tversky,
Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990). This phenomenon is itself a consequence of
the cardinal/monetary framing of the evaluation phase.
Received evidence on preference reversals could potentially be explained
by a number of alternative, “as if” models. Our model, however, delivers
additional, testable predictions on decision times. In particular, choices as-
sociated to reversals of either type are predicted to be slower than corre-
sponding non-reversals. Measuring decision times hence allows us to put our
model to a more stringent test than if we relied on choice data only, and we
consequently do so in two experiments.1
Our ﬁrst experiment conﬁrmed the predictions of the model, both for
choices and decision times. We established the basic eﬀects using diﬀerent
payment methods to incentivize pricing tasks. Speciﬁcally, we employed the
BDM procedure (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) and an ordinal pay-
ment scheme (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman,
1990; Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer, 2004). The aim of our second experiment
was to disentangle the two causes of preference reversals. To do so, we set
out to eliminate the overpricing phenomenon by moving away from cardinal
elicitation tasks. Instead, we employed two diﬀerent ranking methods (plus
a control BDM replication), one with a price framing, and one where we
carefully removed all references to prices. In terms of our model, eliminating
overpricing in the lottery evaluation phase should reduce the occurrence of
predicted reversals should be reduced. However, the basic predictions for de-
cision times remain unaﬀected as they arise from the assumption of noise in
the evaluation phase only. As hypothesized, predicted reversals were greatly
reduced, but decisions times associated with reversals remained signiﬁcantly
1The measurement of decision times or response times is a standard tool in psychology
(see, e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). To our knowledge, the ﬁrst studies employing them
in economics were those of Wilcox (1993, 1994), who related them to decision costs in the
context of risky choice. Decision times were also used by Moﬀatt (2005) relying on risky-
choice data from Hey (2001). More recently, Piovesan and Wengström (2009) measured
response times in a dictator game. Rubinstein (2007) advocated the measurement of
decision times in large-scale, web-based experiments to better understand the process of
reasoning behind economic decisions. Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013) measured response
times within a Bayesian-updating paradigm in order to study intuitive decision making in
economic contexts.
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longer than those associated with non-reversals.
Our research also delivers additional theoretical and methodological in-
sights. A ﬁrst, interesting prediction was unexpected before the development
of the model. On the basis of our assumptions, we are able to prove that
decisions where the riskier $-bet is chosen without giving rise to a reversal
should be slower than those non-reversals where the P -bet is chosen. This
nontrivial prediction arises as a consequence of the conjunction of impre-
cise preferences and the overpricing phenomenon, and hence was predicted
for (and observed in) the ﬁrst experiment but not for the second. A fur-
ther, striking observation was that choices in the treatment with unframed
ranking-based evaluations were much faster than those in other treatments,
in spite of the fact that choice phases were identical across treatments. This
fact has a simple process-based explanation within our model. Last, our
design speciﬁcally allowed comparing the number of preference reversals oc-
curring when prices are elicited before the choice phase to the number of
preference reversals occurring when prices are elicited after the choice phase.
This comparison was motivated by evidence from psychology (see Section
4.2.3 below) indicating that choices might sharpen and even modify previ-
ously imprecise preferences. In agreement with this literature, we show that
ordering eﬀects, although small, are present in the measurement of reversals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 spells
out our model and derives its predictions and corresponding experimental
hypotheses. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe the ﬁrst and second experiments
and their results, respectively. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 A Simple Model of Preference Reversals
and Decision Times
In this section we present our formal model, which is meant to be as simple
as possible. We ﬁrst state and discuss the underlying assumptions, and
then derive a number of predictions concerning preference reversals and the
associated decision times.
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The building blocks of our model are grounded on received evidence from
the literature on preference reversals. First, evidence by Schmidt and Hey
(2004) suggested that part of the preference reversal phenomenon might be
due to pricing errors, while choice errors play a minor role. Butler and
Loomes (2007) found that subjects in preference reversal experiments ex-
hibit imprecise monetary valuations of lotteries.2 Our model incorporates
these observations by assuming a noisy evaluation phase, in comparison to
a relatively noise-free choice phase. Second, we rely on the compatibility
hypothesis proposed by Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) and further in-
vestigated by Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990), according to which
attributes that naturally map onto the evaluation scale are given predomi-
nant weight in the evaluation phase. Since the evaluation scale usually refers
to prices, the monetary outcomes of the lotteries might anchor valuations,
giving rise to an overpricing of the $-bet, where a large monetary outcome is
salient.3
4.2.1 Model and Rationale
We consider a choice between a P -bet and a $-bet and the pricing decisions
for both bets. Let uP and u$ denote the “true” utilities of the P -bet and the $-
bet, respectively. Denote by CEP and CE$ the elicited certainty equivalents
of the P -bet and the $-bet, respectively.
Relying on evidence by Schmidt and Hey (2004) and Butler and Loomes
(2007), we assume that the price elicitation phase is noisier than the choice
phase. This is formalized in two parts. The ﬁrst assumption states that the
pricing of lotteries is a noisy process.
2See Blavatsky (2009) for a formal model focused on those ﬁndings.
3Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) used a design with additional choices between
the bets and cash amounts and showed that at least part of the predicted reversals arise
because of an overpricing of $-bets. Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) also proposed
the prominence hypothesis, which assumes a bias in the choice stage rather than in the
evaluation stage (see also Fischer, Carmon, Ariely, and Zauberman, 1999). Cubitt, Munro,
and Starmer (2004) investigated a number of alternative hypotheses including prominence
and compatibility and dismissed each of them in isolation, concluding that a combination
of hypotheses would be a more reasonable explanation of their ﬁndings.
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Assumption 1. CEP = uP + ζP and CE$ = u$ + ζ$, where ζP and ζ$ are
independent error terms with everywhere positive density functions.4
In contrast, the choice phase should be comparatively noise-free. For sim-
plicity, the second assumption postulates that choices follow the underlying
utilities. Write c(P, $) = P if the P -bet was chosen in the choice task and
c(P, $) = $ if the $-bet was chosen.
Assumption 2. c(P, $) = P whenever up > u$ and c(P, $) = $ whenever
up < u$.
The main element of our model relies on the compatibility hypothesis
(Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990).
It implies that, when pricing lotteries, it is likely that subjects focus their
attention on the salient monetary outcomes. Since the $-bet yields a large
outcome with moderate probability and the P -bet pays a moderate outcome
with high probability, subjects will tend to state a higher price for the $-bet.
This overpricing phenomenon can be captured by simply assuming a strictly
positive mean for the error term associated with the valuation of the $-bet.
Assumption 3. There is a tendency to overprice the $-bet, i.e. E[ζ$] = K >
0 but E[ζP ] = 0. Further, the densities of ζP and ζ$ are symmetric around
the means and unimodal.5
It is a well-established fact that decision times reﬂect preferences in the
sense that hard choices, where the decision maker is close to being indif-
ferent, results in longer decision times than easy choices, where one option
is clearly better (Wilcox, 1993; Shultz, Léveillé, and Lepper, 1999; Moﬀatt,
2005; Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, and Taubinsky, 2009; Sharot, De-
Martino, and Dolan, 2009; Alós-Ferrer, Granić, Shi, and Wagner, 2012). To
model this eﬀect in a simple way, we postulate that the choice time DTC only
4The second part of the assumption is for technical convenience. The analysis goes
through, with more cumbersome proofs, if the error terms have bounded support.
5A density function is unimodal with mode m if it is nondecreasing for all x < m and
nonincreasing for all x > m. For example, normally distributed error terms fulﬁll our
assumptions.
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depends on the utility diﬀerence |uP − u$|. To avoid unnecessarily compli-
cating the model, we make the simplifying assumption that decisions are of
two kinds, easy and hard. Easy decisions correspond to utility pairs (up, u$)
such that |uP − u$| ≥ δ for some δ > 0, while utility pairs (up, u$) with
|uP − u$| < δ lead to hard decisions. Denote by TE = E[DTC | |uP − u$| ≥ δ]
and TH = E[DTC | |uP −u$| < δ] the expected choice times for easy and hard
decisions, respectively. The next assumption captures the idea that choice
decisions in which a subject is close to indiﬀerence between two items are
harder than “obvious” choices.
Assumption 4. Hard choices take longer than easy choices, i.e. TH > TE.
Our assumptions are meant to reﬂect the basic principles involved in
preference reversal experiments without unnecessarily complicating the ex-
position and the analysis. Of course, one could postulate more involved
formulations, as e.g. a continuously monotonic relation between choice times
and closeness to indiﬀerence. The next section shows that the simple versions
postulated above are enough to provide testable hypotheses.
4.2.2 Predictions
In preference reversal experiments, results refer to a relatively large num-
ber of evaluation and choice decisions. Systematic biases are avoided, e.g.
by oﬀering choices between lotteries of similar expected values, or counter-
balancing the diﬀerence in expected values across pairs. Hence, to obtain
experimental hypotheses, it is reasonable to treat the utilities u$ and uP as
random variables. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the utilities of the lotteries in
an experiment are drawn from i.i.d. continuous random variables with some
ﬁxed distribution. Since, in our model, both choices and decision times are
assumed to depend on utility diﬀerences only, the analysis relies on the dis-
tribution of uP − u$. We assume that this distribution has an everywhere
positive density h.6
6Since uP and u$ are i.i.d, uP − u$ and u$ − uP have the same distribution. If the
distribution of uP and u$ has density v then h = (v ∗ v
−), where v−(s) = v(−s) for all s
and the symbol ∗ denotes the convolution operator.
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Our model makes four predictions which can be experimentally tested.
The ﬁrst one concerns a well-established observation in the literature, namely
that predicted reversals are more frequent than unpredicted ones.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3,
(i) there are more predicted than unpredicted preference reversals, i.e
Pr(CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ) > Pr(CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = $);
(ii) and the reversal rate is higher for predicted preference reversals than for
unpredicted preference reversals, i.e. Pr(CE$ > CEP |c(P, $) = P ) >
Pr(CEP > CE$|c(P, $) = $).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Both kinds of reversals re-
sult from noise in the evaluation phase shifting the evaluations of the lotteries
in opposite directions. A reversal occurs when, due to noisy realizations, the
evaluation ranking is reversed with respect to the one derived from utilities.
The overpricing phenomenon helps produce predicted reversals: initially, the
$-bet is ranked lower than the P -bet (u$ < uP ), but overpricing tends to
shift the valuation of the $-bet higher than that of the P -bet. Overpricing,
however, makes unpredicted reversals harder: the $-bet is initially ranked
higher and overpricing tends to increase its evaluation with respect to the
P -bet even more.
We can reformulate the predictions arising from the last proposition
straight away as experimental hypotheses.
H1a. The average number of predicted preference reversals per subject is
larger than the average number of unpredicted reversals.
H1b. The average rate of predicted reversals (i.e. percentage of reversals
over all P -choices) per subject is larger than the average rate of unpredicted
reversals (i.e. percentage of reversals over all $-choices).
These predictions ﬁt received evidence in the literature on preference
reversals, and are hence a ﬁrst validation of the model. We will, of course,
also test them with our own data. The added value of the model, however,
is given by the following, novel predictions, which concern decision times
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in the choice task. The ﬁrst refers to decision times in “conﬂict situations”
as compared to those in “non-conﬂict situations”, i.e. for choices leading to
preference reversals vs. choices not leading to preference reversals.
Proposition 2. Let DTC denote the decision time in the choice phase. Un-
der Assumptions 1, 2, and 4,
(i) the decision time for a P -bet leading to a preference reversal is longer
than the decision time for a P -bet that does not lead to a preference
reversal, i.e. E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ] > E[DTC |CEP >
CE$, c(P, $) = P ];
(ii) and the decision time for a $-bet leading to a preference reversal is
longer than the decision time for a $-bet that does not lead to a prefer-
ence reversal, i.e. E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = $] > E[DTC |CE$ >
CEP , c(P, $) = $].
The intuition for this result is again simple. Since the origin of reversals
lies in the noise arising in the evaluation process, it is clear that reversals
are more likely when utilities were close, and hence errors in the evaluation
phase are more likely to reverse the order of the lotteries. Decisions where
utilities are close are comparatively harder and hence take longer. In other
words, reversals are more likely to involve hard choices than non-reversals,
which leads to longer decision times.
This proposition translates into the following experimental hypotheses.
H2a. The average decision time for predicted preference reversals is longer
than the average decision time for comparable non-reversals (i.e. non-reversals
where the P -bet is chosen).
H2b. The average decision time for unpredicted preference reversals is
longer than the average decision time for comparable non-reversals (i.e. non-
reversals where the $-bet is chosen).
The next prediction is orthogonal to preference reversals. At the same
time, it represents an a priori unexpected feature of the model and is hence
especially valuable for its validation. It concerns decision times when the
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$-bet was chosen given that it was priced higher compared to decision times
when the P -bet was chosen given that it was priced higher.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the decision time for a $-
bet that does not lead to a preference reversal is longer than the decision time
for a P -bet that does not lead to a preference reversal, i.e. E[DTC |CE$ >
CEP , c(P, $) = $] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ].
This result seems less intuitive. On the one hand, under overpricing, it is
more likely that $-bets will be priced higher than P-bets than the other way
around. Hence, the probability that a hard (slow) $-bet-choice will result
in a non-reversal is larger than the probability that a hard P -bet-choice will
result in a non-reversal. On the other hand, an easy (fast) $-bet-choice is also
more likely to result in a non-reversal than an easy P -bet-choice. The reason
for this is that in the ﬁrst case u$ > up and overpricing pushes the evaluations
further apart, while in the second case u$ < up and overpricing pushes the
evaluations together. Proposition 3 holds because the relative likelihood for
a hard choice to lead to a non-reversal compared to the likelihood for an easy
choice to lead to a non-reversal is larger for $-bets than for P-bets.7
This result leads to our next experimental prediction.
H3. The average decision time for non-reversals where the $-bet is chosen
is longer than the average decision time for non-reversals where the P -bet is
chosen.
4.2.3 Order Effects and Preference Reappraisal
Preference-reversal experiments include a pricing/evaluation phase and a
choice phase. Up to date, the literature has remained silent on order ef-
fects, i.e. on whether there is any diﬀerence between experiments where the
choice phase precedes the evaluation phase, and experiments where the or-
der of the tasks is the opposite. Preference reversals have been established
in experiments using either of the two possible orderings.
7In particular, the arguments in the proof of this result hold only for non-reversals. No
analogous version of Proposition 3 for reversals can be established.
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We argue, however, that order eﬀects need to be taken into account. The
reason is that, as discussed above, imprecise preferences have been identiﬁed
as one of the factors driving preference reversals. If preferences are impre-
cise, a large literature in psychology indicates that they might become more
precise, or be generally altered, by the mere act of making choices. In the
classical Free-Choice Paradigm (Brehm, 1956), subjects ﬁrst face a rating
(ranking) task, then a choice task, and ﬁnally another rating (ranking) task
identical to the ﬁrst one. The chosen options are usually evaluated more pos-
itively in the second rating (ranking) task while the options that were not
chosen tend to be evaluated more negatively.8 According to Cognitive Dis-
sonance Theory (Festinger, 1957), this happens because in the reevaluation
phase subjects attempt to reduce the tension between the negative aspects
of a chosen option and the positive aspects of an option that was not chosen.
Self-Perception Theory (Bem, 1967), on the other hand, attributes this phe-
nomenon to the fact that subjects learn their preferences better by making
choices and hence ratings (rankings) in the second phase more closely re-
semble the “true preferences”. This raises the question of whether preference
reversals are aﬀected by the order of valuation and choices. More precisely, if
preference reappraisal occurs during the choice phase, there should be fewer
preference reversals if the valuation task follows the choice task. This yields
an additional hypothesis.
H4. Preference reversals are reduced if the valuation task follows the choice
task, compared to the opposite ordering.
More generally, and in view of the discussion above, our expectation was
that eﬀects would in general be more clear when considering post-choice
evaluations than when relying on pre-choice ones. For example, if one relies
on self-perception theory, classifying choices as reversals or non-reversals on
the basis of pre-choice evaluations will result in some false classiﬁcations,
eﬀectively adding more noise to all measurements. However, since preference
reversals have been established in the literature using both possible task
8Although this classical task has recently been shown to be aﬀected by statistical
biases, improved versions of the task have meanwhile re-established the basic eﬀect. See
e.g. Alós-Ferrer, Granić, Shi, and Wagner (2012).
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orderings, we expected order eﬀects to be subtle. The diﬀerence should be
more clear for unpredicted reversals, because, if those are purely due to noise,
any reduction of noise in the evaluation task should eliminate at least part
of them.
Finally, it should be noted that there is evidence from fMRI (Jarcho,
Berkman, and Lieberman, 2011) as well as response time studies (Alós-Ferrer,
Granić, Shi, and Wagner, 2012) indicating that preference reappraisal and
process conﬂict resolution in the Free-Choice Paradigm occur during the
choice phase. Incorporating this additional observation into our model would
not aﬀect our predictions, as discussed in the next subsection.
4.2.4 Process Conflict and Decision Times
In psychological terms, the compatibility hypothesis suggests that several
decision processes might be at work when choosing from a pair of lotteries.
Overpricing might result from a process focusing on monetary outcomes only,
which competes with a more global decision process that evaluates lotteries
by taking both outcomes and winning probabilities into account.
Taking the process view into account is important because this view deliv-
ers standard predictions regarding process data (speciﬁcally, decision times).
According to dual-process models from psychology (Schneider and Shiﬀrin,
1977; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Rottenstreich, Sood, and Brenner, 2007;
Evans, 2008; Weber and Johnson, 2009; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2013) de-
cision processes can be either automatic and fast, corresponding to quick
heuristics, or controlled and slow. In our interpretation, overpricing should
result from an automatic (impulsive) process, while a more global valuation
should be associated with a more cognitive, controlled process. The quick
“look-at-monetary-outcomes” process is more prevalent in the pricing task
and causes an overpricing of the $-bets. We hypothesize that this process is
also active in the choice task, but there it is often inhibited, which leads to
a choice causing a preference reversal.
A basic prediction of dual-process models is that inhibiting automatic
processes costs time and cognitive resources. More generally, conﬂict de-
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tection and resolution is time consuming, that is, decision times are longer
when several processes conﬂict than when processes are aligned. If reversals
result from an automatic process which aﬀects the pricing of lotteries but is
inhibited in the choice phase, preference reversals should be associated with
longer decision times in the choice phase.
This observation can be incorporated into our model by postulating that
decision times in the choice task, DT , are noisy and consist of two com-
ponents, choice time DTC and conﬂict resolution time DTR, i.e. DT =
DTC + DTR. The next assumption reﬂects the considerations above and
concerns conﬂict resolution time only.
Assumption 5. Conflict resolution is time-consuming, i.e. conflict resolu-
tion time is longer for a reversal than for a comparable non-reversal:
E[DTR|CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = $] > E[DTR|CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $] and
E[DTR|CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ] > E[DTR|CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ].
How does this assumption aﬀect our predictions? Hypotheses H1a and
H1b do not concern decision times and are hence unaﬀected. Hypothesis H3 is
equally unaﬀected since this prediction does not concern preference reversals.
The additional assumption aﬀects the interpretation of Hypotheses H2a and
H2b. Since total decision time is now viewed as the sum of choice time and
conﬂict resolution time, Proposition 2, which states that choice times are
longer for reversals than for non-reversals, does not directly translate into
experimental hypotheses anymore. However, by Assumption 5, also conﬂict
resolution time is on average larger for reversals. Hence, both eﬀects are
aligned and Hypotheses H2a and H2b still obtain.
4.3 Experiment 1: Preference Reversals and
Decision Times
The objective of our ﬁrst experiment was to test the predictions of the model
with regard to both choices and decision times. This would allow us to con-
clude that the combination of imprecise preferences in the evaluation phase
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and an overpricing phenomenon arising from the compatibility hypothesis is
able to explain received evidence on preference reversals while at the same
time ﬁtting novel evidence on process data.
4.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We followed a between-subject design comprised of three independent, con-
secutive single-decision making parts. The ﬁrst and third phases were evalu-
ation tasks, while the second, intermediate phase contained the choice task.
This way, we can consider two kinds of preference reversals. On the one hand,
we have “Price-Choice Reversals” which occur comparing the evaluations in
the ﬁrst phase and the choices in the second phase. On the other hand, we
have “Choice-Price Reversals” which occur comparing the evaluations in the
third phase and the choices in the second phase. Each of our Hypotheses
H1 to H3 can be tested either on Price-Choice or Choice-Price reversals (or
non-reversals), and we will report the results for both possibilities, keeping in
mind that we expect clearer results for the Choice-Price ordering. Comparing
both orderings allows us to test Hypothesis H4.
The stimuli were 40 diﬀerent lotteries, which are presented in Table 4.5
in Appendix 4.B. Each of the pairs in the choice task contained one P -bet
and one $-bet from this set of lotteries, with the former being deﬁned by
a high probability of winning a moderate amount of money and the latter
being deﬁned by a low probability of winning a high amount of money.9
We employed a pricing method for the evaluation of lotteries in phases
1 and 3. In these two pricing tasks participants were asked to state their
minimum selling price for each of the 40 lotteries which were presented se-
quentially in fully randomized order (“State the lowest price for which you
9Of the 20 lottery pairs, pairs 3 to 8 were such that the expected value of the P -bet was
higher than the expected value of the $-bet (with a diﬀerence between e1.00 to e3.40).
Pairs 9 to 14, which most closely resemble the ones commonly used in the literature, had
roughly equal expected values. In pairs 15 to 20, the $-bet had a higher expected value
than the P -bet (diﬀerence between e1.60 to e4.80). Finally, lottery pairs 1 and 2 were
such that one bet dominated the other strictly and were only included as a basic rationality
check. Only 2 out of 141 subjects chose one of the two strictly dominated lotteries in phase
2. These two lottery pairs are therefore excluded from the analysis.
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are just willing to sell the presented lottery.”). Subjects were only allowed to
state prices between e2 (the lower amount to win) and the higher amount
to win. An example screen display for the pricing tasks is shown in Figure
4.6(a) in Appendix 4.C. The colors in the pie charts (green and blue) were
counterbalanced across subjects. In phase two, the choice task, subjects faced
the 20 lottery pairs sequentially and had to choose the lottery they would
prefer to play out. See Figure 4.6(c) in Appendix 4.C for an example screen
of the choice task. The order of the pairs and the onscreen position of the
P -bet (i.e. left or right) was randomized. For each choice, we recorded the
individuals’ decision times as the time elapsed between the presentation of
the lottery pair and clicking the button (“This lottery”) underneath one of
the two lotteries.
After the three tasks, participants ﬁlled in a questionnaire containing var-
ious questions on their statistical knowledge, sociodemographic background,
and personality attitudes.
All three tasks were incentivized. Payoﬀs were determined independently
for each task after completion of the ex-post questionnaire to prevent spillover
eﬀects between tasks (e.g. through wealth eﬀects). The two treatments in
this experiment, BDM and OrdPM, diﬀered only in the payment scheme
used in the pricing tasks (phases 1 and 3). The former used a BDM payment
scheme (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964), and the latter a variant of
the Ordinal Payment Method (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Tversky, Slovic,
and Kahneman, 1990; Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer, 2004). We included
these two treatments to ensure that our results were robust with respect to
the elicitation method.
The two schemes determined the payment in an evaluation task as follows.
In the BDM treatment, after one of the 40 lotteries was picked at random the
computer drew a price from a uniform distribution over the interval ]2, A[,
where A denotes the higher of the two amounts to win. If this price was
higher than or equal to the price stated by the subject, the subject received
this amount. If it was lower, the subject played the lottery and the payment
was the realized outcome of that lottery. This was done separately for each
pricing task. In the OrdPM treatment, two lotteries were chosen at random.
137
Chapter 4
Preference Reversals: Time and Again
The more highly priced lottery of the two was then played out and the realized
outcome was the payoﬀ for this phase (in case of a tie, the computer chose
one at random). As in the BDM treatment, this procedure was conducted
separately for the two pricing phases. Note that under the ordinal payment
scheme, the absolute prices do not play a role, but only the induced ordering
matters.
The payment method for the choice task in phase 2 was identical in both
treatments. One of the 20 lottery pairs was picked at random, then the
lottery the subject had chosen from this pair was played out and the realized
outcome of that lottery was the payment for this round. The total payment
a participant received in the experiment was the sum of realized payoﬀs in
the three decision tasks.
4.3.2 Procedures
Before the experiment started, participants were brieﬂy informed that the
session consisted of three decision tasks, that payment for each task was
partly determined by their decisions and partly by luck, that the tasks were
paid independently of one another and that lotteries from each phase were
not played out before the end of the experiment. In addition, four control
questions had to be answered, using pencil and paper, before the start of the
experiment to ensure that participants understood the concept of a lottery
and its pie chart representation. Detailed instructions about each individual
decision-making task (phase 1 to 3) and how payments would be determined
in each phase were handed to the participants prior to the start of each phase.
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Par-
ticipants were university students with majors other than psychology and
economics. Each student participated in only one session. We conducted
7 sessions with a total of 141 participants (91 female). Of those, 67 were
allocated to the BDM treatment and 74 to the OrdPM treatment. A session
lasted about 2 hours with average earnings of e24.76 in the BDM treatment
and of e23.03 in the OrdPM treatment.
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Table 4.1: Preference reversal rates, Experiment 1.
Treatment Predicted Reversals Unpredicted Reversals
Price-Choice Choice-Price Price-Choice Choice-Price
BDM 48.75 47.20 18.80 8.99
OrdPM 40.96 35.47 17.69 11.14
Note: Predicted (resp. unpredicted) reversal rates computed as percentage of reversals
over all P -bet-choices (resp. $-bet-choices).
4.3.3 Results of Experiment 1
As a ﬁrst illustration, Table 4.1 contains the average reversal rates in the
BDM and the OrdPM treatments in Experiment 1. The rate of predicted
(unpredicted) reversals is computed as the number of predicted (unpredicted)
reversals divided by the number of P -bet choices ($-bet choices). Figure 4.1
further depicts the average number of preference reversals per participant for
both treatments. It is already apparent from Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 that
predicted reversals are more frequent than unpredicted reversals, that mea-
suring reversals with respect to post-choice attitudes reduces their quantity,
possibly by reducing noise, and that there might be some minor diﬀerences
between treatments. We now proceed to test for these observations and our
experimental hypotheses.
Predicted vs. unpredicted reversals (H1). We conducted two-sided Wil-
coxon Signed-Rank (hereafter WSR) tests to assess whether participants gen-
erated more predicted than unpredicted reversals. Tests were highly signif-
icant both for the BDM (Price-Choice, N = 67, z = 6.060, p < 0.0001;
Choice-Price, N = 67, z = 6.439, p < 0.0001) and the OrdPM treatments
(Price-Choice, N = 74, z = 6.177, p < 0.0001; Choice-Price, N = 74,
z = 5.770, p < 0.0001). This conﬁrms our Hypothesis H1a. To conﬁrm
Hypothesis H1b, we computed the predicted and unpredicted preference re-
versal rates for each subject individually as the percentage of P -bet/$-bet
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Figure 4.1: Average number of reversals per subject, Experiment 1.
Note: Reversals for the Price-Choice (dark bars) and Choice-Price (light bars) task order-
ings. Error bars depict the 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
choices (respectively) resulting in reversals. The rates for predicted rever-
sals were signiﬁcantly higher than the rates of unpredicted reversals for both
treatments and both possible task orderings (BDM Price-Choice, N = 60,
z = 4.170, p < 0.0001; BDM Choice-Price, N = 60, z = 5.140, p < 0.0001;
OrdPM Price-Choice, N = 69, z = 4.585, p < 0.0001; OrdPM Choice-Price,
N = 69, z = 3.595, p < 0.0005).10
Order effects (H4). In both treatments, there were signiﬁcantly fewer
unpredicted reversals when prices are elicited after choices (Choice-Price)
than when they are elicited before choices (Price-Choice) according to two-
sided WSR tests (BDM, N = 67, z = −3.487, p < 0.0005; OrdPM, N =
74, z = −2.858, p = 0.004). There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
number of predicted reversals, although there seems to be a trend towards
fewer predicted Choice-Price reversals in the OrdPM treatment (BDM, N =
67, z = −0.169, p = 0.865; OrdPM, N = 74, z = −1.526, p = 0.127).
Since unpredicted reversals are essentially due to noise, this is consistent with
the interpretation that measuring reversals through post-choice evaluations
reduces noise.
10The tests for reversal rates include of course only the participants for which both rates
can be computed. For instance, if a participant never chose a $-bet, no rate of unpredicted
reversals can be computed.
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Figure 4.2: Average decision time per individual in the choice task, Experiment 1.
Note: Predicted reversals are compared to non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen,
unpredicted reversals to non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen. Error bars depict the
95 percent conﬁdence interval.
Treatment effects (reversals). We compared the individual numbers of
reversals across treatments using Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests. We found
signiﬁcantly fewer predicted reversals in the OrdPM treatment than in the
BDM treatment, for both task orderings (Price-Choice, z = −2.101, p =
0.036; Choice-Price, z = −2.688, p = 0.007). There were, however, no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences for unpredicted reversals (Price-Choice, z = −0.735,
p = 0.462; Choice-Price, z = 1.067, p = 0.286).
Decision times and reversals (H2). Figure 4.2 displays the decision times
for reversals and comparable non-reversals for both treatments and both task
orderings. Each type of reversal is compared with the correct counterfactual,
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i.e. predicted reversals are compared with non-reversals where the P -bet was
chosen, and unpredicted reversals with non-reversals where the $-bet was
chosen.
Two-sided WSR tests conﬁrmed that predicted reversals involved signif-
icantly longer decision times than comparable non-reversals, both for Price-
Choice and for Choice-Price, both for the BDM (Price-Choice N = 61,
z = 2.758, p = 0.006; Choice-Price, N = 54, z = 3.625, p < 0.0005)
and the OrdPM treatments (Price-Choice, N = 66, z = 2.894, p = 0.004;
Choice-Price, N = 57, z = 2.987, p = 0.003).11 Unpredicted reversals were
also associated with signiﬁcantly longer decision times in the OrdPM treat-
ment (Price-Choice, N = 39, z = 2.854, p = 0.004; Choice-Price, N = 22,
z = 1.883, p = 0.060), but there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for unpre-
dicted reversals in the BDM treatment (Price-Choice, N = 31, z = 0.950,
p = 0.342; Choice-Price, N = 17, z = −0.947, p = 0.344).
Decision times and non-reversals (H3). Non-reversals were clearly slower
when the $-bet was chosen than when the P -bet was chosen. The diﬀer-
ence was highly signiﬁcant independently of whether choices were declared
non-reversals according to pre-choice or post-choice evaluations, for both the
BDM treatment (Price-Choice, N = 56, z = 3.242, p = 0.001; Choice-Price,
N = 51, z = 2.995, p = 0.003) and the OrdPM treatment (Price-Choice,
N = 64, z = −3.681, p < 0.0005; Choice-Price, N = 59, z = −3.204,
p = 0.001). The diﬀerences are illustrated in Figure 4.3.
4.3.4 Regression Analysis for Experiment 1
We also conducted a random eﬀects panel regression analysis (with stan-
dard errors clustered at the subject level) to further investigate the relation
between preference reversals and decision times, and to further test our hy-
potheses while controlling for a number of natural variables, e.g. individual
and lottery-pair covariates. Since decision times are always positive, we used
the log of decision times (logDT ) as the dependent variable. The main re-
11Every test on decision times was conducted for the population of subjects for which
the involved average decision times could be computed. For instance, if a subject did not
display any unpredicted reversal, no decision time can be computed for this category.
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Figure 4.3: Average non-reversal decision time per individual in the choice task,
Experiment 1.
Note: Choices classiﬁed as non-reversals according to the indicated task ordering, Price-
Choice (left) and Choice-Price (right). Error bars depict the 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
sults of these regressions are displayed in Table 4.2. For each treatment, we
report a regression including a dummy variable for Price-Choice reversals
and an analogous one with a dummy variable for Choice-Price reversals. We
also ran a number of additional regressions and found the main eﬀects to
be robust (in magnitude and signiﬁcance) to the inclusion or exclusion of
additional control variables.
The regressions include dummies for choices which were part of reversals,
for $-bet-choices, and the interaction thereof. Hence we can make any com-
parison among reversals and non-reversals where the $-bet or the P -bet was
chosen, either directly through speciﬁc regression coeﬃcients or via appro-
priate postestimation tests, which are also reported in the table.
Predicted reversals vs. non-reversals. Hypothesis H2a states that decision
times for predicted preference reversals should be longer on average than de-
cision times for comparable non-reversals, i.e. non-reversals where the P -bet
was chosen. Since a $-choice dummy is included, the comparison between
predicted reversals and non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen corresponds
to the reversal dummy in the regression, which is highly signiﬁcant and pos-
itive for both regressions for the OrdPM treatment, and for the Choice-Price
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Table 4.2: Random effects panel regressions for decision times, Experiment 1.
Treatment BDM BDM OrdPM OrdPM
Order P-C C-P P-C C-P
ReversalPC 0.018 0.078∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.025)
ReversalCP 0.083∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.027)
$-Choice 0.127∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026)
$-Choice -0.097 0.107∗∗
×ReversalPC (0.073) (0.052)
$-Choice -0.189∗∗ 0.058
×ReversalCP (0.095) (0.064)
DiﬀEV -0.023∗ -0.022∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Ratio 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
StatedDiﬀ-1 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
StatedDiﬀ-3 -0.010 -0.011∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Round -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.286∗∗ -0.290∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.151∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.072) (0.071)
Position 0.016 0.015 -0.012 -0.009
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
Color -0.021 -0.019 0.088 0.084
(0.111) (0.112) (0.070) (0.068)
Constant 2.666∗∗∗ 2.649∗∗∗ 2.563∗∗∗ 2.556∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.105) (0.073) (0.072)
Nr. Obs. 1340 1340 1480 1480
Nr. Groups 67 67 74 74
R2-Overall 0.103 0.101 0.118 0.119
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Postestimation tests
Reversal -0.079 -0.106 0.185∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
+($-Choice×Reversal) (0.072) (0.094) (0.045) (0.056)
Note: All regressions are random-eﬀects panel estimations, with log decision time as de-
pendent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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regression for the BDM treatment. This indicates that predicted reversals
took longer than comparable non-reversals, conﬁrming Hypothesis H2a.
Unpredicted reversals vs. non-reversals. Hypothesis H2b states that un-
predicted reversals should take longer than non-reversals where the $-bet
was chosen. The diﬀerence between both types of choices corresponds to
βReversal + β$−Choice×Reversal, which is highly signiﬁcant and positive in both
regressions for the OrdPM, conﬁrming Hypothesis 2b. However, the postes-
timation tests are not signiﬁcant for the BDM treatment.
Comparison of non-reversals. According to Hypothesis H3, non-reversals
where the $-bet was chosen should take longer than non-reversals where the
P -bet was chosen. Since reversals dummies are included, this comparison
corresponds to the $-choice dummy, which is highly signiﬁcant and positive
for all four regressions. Hence, conditional on the absence of a preference
reversal, $-bet-choices took longer, conﬁrming Hypothesis H3.
Controls: Lotteries. We included a number of covariates in order to con-
trol for diﬀerences in the lottery pairs. The ratio of the two higher amounts
to win in the $-bet and the P -bet (Ratio) had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in
both treatments. The absolute value of the diﬀerence in expected values of
the P -bet and the $-bet (DiﬀEV) had a weakly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in
both treatments. We further included the absolute diﬀerence in the prices
stated for the lotteries in phases one and three (StatedDiﬀ-1, StatedDiﬀ-3)
as a rough measure of how similar (or diﬀerent) the participant viewed the
lotteries within a pair. Both were highly signiﬁcant in the OrdPM treatment,
but essentially not signiﬁcant in the BDM treatment.
Other controls. Decision time measurements in repeated tasks usually
capture a learning eﬀect as participants gain familiarity with the interface.
We controlled for this eﬀect by including the round in which the choice
was made as a regressor (Round). This was signiﬁcantly positive in both
treatments. A dummy variable controlling for gender (Female) was also
signiﬁcant in both treatments. Finally, we controlled for onscreen position
(Position) of the P -bet and the $-bet and for the colors used in the pie-chart
(Color) to verify that these factors did not inﬂuence the results. As expected,
these variables never had signiﬁcant eﬀects.
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4.3.5 Discussion of Experiment 1
The analysis of the data conﬁrms our predictions as derived from the model
in Section 4.2. First, predicted reversals are clearly more frequent than un-
predicted ones, in agreement with previous experiments. Second, preference
reversals appear to involve longer decision times. This eﬀect is clear for an
ordinal-based elicitation of prices; in the BDM treatment, the eﬀect is also
present albeit less pronounced. Third, in both treatments we found that
$-bet-choices which are part of non-reversals take signiﬁcantly longer than
P -bet-choices part of non-reversals.
In view of the evidence, we conclude that the data is compatible with the
idea that preference reversals arise from the combination of two factors. First,
as pointed out by Schmidt and Hey (2004) and Butler and Loomes (2007),
monetary valuations of lotteries are typically imprecise, and hence preference
elicitation through pricing tasks is much noisier than actual choices. Second,
as summarized by the compatibility hypothesis (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic,
1988; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990), the use of pricing tasks causes
an overpricing phenomenon which anchors up the evaluation of bets where
a relatively high monetary outcome is salient. These observations produce
testable hypotheses for both choice data and decision times once we incor-
porate the observation that easier choices (where the alternatives are farther
away from indiﬀerence) take longer (e.g. Wilcox, 1993; Shultz, Léveillé, and
Lepper, 1999; Moﬀatt, 2005).
Regarding ordering eﬀects, we observe small but systematic diﬀerences
suggesting that a Price-Choice ordering, where the evaluation task precedes
actual choices, might be noisier than the opposite order, hence producing
both more reversals and slightly less clear eﬀects. This is compatible with
self-perception theory (Bem, 1967), which holds that actual choices serve as
“self-signals” which help reduce noise in future evaluations of alternatives.
Last, we observe small but deﬁnite treatment eﬀects, pointing out that
price evaluations conducted through the BDM “price-list” scheme might be
noisier than those conducted according to a more intuitive, ordinal-like scheme.
This is reﬂected by the fact that preference reversals (and especially unpre-
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dicted ones, which are presumably due to noise) are more frequent in the
BDM case. It is also compatible with the general observation that eﬀects are
often more clearly observed in the OrdPM treatment than in the BDM one.
4.4 Experiment 2: Eliminating Reversals
The objective of our second experiment was twofold. First, we wanted to
show that the overpricing phenomenon can be next to eliminated by using
ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks. Second, this manipulation would
allow us to disentangle the two building blocks of our model. The absence of
the overpricing phenomenon should result in a reduction of predicted pref-
erence reversals, while the assumption of imprecise preferences still delivers
predictions on decision times.
4.4.1 Motivation and Hypotheses
In our ﬁrst experiment we found that the method used to elicit participants’
minimum selling prices aﬀects the rate of preference reversals. According
to the compatibility hypothesis, predicted reversals appear because partici-
pants focus more on monetary outcomes when their preferences are elicited
through prices. Notably, preference reversals were also present in the OrdPM
treatment, where the use of prices in the evaluation task was simple framing,
with no direct monetary consequences. This raises the natural hypothesis
that the overpricing phenomenon predicted by the compatibility hypothesis
arises due to a price-based, cardinal framing (i.e., a “rating task”) in the eval-
uation phases. As a consequence, moving away from a cardinal evaluation
task towards a more natural, ordinal-based one (a “ranking task”) should
greatly reduce preference reversals.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that, by employing a ranking-based evaluation task,
we were able to shut down the decision process responsible for the overpric-
ing phenomenon. In terms of the model in Section 4.2, this would imply
K = 0 in Assumption 3. It is easy to revisit our theoretical predictions
and derive new experimental hypotheses for such a situation. First, Propo-
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sition 1 crucially depends on Assumption 3, and hence we would not expect
Hypotheses H1a/H1b to hold in this setting. Although from the point of
view of the model we would expect no diﬀerences in reversal rates, this rests
upon the implicit assumption that there is no other (second-order) latent
process causing unpredicted reversals. Even if this was the case, a conser-
vative hypothesis derived from our theoretical analysis is that the number
and frequency of predicted preference reversals should be greatly reduced in
comparison to treatments with price-framed evaluations.
H5. There will be fewer predicted preference reversals if ordinal, ranking-
based evaluation tasks are used than if rating-based tasks are used.
The ﬁrst decision-times predictions spelled out in Proposition 2, however,
do not depend on Assumption 3. Hence, independently of whether evaluation
tasks are based on ratings or rankings, we would expect Hypotheses H2a/b
to hold.
H6a/b. Even if ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks are used, choices
associated with predicted preference reversals take longer than P -bet-choices
associated with non-reversals, and choices associated with unpredicted pref-
erence reversals take longer than $-bet-choices associated with non-reversals.
Proposition 3 depends on Assumption 3. If K = 0, we would a priori ex-
pect no diﬀerences in the decision times associated with non-reversals where
the P -bet or the $-bet was chosen.
H7. If ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks are used, the average decision
time for non-reversals where the P -bet is chosen is not diﬀerent from the
average decision time for non-reversals where the $-bet is chosen.
4.4.2 Design of Experiment 2
The basic setup of our second experiment was almost identical to Experiment
1, with the exception that we used diﬀerent evaluation tasks. We used two
diﬀerent ranking-based tasks and one BDM task. The former were meant to
shut down the overpricing decision processes; the latter was intended as a
control treatment. In each of the three treatments, presentation of lotteries
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was such that participants faced a total of three blocks consisting each of
six lotteries, i.e. a total of 18 pairs.12 In the Rank-Unframed treatment, we
used a purely ranking-based task. Participants were asked to assign ranks
(from most preferred to least preferred) to the lotteries according to how
much they would like to play each lottery, separately for each block. Most
importantly, we did not make any reference to prices (see Figure 4.6(b) in
Appendix 4.C for an example screen display of the two ranking treatments).
In this sense, the task was unframed. The Rank-Framed treatment was identi-
cally programmed. The only diﬀerence was in the experimental instructions.
Participants were asked to rank the lotteries (from 1 to 6) according to their
minimum selling price, separately for each block. However, they were not
asked to type in or otherwise state the prices, but merely to think about
them and use them for the ranking. Finally, in the BDM2 treatment, par-
ticipants had to complete a pricing task that was identical to the one in the
BDM treatment in Experiment 1, with the only exception that (for compa-
rability with the other treatments) lotteries were presented one after another
in three blocks of six lotteries each. Again, colors and onscreen positions of
the lotteries were completely randomized in all treatments.
As in Experiment 1, all three tasks were incentivized and payoﬀs for
each task were determined independently. Payoﬀs for the evaluation task
of the BDM2 and the choice tasks of all three treatments were determined
in the same way as in Experiment 1. Payoﬀs for the evaluation phases for
Treatments Rank-Unframed and Rank-Framed were determined as follows.
First, the computer picked one of the six blocks at random. From the six
lotteries contained in that block, the computer again randomly picked two.
The one that had been ranked higher by the participant was then played out
and the participant received the outcome of that lottery as payment for that
round. In all three treatments, payments were determined and presented
to participants only after all three tasks had been completed. Since in both
ranking treatments there was no actual “pricing” task, we will refer to the two
possible task orderings for these treatments as “Rank-Choice” and “Choice-
Rank”.
12We only used 18 of the lottery pairs that had been used in Experiment 1 (pairs 3-20
in Table 4.5), excluding pairs 1 and 2 which contained stochastically dominated lotteries.
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4.4.3 Procedures
We followed the same procedures as in Experiment 1. We conducted 12
sessions with a total of 215 participants (102 female). Of those, 73 were allo-
cated to the Rank-Unframed treatment, 73 to the Rank-Framed treatment,
and 69 to the BDM2 treatment. Sessions in the Rank-Unframed treatment
lasted roughly an hour with average earnings of e23.36. Sessions in the
Rank-Framed treatment lasted one hour and 20 minutes with average earn-
ings of e24.07, while sessions in the BDM2 treatment lasted about 2 hours
with average earnings of e28.44.
4.4.4 Results of Experiment 2
Table 4.3 shows the average reversal rates for all three treatments for both
Price/Rank-Choice and Choice-Price/Rank reversals. As before, the per-
centage of predicted (unpredicted) reversals is computed as the number of
predicted (unpredicted) reversals divided by the number of P -bet choices ($-
bet choices). Figure 4.4 shows the average number of reversals per subject in
the three treatments. The basic trends are already apparent. Predicted re-
versals were enormously reduced in both ranking treatments, and especially
in the rank-unframed one, to the extent of dropping below the levels of un-
predicted reversals. Further, as in Experiment 1 we observe that measuring
reversals with respect to post-choice attitudes reduces their quantity.
BDM replication. The ﬁrst observation is that, as expected, there is no
qualitative diﬀerence between the results of Treatment BDM2 and Treatment
BDM of Experiment 1. For instance, in Treatment BDM2 the number of
predicted reversals is signiﬁcantly higher than the number of unpredicted
ones (WSR tests; Price-Choice, N = 69, z = 6.658, p < 0.0001; Choice-Price,
N = 69, z = 6.680, p < 0.0001). Likewise, the rates of predicted reversals
(relative to the number of P -bet-choices) are signiﬁcantly higher than the
rates of unpredicted reversals (relative to the number of $-bet-choices) (Price-
Choice, N = 68, z = 4.495, p < 0.0001; Choice-Price, z = 4.585, p < 0.0001).
Reduction of predicted reversals (H5). Kruskal-Wallis tests conﬁrmed that
the number of predicted reversals was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across treatments
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Table 4.3: Preference reversal rates, Experiment 2.
Treatment Predicted Reversals Unpredicted Reversals
Price-Choice Choice-Price Price-Choice Choice-Price
BDM 46.87 44.66 16.05 11.32
Rank-Framed 17.67 13.57 34.78 32.95
Rank-Unfr. 12.64 8.39 49.32 45.95
Note: Predicted (resp. unpredicted) reversal rates computed as percentage of reversals
over all P -bet-choices (resp. $-bet-choices).
(Price/Rank-Choice, χ2 = 71.304, df= 2, p < 0.0001; Choice-Price/Rank,
χ2 = 81.095, df= 2, p < 0.0001). To conﬁrm that the diﬀerences were
between the ranking treatments and the control BDM2 treatment, we con-
ducted two-sided MWU tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction to account
for multiple comparisons (p-values below are the adjusted values). Both
ranking treatments generated signiﬁcantly fewer predicted reversals than
the BDM2 treatment (Rank-Framed Price/Rank-Choice, z = −6.769, p <
0.0001; Rank-Framed Choice-Price/Rank, z = −7.040, p < 0.0001; Rank-
Unframed Price/Rank-Choice, z = −7.745, p < 0.0001; Rank-Unframed
Choice-Price/Rank, z = −8.210, p < 0.0001). The diﬀerence in the num-
ber of predicted reversals across both ranking treatments was not signiﬁ-
cant for the Rank-Choice ordering (z = −0.824, p = 0.410), but for the
Choice-Rank ordering there were signiﬁcantly fewer predicted reversals in the
Rank-Unframed treatment than in the Rank-Framed treatment (z = −2.248,
p = 0.025). This last result agrees with the idea that the Rank-Unframed
treatment goes one step further in the elimination of the overpricing process
than a ranking-based but still price-framed approach.
Order effects. As in Experiment 1, there were signiﬁcantly fewer un-
predicted reversals in the BDM2 treatment when prices were elicited after
choices than when they were elicited before choices (N = 69, z = −1.884,
p = 0.059), but no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for predicted reversals (N = 67,
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Figure 4.4: Average number of reversals per subject, Experiment 2.
Note: Reversals for the Price/Rank-Choice (dark bars) and Choice-Price/Rank (light bars)
task orderings. Error bars depict the 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
z = −0.470, p = 0.638). We found no diﬀerences in the Rank-Framed treat-
ment (unpredicted reversals, N = 73, z = −0.532, p = 0.595; predicted
reversals, N = 73, z = −1.154, p = 0.248). For the Rank-Unframed treat-
ment, we only found diﬀerences for predicted reversals (unpredicted reversals,
N = 73, z = −0.513, p = 0.608; predicted reversals, N = 73, z = −2.245,
p = 0.025).
Decision Times and Reversals (H2/H6). Figure 4.5 displays the decision
times for reversals and comparable non-reversals for all three treatments
and both task orderings, comparing each type of reversal with the appro-
priate non-reversals. Two-sided WSR tests conﬁrmed that predicted rever-
sals involved longer decision times than comparable non-reversals, both for
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Price/Rank-Choice and for Choice-Price/Rank, for all treatments. For both
ranking treatments, the diﬀerences were highly signiﬁcant (Rank-Framed
Rank-Choice, N = 42, z = 3.551, p < 0.0005; Rank-Framed Choice-Rank,
N = 45, z = 2.743, p = 0.006; Rank-Unframed Rank-Choice, N = 43,
z = 2.614, p = 0.009); Rank-Unframed Choice-Rank, N = 34, z = 3.163,
p = 0.002). This conﬁrms that the decision times eﬀect predicted by our
model, which is independent of the overpricing assumption, is still present
under ordinal (ranking) evaluation tasks. In the case of the BDM2 treat-
ment, the test missed signiﬁcance for the Price-Choice ordering (N = 64,
z = 1.595, p = 0.111), but the diﬀerence was signiﬁcant for Choice-Price
(N = 58, z = 3.004, p = 0.003).
For both ranking treatments unpredicted reversals were again signiﬁ-
cantly slower than comparable non-reversals independently of task ordering
(Rank-Framed Rank-Choice, N = 49, z = 2.875, p = 0.004; Rank-Framed
Choice-Rank, N = 45, z = 3.014, p = 0.003; Rank-Unframed Rank-Choice,
N = 49, z = 1.930, p = 0.054); Rank-Unframed Choice-Rank, N = 47,
z = 3.656, p < 0.0005). In the BDM2 treatment the decision time diﬀer-
ences were not signiﬁcant for the Price-Choice ordering (N = 30, z = 1.131,
p = 0.258), but unpredicted reversals were signiﬁcantly slower for the Choice-
Price ordering (N = 23, z = 1.992, p = 0.046).
Decision times and non-reversals (H3/H7). Treatment BDM2 success-
fully replicated the ﬁnding that non-reversals are slower when the $-bet is
chosen than when the P -bet is chosen, as predicted in Hypothesis H3 (WSR
tests; Price-Choice, N = 60, z = 1.984, p = 0.047; Choice-Price, N = 58,
z = 2.609, p = 0.009). However, for ranking treatments we expected no
diﬀerences (Hypothesis H7). There is still a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the
Rank-Choice ordering (Rank-Framed, N = 57, z = 1.835, p = 0.066; Rank-
Unframed, N = 54, z = 1.825, p = 0.068), but there is clearly no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence for the (presumably more appropriate) classiﬁcation according to
the Choice-Rank ordering (Rank-Framed, N = 55, z = 0.733, p = 0.463;
Rank-Unframed, N = 48, z = 0.385, p = 0.701). Figure 4.6 illustrates these
results.
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Figure 4.5: Average decision time per individual in the choice task, Experiment 2.
Note: Predicted reversals are compared to non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen,
unpredicted reversals to non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen. Error bars depict the
95 percent conﬁdence interval.
Decision times in the Rank-Unframed Treatment. As can be seen in Fig-
ures 4.5 and 4.6, all decisions in the Rank-Unframed treatment were signiﬁ-
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Figure 4.6: Average non-reversal decision time per individual in the choice task,
Experiment 2.
Note: Choices classiﬁed as non-reversals according to the indicated task ordering. Error
bars depict the 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
cantly quicker than in the other two treatments. The diﬀerence is substantial:
the median decision time over all choices was 13.41 s in BDM2, 12.52 s in
Rank-Framed, and only 9.61 s in Rank-Unframed. This diﬀerence is remark-
able, because the choice phases in which the decision times were measured
were completely identical across treatments; the diﬀerences across treatments
concerned only the evaluation phases. We will discuss this observation in de-
tail below.
A Kruskal-Wallis test conﬁrmed that the decision times were signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent across treatments (χ2 = 35.545, df= 2, p < 0.0001). Two-sided
MWU tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction to account for multiple com-
parisons showed that decisions were faster in the Rank-Unframed treatment
than in both of the other treatments (BDM2, z = −5.722, p < 0.0001;
Rank-Framed, z = −4.225, p < 0.0001).13
13The diﬀerence between decision times in Treatments Rank-Framed and BDM2 missed
signiﬁcance, z = −1.596, p = 0.111.
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4.4.5 Regression Analysis for Experiment 2
As for Experiment 1, we conducted a random eﬀects panel regression anal-
ysis on the log of decision times from Experiment 2. The objective was to
conﬁrm and clarify our results while controlling for natural individual and
lottery-pair characteristics; speciﬁcally, we included the same controls as in
Experiment 1.14 Table 4.4 contains the main results of all treatments. For
each treatment, in the ﬁrst regression reversals are classiﬁed as such according
to the Price/Rank-Choice task ordering, while in the second one the Choice-
Price/Rank is used. We present a single regression for each treatment and
task ordering, but the results are robust with respect to the control variables.
Predicted reversals vs. non-reversals. The reversal dummies were highly
signiﬁcant in all treatments and task orderings, except for the “noisiest”
Price-Choice in Treatment BDM2. This indicates that, as in Experiment
1, predicted reversals took longer than comparable non-reversals, conﬁrming
Hypothesis H2a.
Unpredicted reversals vs. non-reversals. Hypothesis H2b states that un-
predicted reversals should take longer than non-reversals where the $-bet was
chosen. The diﬀerence corresponds to βReversal + β$−Choice×Reversal, which is
indeed highly signiﬁcant and positive in all four regressions for the rank-
ing treatments. The postestimation tests are not signiﬁcant for the BDM2
treatment.
Comparison of non-reversals. The $-choice dummy is signiﬁcant and
positive for Treatment BDM2. That is, as in Experiment 1, non-reversals
where the $-bet was chosen took longer than non-reversals where the P -
bet was chosen in this treatment (Hypothesis H3). As stated in Hypothesis
H7, we expected this eﬀect to disappear for the purely ordinal, unframed
treatment Rank-Unframed. Indeed, the dummy is not signiﬁcant in any
of the regressions for this treatment. The prediction is less clear for the
“intermediate” treatment Rank-Framed, where the evaluation task was also
14For the two ranking treatments, StatedDiﬀ-1 and StatedDiﬀ-3 refer to the diﬀerence
in stated ranks between the two lotteries within a pair in phases 1 and 3, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Random effects panel regressions for decision times, Experiment 2.
Treatment BDM2 RankFramed RankUnframed
Order P-C C-P R-C C-R R-C C-R
ReversalPC 0.049 0.135∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.042) (0.044)
ReversalCP 0.100∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.043) (0.051)
$-Choice 0.072∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.030 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035)
$-Choice 0.026 0.014 0.014
×ReversalPC (0.069) (0.062) (0.061)
$-Choice 0.011 0.039 0.008
×ReversalCP (0.077) (0.064) (0.067)
DiﬀEV -0.022∗∗ -0.020∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.013 -0.008
(0.031) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Ratio 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
StatedDiﬀ-1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.011 -0.014 -0.024∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
StatedDiﬀ-3 -0.003 -0.005 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Round -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.190∗∗ -0.181∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗ -0.212∗∗
(0.089) (0.087) (0.077) (0.077) (0.087) (0.085)
Position 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.030 0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Color 0.108 0.112 0.088 0.085 -0.034 -0.040
(0.087) (0.086) (0.077) (0.077) (0.085) (0.083)
Constant 2.624∗∗∗ 2.595∗∗∗ 2.649∗∗∗ 2.645 2.391∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.094) (0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088)
Nr. Obs. 1242 1244 1314 1314 1314 1314
Nr. Groups 69 69 73 73 73 73
R2-Overall 0.066 0.069 0.128 0.140 0.104 0.122
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Postestimation tests
Reversal 0.075 0.111 0.149∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
+($-Ch×Rev) (0.060) (0.068) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.041)
Note: All regressions are random-eﬀects panel estimations, with log decision time as de-
pendent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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ordinal but there was an indirect framing in terms of prices.15 For this
treatment, the $-choice was signiﬁcantly positive, but e.g. only at the 10%
level for the Choice-Rank ordering.
Controls: Lotteries. As in Experiment 1, the ratio of the two higher
amounts to win in the $-bet and the P -bet (Ratio) had a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect throughout. Likewise, the absolute diﬀerence in expected values of
the P -bet and the $-bet (DiﬀEV) had a weakly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect,
but not in the Rank-Unframed treatment. The absolute diﬀerence in the
prices/ranks stated for the lotteries in phases one and three (StatedDiﬀ-1,
StatedDiﬀ-3) was signiﬁcant for Rank-Unframed but not for BDM2 (and only
the second measure was signiﬁcant for Rank-Framed).
Other controls. As in Experiment 1, we controlled for learning and fa-
miliarity eﬀects by including the round in which the choice was made as a
regressor. Also as in Experiment 1, female participants were signiﬁcantly
quicker in all treatments and task orderings. The onscreen position (Posi-
tion) of the P -bet and the $-bet and the colors used in the pie-chart (Color)
had, as expected, no eﬀect.
4.4.6 Discussion of Experiment 2
The analysis of the data conﬁrms our predictions, strengthening our inter-
pretation that preference reversals arise from the combination of noisy evalu-
ations and an overpricing phenomenon. The almost-complete disappearance
of predicted reversals in the ranking treatments (especially when ordinally
framed) conﬁrms that the overpricing phenomenon appears due to the cardi-
nal, rating-based frame used in standard evaluation tasks as those employed
in Experiment 1. The fact that reversals are still associated with longer
decision times (a prediction our model derives from noisy evaluations) even
though the overpricing process has been impaired is further evidence that
both noisy evaluations and the overpricing phenomenon need to be taken
into account as diﬀerent ingredients in order to model preference reversals.
15We consider the framing “indirect” because, contrary to the tasks in Experiment 1 or
Treatment BDM2, participants did not actually write down prices.
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An important observation is that decision times in Treatment Rank-
Unframed were signiﬁcantly lower than those in other treatments. To under-
stand this eﬀect, recall our dual-process interpretation as sketched in Section
4.2.4. In this treatment, we removed all references to prices, and it is easy to
argue that the decision process which usually causes overpricing was simply
not activated at all. Hence, in the choice phase there was no process con-
ﬂict, and no additional time was spent in conﬂict resolution. It is especially
interesting to observe that in the Treatment Rank-Framed, where the evalu-
ation task was also ordinal but the frame made a reference to prices, decision
times were closer to those of the rating treatments, even though predicted
reversals were also greatly reduced. Again, the interpretation is simple. The
price frame generally activated the process behind overpricing, but the fact
that the task was ultimately a purely ordinal one made it less likely that this
process actually shaped the decision in the evaluation tasks, hence reducing
reversals. However, since the process had been activated, it needed to be
inhibited in the choice phase, causing longer decision times.
Our results are consistent with evidence from Bateman, Day, Loomes,
and Sugden (2007). These authors also observed a reduction in predicted
preference reversal rates in an experiment where lotteries were ranked within
sets which also contained sure amounts. Their ranking task is not directly
comparable to ours because $-bets and P -bets were ranked separately, i.e.
within diﬀerent sets, and the ranks of P -bets relative to $-bets were inferred
indirectly. Oliver (2013) used a similar method for the measurement of pref-
erences in the health domain (life expectancy).
Our main object of study have been predicted preference reversals, since
they are empirically more relevant and the compatibility hypothesis points
to an overpricing phenomenon as a reason for the predominance of these
reversals, while the origin of unpredicted ones might be just noisy evalua-
tions. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that the number and rate of
unpredicted reversals increased in the ranking treatments with respect to the
control (BDM2) treatment. We hypothesize that, when the cues on which
the overpricing process acts are removed, attention is diverted to probabili-
ties instead. Following the compatibility hypothesis, this would result in an
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over-evaluation of P-bets, for which a high probability is salient. However,
this process is weaker than the one causing overpricing of $-bets with pricing
frames, simply because monetary rewards are a more immediately accessible
concept than probabilities. Thus, in a standard preference-reversal study,
this second, probability-based process is overshadowed by the overpricing
of $-bets. Our evidence in this respect is consistent with Cubitt, Munro,
and Starmer (2004), where the rate of unpredicted reversals increased when
subjects were asked for “probabilistic valuations” instead of prices, trying to
induce a probability anchor and shift the predictions of the compatibility hy-
pothesis to unpredicted, rather than predicted reversals. However, the rates
of predicted reversals remained relatively high, suggesting that such valuation
tasks, being still cardinal, do not completely remove the salience of mone-
tary outcomes.16 Casey (1991, 1994) observed a higher rate of unpredicted
reversals compared to predicted ones using very high payoﬀs and maximum
buying prices (rather than minimum selling prices). Again, however, pre-
dicted reversal rates remained comparatively high. Casey (1994) argues that
high stakes might induce buyers to anchor on the smallest monetary outcome
of a lottery, adjusting the valuation upwards on the basis of probabilities, and
hence resulting in an overpricing of P-bets. In our terms, the setting of Casey
(1991, 1994) might correspond to a combination of elements enhancing the
second process mentioned above. If such a second process is assumed, the in-
crease of unpredicted reversals in our ranking treatments, in Cubitt, Munro,
and Starmer (2004), and in Casey (1991, 1994) can be easily explained within
our model.
Last, we observe order eﬀects similar to those already seen in Experiment
1, again supporting our view that post-choice elicitation tasks carry less
noise than pre-choice analogues, possibly due to “preference sharpening” or
reappraisal in the sense of self-perception theory.
16Participants were asked for the probability p making them indiﬀerent between a given
lottery and receiving a ﬁxed, high monetary outcome X with probability p. Hence mone-
tary outcomes remained an important part of the frame.
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4.5 General Discussion and Conclusion
We propose a simple, parsimonious model which predicts both preference
reversals and a clear pattern of decision times in choices among lotteries.
We conducted two experiments which conﬁrm the predictions derived from
the model. The consideration of decision times allows us to put our model
to a more stringent test than if we had relied exclusively on choice data.
At the same time, the insights provided by the analysis of decision times
allow us to deepen our understanding of the actual decision processes behind
preference reversals. Our model, which is based on insights from the previous
literature, postulates that reversals arise due to the interaction of noise in the
evaluation phases and a psychological process (or set thereof) which causes an
overpricing phenomenon of lotteries with a salient monetary outcome. In our
second experiment, we have been able to eﬀectively shut down that process,
resulting in the practical elimination of predicted preference reversals and a
notable reduction of decision times.
Our experimental design also allowed us to evaluate diﬀerent experimen-
tal possibilities with regard to the amount of noise they induce. By using two
evaluation phases, one pre-choice and one post-choice, we are able to con-
clude that post-choice evaluation tasks are in general more appropriate for
preference elicitation, in accordance with evidence on preference reappraisal
from psychology. By using diﬀerent evaluation tasks across treatments, we
conclude that tasks based on the BDM procedure might add additional, un-
wanted noise and other tasks, as e.g. the Ordinal Payment Method, might
be more accurate. Finally, if one is interested in preferences rather than
certainty equivalents, our second experiment shows that the most accurate
evaluation method (in the sense of inducing fewer reversals) is to rely on
purely ordinal, ranking-based tasks.
Our research investigated (theoretically and experimentally) the mecha-
nisms and processes behind the preference reversal phenomenon. Previous
research (see e.g. Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer, 2004) has pointed out that a
combination of psychological mechanisms might be the simplest explanation
of the phenomenon. Given the fundamental importance of preference (and
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consumer demand) elicitation methods for both decision theory and applied
economics, and the amount of attention dedicated to the preference rever-
sal phenomenon in the last half century, we believe that ﬂeshing out these
mechanisms is an important step. At the same time, we show that a sim-
ple parsimonious model can account for received evidence and provide new,
testable hypotheses. By using process data (decision times), we are able to
show that our model is more than an as if construction and, in spite of its
simplicity, is able to capture the essential features of the actual mechanisms
behind the phenomenon.
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Appendix 4.A: Proofs
Throughout the appendix, let ∆ζ = ζP − ζ$ +K. Under Assumption 3, ζP
and ζ$ are i.i.d. and unimodal, implying that ∆ζ is symmetrically distributed
around 0 and unimodal (cf. Purkayastha, 1998, Theorem 2.1).
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Since K > 0 by Assumption 3, Pr(∆ζ < −K −
s) < Pr(∆ζ < K − s) for all s ∈ [0,∞[ and the conclusion follows from the
following computations.
Pr(CE$ > CEP , C(P, $) = P )
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ = s)h(s)ds =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(∆ζ < K − s)h(s)ds
Pr(CEP > CE$, C(P, $) = $) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(CEP > CE$|u$ − uP = s)h(s)ds
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr(∆ζ > K + s)h(s)ds =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(∆ζ < −K − s)h(s)ds.
(ii) Note that Pr(CE$ > CEP |c(P, $) = P ) =
Pr(CE$>CEP ,c(P,$)=P )
Pr(uP>u$)
, and
Pr(CEP > CE$|c(P, $) = $) =
Pr(CEP>CE$,c(P,$)=$)
Pr(u$>uP )
. Since Pr(uP > u$) =
Pr(u$ > uP ), the conclusion follows from (i).
The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma A.1. Under Assumption 1, the following hold.
(i) Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 < uP − u$ < δ) > Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ > δ).
(ii) Pr(CEP > CE$|0 < u$ − uP < δ) > Pr(CEP > CE$|u$ − uP > δ).
Proof. We prove part (i). The proof of part (ii) is analogous. We have
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Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ = s) = Pr(∆ζ < K − s) and
Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 < uP − u$ < δ)
=
1
Pr(0 < uP − u$ < δ)
∫ δ
0
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ = s)h(s)ds
>
1
Pr(0 < uP − u$ < δ)
∫ δ
0
Pr(∆ζ < K − δ)h(s)ds = Pr(∆ζ < K − δ).
Similarly Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ = s) = Pr(∆ζ < K − s) and
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ > δ)
=
1
Pr(uP − u$ > δ)
∫ ∞
δ
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ = s)h(s)ds
<
1
Pr(uP − u$ > δ)
∫ ∞
δ
Pr(∆ζ < K − δ)h(s)ds = Pr(∆ζ < K − δ)
and the conclusion follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) To shorten notation let∆0 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 <
uP − u$ < δ), ∆1 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP − u$ > δ), P
δ = Pr(0 < uP − u$ <
δ|0 < uP − u$), and P = Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP > u$).
With these deﬁnitions, P = ∆0P
δ+∆1(1−P
δ). We obtain E[DTC |CE$ >
CEP , c(P, $) = P ] =
1
P
[∆0P
δTH + ∆1(1 − P
δ)TE ], and E[DTC |CEP >
CE$, c(P, $) = P ] =
1
1−P
[(1 − ∆0)P
δTH + (1 − ∆1)(1 − P
δ)TE ]. A simple
calculation shows that
E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ]
⇔ P δTH [∆0 − P ] > (1− P
δ)TE [P −∆1]
As P = ∆0P
δ + ∆1(1 − P
δ), we obtain ∆0 − P = (1 − P
δ)(∆0 − ∆1)
and P − ∆1 = P
δ(∆0 − ∆1). Hence E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ] >
E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ] holds if and only if TH(∆0 − ∆1) >
TE(∆0 −∆1). By Lemma A.1(i), ∆0 > ∆1 and hence the inequality holds if
and only if TH > TE , which is true by Assumption 4.
(ii) is analogous to (i), using part (ii) of Lemma A.1 instead of (i).
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The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma A.2. Pr(0 < uP − u$ < δ|0 < uP − u$) = Pr(0 < u$ − uP < δ|0 <
u$ − uP ).
Proof. First note that since uP and u$ are i.i.d, uP − u$ and u$ − uP are
identically distributed and Pr(u$−uP > 0) = Pr(u$−uP < 0) = 1/2. Then
Pr(0 < u$−uP < δ|0 < u$−uP ) =
Pr(0<u$−uP<δ)
Pr(u$>uP )
= Pr(0<uP−u$<δ)
Pr(uP>u$)
= Pr(0 <
uP − u$ < δ|0 < uP − u$).
Proof of Proposition 3. To shorten notation let ∆0 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 <
u$−uP < δ), ∆1 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |u$−uP > δ), ∆2 = Pr(CEP > CE$|0 <
uP−u$ < δ), ∆3 = Pr(CEP > CE$|uP−u$ > δ), P1 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |u$ >
uP ), P2 = Pr(CEP > CE$|uP > u$). Let also P
δ be the probability given in
Lemma A.2.
With these deﬁnitions, we have that P1 = ∆0P
δ +∆1(1 − P
δ) and P2 =
∆2P
δ +∆3(1− P
δ).
We obtain E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $] =
1
P1
[∆0P
δTH + ∆1(1 −
P δ)TE] and E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ] =
1
P2
[∆2P
δTH+∆3(1−P
δ)TE ].
This yields.
E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ]
⇔ P δ(1− P δ)TH [∆0∆3 −∆1∆2] > (1− P
δ)P δTE[∆0∆3 −∆1∆2]
Since TH > TE by Assumption 4, the claim holds if ∆1∆2 < ∆0∆3. The rest
of the proof is devoted to establish this fact. For this, we rely on ideas taken
from Wijsman (1985).
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First, note that
∆0 =
1
Pr(0 < u$ − uP < δ)
∫ δ
0
Pr(∆ζ < K + s)h(s)ds,
∆1 =
1
Pr(u$ − uP > δ)
∫ ∞
δ
Pr(∆ζ < K + s)h(s)ds,
∆2 =
1
Pr(0 < up − u$ < δ)
∫ δ
0
Pr(∆ζ < −K + s)h(s)ds, and
∆3 =
1
Pr(uP − u$ > δ)
∫ ∞
δ
Pr(∆ζ < −K + s)h(s)ds.
Now let f1(s) := Pr(∆ζ < K + s), f2(s) = Pr(∆ζ < −K + s),
g1(s) =

h(s) if s ∈]δ,∞[,0 otherwise, and g2(s) =

h(s) if s ∈ [0, δ],0 otherwise.
As u$ and uP are i.i.d Pr(0 < u$ − uP < δ) = Pr(0 < uP − u$ < δ) and
Pr(u$ − uP > δ) = Pr(uP − u$ > δ) and hence showing that ∆1∆2 < ∆0∆3
boils down to showing that
∫ ∞
0
f1(s)g1(s)ds
∫ ∞
0
f2(s)g2(s)ds <
∫ ∞
0
f2(s)g1(s)ds
∫ ∞
0
f1(s)g2(s)ds.
To see that this is true note that
2
(∫ ∞
0
f1(s)g1(s)ds
∫ ∞
0
f2(s)g2(s)ds−
∫ ∞
0
f2(s)g1(s)ds
∫ ∞
0
f1(s)g2(s)ds
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
F (x, y)G(x, y)dxdy,
where F (x, y) = f1(x)f2(y)−f1(y)f2(x) andG(x, y) = g1(x)g2(y)−g1(y)g2(x).
Further,
(
f1
f2
)′
(s) =
q(K + s)Pr(∆ζ < −K + s)− Pr(∆ζ < K + s)q(−K + s)
(Pr(∆ζ < −K + s))2
,
where q is the density of ∆ζ . Then (f1
f2
)′(s) < 0 since 0 < q(K + s) ≤
q(−K + s) and Pr(∆ζ < −K + s) < Pr(∆ζ < K + s) by Assumptions 3
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and 3.17 Thus f1
f2
is strictly decreasing and hence F (x, y) > 0 if x < y and
F (x, y) < 0 if y < x (of course, F (x, y) = 0 if x = y). By construction
G(x, y) > 0 if (x, y) ∈]δ,∞[×[0, δ], G(x, y) < 0 if (x, y) ∈ [0, δ]×]δ,∞[, and
G(x, y) = 0 otherwise. Hence F (x, y)G(x, y) ≤ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ R+×R+ and
F (x, y)G(x, y) < 0 for all (x, y) ∈]δ,∞[×[0, δ] ∪ [0, δ]×]δ,∞[. This implies
that
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
F (x, y)G(x, y)dxdy < 0 which proves the claim.
17The fact that q(K+s) ≤ q(−K+s) follows by unimodality. If s ≥ K then q(−K+s) ≤
q(K + s) since q is nonincreasing in the positive domain. If s < K then q(−K + s) >
q(−K − s) = q(K + s) since q is nondecreasing in the negative domain and symmetric.
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Appendix 4.B: Lotteries
Table 4.5: The lottery pairs.
Lottery P-bet $-bet
pair Prob Outc EV StdDev Prob Outc EV StdDev
1 0.44 7 4.20 3.536 0.36 7 3.80 3.536
2 0.40 8 4.40 4.243 0.40 7 4.00 3.536
3 0.82 11 9.38 6.364 0.10 48 6.60 32.527
4 0.94 9 8.58 4.950 0.20 30 7.60 19.799
5 0.80 11 9.20 6.364 0.20 24 6.40 15.556
6 0.90 10 9.20 5.657 0.30 22 8.00 14.142
7 0.60 15 9.80 9.192 0.21 23 6.41 14.849
8 0.80 10 8.40 5.656 0.40 15 7.20 9.192
9 0.89 6 5.56 2.828 0.11 36 5.74 24.042
10 0.81 6 5.24 2.828 0.19 18 5.04 11.314
11 0.97 12 11.70 7.071 0.31 34 11.92 22.627
12 0.94 8 7.64 4.242 0.39 16 7.46 9.899
13 0.82 9 7.74 4.243 0.50 13 7.50 7.778
14 0.87 7 6.35 3.536 0.50 11 6.50 6.364
15 0.68 7 5.40 2.828 0.20 25 6.60 16.971
16 0.79 8 6.74 2.828 0.30 24 8.60 15.556
17 0.80 6 5.20 2.828 0.40 18 8.40 11.314
18 0.90 6 5.60 2.828 0.30 18 6.80 11.314
19 0.60 9 6.20 4.950 0.45 17 8.75 10.607
20 0.60 10 6.80 5.657 0.40 16 7.60 9.899
Note: All lotteries pay an amount of e2 with the corresponding converse probabilities.
The table shows for each P -bet and $-bet within a pair the probability with which the
outcome occurs, the expected value and the standard deviation. Lottery pairs 1 and 2,
containing strictly dominated bets, were only used in Experiment 1 as a basic rationality
check.
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Appendix 4.C: Screenshots
(a) Pricing phase (Experiment 1)
(b) Ranking phase (Experiment 2)
(c) Choice phase (Experiments 1 and 2)
Figure 4.7: Screen displays.
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